Let Us Help Him Who Did So Human a Thing

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Friedrich Nietzsche stated that at some point a society will question its actions toward criminals in the following manner: "Is it not enough to render him undangerous? Why still punish?"[1] These questions, for me have many implications but the most important one may be expressed as a simple restatement of them in the form of another question. That question is: Can we justify vindictive punishment? In Plato's Gorgias we find a conversation that explores this question.

That conversation is, for the most part, between Callicles and Socrates. Each of these men hold different opinions as to what should be done to an individual who transgresses against the state. The view of Callicles is that there is such a thing as vindictive punishment and that it is justifiable. His personal view is not a very complicated one, it mainly says that he who has power has the right to use it to punish. There are, however, many justifications for punishment most of which are more complicated. These complications usually have to do with arguing that there is a moral order in the world that demands punishment as a redress of moral order. Some of the most notable justifications for this view come from writers such as Kant, Luther and Hegel. It is not my purpose to discuss their arguments but rather to suggest to the reader and myself that when we next hear their arguments that we consider whether or not those opinions may be at base as simple and unjustifiable as the argument Callicles puts forth. I plan to deal with these more complicated views only in so far as Socrates justifies vindictive punishment and I hope to show that his reasons are unjustifiable.

Socrates, for the most part, sides with those who wish to render the criminal undangerous. He does this and more; he also says that one must attempt to order the criminals soul. I agree with this and hope to show how this might be done.

These problems will be dealt with in three parts. The first of which will explore the individuals relationship to the world outside the state and his relationship to the state. From this it will be concluded that our view of punishment and its ends are at bottom based on whether or not we see the political realm as one in which power, used towards vindictive ends, prevails or one in which authority is used to order the criminals soul. The second part will attempt to show how rhetoric is the tool of those who believe in a state based on the former of these two uses of power. That is, it will show how rhetoric allows one to use punishment for arbitrary ends. The last part will offer a solution to the state's problem of dealing with the criminal.

My investigation starts by looking at Plato's Gorgias. Near the end Socrates discusses with Callicles whether or not pleasure equals good and pain, evil. The discussion begins when Socrates asks: "…is there no need for him to [man] to govern himself but only to govern others?"[2] The commentary on this will give a working definition of what I see Plato's view of two man's most basic relationship to be. These relationships are: his relationship to nature, i.e. the physical world, and the political order.

An understanding of the former relationship follows from the above quotation. In the ensuing conversation Socrates wants to show Callicles that before he can rule anyone he must rule himself whereas Callicles takes for granted that he is ready to rule.

For Callicles "Luxury and intemperance and license, when they have sufficient backing are virtue and happiness…"[3] The reply to this is that the relationship between body and soul is such that bodily pleasure cannot be taken in and by itself. For Socrates man does not have a soul that is like a jar badly needing repair, a fact which necessitates its owner working day and night to keep it full. Callicles on the other hand does see it as

such because it is only when we see ourselves having such a soul that we can achieve happiness.[4] Happiness for Callicles is having the power to indulge in bodily pleasure at anytime and only through a taking in and giving out is a physical operation, and so Socrates argues: "…when a body is sick and distempered…giving it abundant food and the most delicious drinks…far from profiting it, will…if the truth be told, do it more harm."[5] To this Callicles must agree but in so doing he is also forced to agree that the soul "…so long as it is evil, senseless and undisciplined and unjust and impious, it should be restrained from its desired and suffered to do nothing but what will improve it."[6]

So if only for the most practical reasons man must discipline himself. Sickness and death point to an order that all men must be attentive to. They point to an order which man has no control, yet one which encompasses him. Our responses to nature can give us an efficient means of feeding and sheltering ourselves but can never do away with the needs themselves. Callicles is reduced to being absurd or resorting to anger because he is in a sense proposing that we can, through our will, do away with the need to be attentive to the simple physical order of things. He agrees that through will one may be free from slavery to anything and anyone including oneself.

If we agree that such an argument is absurd, then Socrates' argument can be taken as an explication of the first problem that was to be dealt with, namely, mans relationship to the physical order of things. This is summarized in the statement that pleasure is not always good and pain not always evil. The ill man must suffer pain in denying himself a pleasant yet presently harmful diet in order to survive and enjoy the diet upon recovery.

Now before turning to punishment the second relationship that was to be dealt with must be considered, that is, the individuals relationship to the state. Our attitude

toward punishment is based on one of the three following opinions about this relationship: (1) that it is based in tyrannical power, or (2) in a belief that the state has priority over the individual, or (3) it is based in the belief that the individual is somehow on equal footing with the state. It is not the genesis of this relationship that I am concerned with. Those concerns belong to Hobbes and Rousseau. I am concerned rather with what the state should do, given an individual who has violated a law. An example of such a situation is given in The Antigone. Antigone believes that the Gods have given her the right to go against a law of state. She feels that she is in some way equal to the state in matters of morality. On the other hand Creon is an example of the first two opinions mentioned above. He is at times the tyrant who uses sheer force and at times sees himself as simply the administrator and defender of the state against the law breaking individual.

Plato gave us the bare bones of what is involved in the situation set forth in The Antigone in the conversation between Plato and Socrates. They address themselves to this most basic relationship between the individual and the state. The conversation begins when Polus says that he wishes "to be at liberty to…kill, to exile, and to follow his own pleasures in every act."[7] We have heard this already in so many words from Callicles but now it is not only the satisfaction of his own bodily desires that he wants fulfilled but also his political desires. He is no longer merely dealing with the demands of his physical nature but with other men and with a state.

Socrates' means of exploring Polus' view is by using the example of a man with a dagger who can kill at will in the market place.[8] Though this example follows immediately after the above quotation. Polus nevertheless says the man should be

punished (and remember also that for Polus punishment is evil). Why must he be punished?

This is made clear when Socrates asks if it is more shameful to do or to suffer wrong.[9] To this Polus answers that it is more shameful to do wrong. At first this answer is as confusing as his saying that the man deserves punishment. It seems that it would be more shameful to suffer wrong for if one suffers does not that mean that he is weak and therefore in a shameful condition? I think Polus would agree but in this case he is seeing the question from the point of view of 'public opinion.' That is he as tyrant must hold the common tenets about good and evil as the basis for people's actions, though for himself power is the only rule. So it is from the common point of view that to do wrong is more shameful and consequently the man with the dagger must be punished. Concerning his own actions Polus would accept Socrates statement: "…[that] if his [the tyrant's] action is accompanied by advantage, it is a good thing and this apparently is the meaning of great power, but otherwise, it is an evil thing and implies small power…"[10]

Now just as the significant aspect of the relationship between the individual and the non-political world was that nature demanded certain responses of man; so too, there is an undeniable relationship between man and the state before we are aware of it. Both Callicles and Socrates have a particular view of what the characteristics of that relationship are. One sees it as a question of tyrannical power the other of a principled use of power. Which of them is right will be dealt with in a moment. The point to be made now is that by nature the state has a transcendent quality to it. It is something we have to respect very much as we have to deal with our physical nature. It is there before us. We must react to it and it is there to act on us.

If these relationships are an unavoidable given then they can suggest to us something about the nature of punishment. In the first case when the individual acts improperly with respect to the physical world there is a natural punishment that I will call punishment by reciprocity. Nature is a harsh judge and if we do not obey her, we suffer in proportion to our transgression, what happens when someone injures the state? Is it so clear that there are natural consequences? Or is it on the other hand clear that all is convention? I think that there is an element of convention in the way punishment is carried out, but this is not to say that there are no underlying principles to be found and used to decide what conventions a state should use. The type of conventions that are going to be used is based on whether we see the world as Polus and Callicles do or as Socrates does.

We must remember, however, that those who would side with Callicles and Polus are a very mixed group. There are those like Callicles who see punishment as simply a matter of force, and then there are those who see it as a matter of a higher moral order. The members of this latter group fail to see their arguments as being aimed at trying to preserve some power structure. The confusion of their thoughts and their success in imposing their will has much to do with the nature of speech. That is just as Callicles tried to ignore the physical restraints that his body imposed on him and argued that no one should indulge in pleasure whenever he can; so too may we argue for arbitrarily chosen punishments and ignore the real nature of the relationship between the individual and the state. Through speech we are, to an amazing degree, able to achieve ends that are not the best ends. Callicles can be very successful in carrying out his states desire to revel in pleasure just as the tyrant can be very successful in talking and fighting his way

to power. The contention here is of course, that there are better and indeed more pleasurable ends which ought to be sought, given mans true relationship to the state.

To show this, let me return to Plato's dialogue. Gorgias opens with Callicles stating: "This is how they say you should take part in warfare and battle, Socrates"[11] in the rest of the work we see how warfare and battle are the state in which we find ourselves if we do not seek ends which are at once more justified and more really pleasurable. If we believe that the 'right of the stronger' is the way things are, we find ourselves at war and we find that our speech comes to reflect that view. To illustrate this Socrates again returns to the physical realm and medicine and puts forth the following proportions:

Sophistic:Legislation:Beautification:Gymnastic

&

Rhetoric:Justice:Cookery:Medicine[12]

These are a summation of what has taken place in the first part of the dialogue. They show us how the relationships between man and nature and man and the state are reflected in our speech and in turn how speech is bifurcated due to the possibility of approaching the latter relationship as one of unprincipled or principled power. Socrates shows that there is little connection between what is and rhetoric. Rhetoric is concerned with words and unbridled appetite and as such floats above the concerns of the world.

He argues this by asking Gorgias what his art is. The answer to this question comes through asking Georgias to make certain distinctions. Rhetoric is first of all not, as Gorgias says, a "manual product" like gymnastics or medicine even though these too are "concerned" with words. "…Its activity and all that it accomplishes is through the

medium of words."[13] But Socrates is uneasy about this because "…there are other arts that secure their result entirely through words…arithmetic, for instance…"[14] Gorgias agrees that such subjects are not rhetoric and when pressed for another answer gives the following account: "I mean the power to convince by your words the judges in court, the senators in council, the people in the assembly…and yet possessed of such power you will make the doctor, you will make the trainer your slave, and your businessman will prove to be making money, not for himself, but…for you who can speak and persuade multitudes."[15]

Here Gorgias has shown himself to be of the school of the 'right of the stronger' and in so doing has set the stage for Socrates to put Gorgias in the position of saying that the rhetorician is just by necessity (for he has to have a knowledge of right and wrong in order to teach it) but at the same time able to do wrong. That is if the rhetorician knew the right he would do it, but he often does wrong. Evidently Gorgias has no way out of this position since we hear little from him for the rest of the dialogue. At this point Polus picks up the standard but to little avail for Socrates reduces rhetoric to "a part of flattery"[16] and finally says of rhetoricians that they are of no importance at all in the city because they do nothing "…that they will, but do only what seems best to them."[17]

But is it not also absurd to say that the rhetorician plays no part in the city? It is more to the point to say that they play no part in true legislation and the striving for justice. They play an extremely important role in determining how punishment is seen in the state. As has been argued here, the rhetorician deals not with right and wrong but with the maintenance of power; and, if so, with retaliatory punishment that fits arbitrary judgment, since the god's (i.e. nature) authorized her to do what she did. Creon's

judgments are based on his naked will, his power. But even though they were arbitrary judgments they did bring about her death. Creon did have power even if it was the power achieved through sophistry, not reason.

In fact it seems to me that the rhetorician is still very much in control. So much is he in control that a reasonable man who wanted only those punishments to exist which reason justified might say with Socrates: "I think that I am one of the very few…not to say the only one, engaged in the true political art, and that of the men of today I alone practice Statesmanship."[18]

I say this because I think we have had a dismal record in view of our ideals. Most political men, past and present, would give lip service to the ideal that it was their duty to find means to make the "…citizens…as good as possible"[19] While in practice they carry on their affairs in the Calliclean and Machiavellian fashion. The proof lies in the way we have treated our "criminals." I am in agreement with Winston Churchill who said that one may judge the civilization of a country by the public's attitude towards crime and criminals. I will not give examples of our failures but rather discuss how the punishment of a criminal is used for purposes other than the ends Plato sets forth. The following proposal by Edward Livingston in 1860 for a "System of Penal Law for the State of Louisiana" might serve as a ground work:

> In this cell is confined, to pass his
> Life in solitude and sorrow, A.B., convicted
> of the murder of C.D.: his food is
> bread of the coarsest kind, his drink
> is water, mingled with his tears; he is
> dead to the world; this cell is his grave;
> his existence is prolonged, that he may
> remember his crime and repent it, and
> that the continuance of his punishment
> may deter others from the indulgence of

> hatred, avearice, sensuality, and the passions which led to the crime he has committed. When the Almighty in his due time shall exercise toward him that dispensation which he himself arrogantly and wickedly usurped toward another, his body is to be dissected and his soul will abide that judgment which Divine Justice shall decree.[20]

This was to be inscribed on each murderer's cell. But to what end? The two most common arguments for retaliatory punishment are, I think, embodied in this pronouncement. First is the infliction of suffering on the criminal "…that he may remember his crime and repent it." The second is the hope that it "…may deter others from the indulgence of hatred avarice, sensuality and passion…". The first justification seems to be based on some appeal to a higher justice that extracts a proportionate amount of suffering for a given transgression. But from whence does this information come? It is certainly not religious, at least in the west for it seems to me that the Old Testament law is instructive rather than vindictive and the New Testament says to love and have mercy.

I think such thoughts as Mr. Livingston's are a proof that he has an appetite for tyrannical and unprincipled power. Like with Creon, through sophistry he is trying to use legislation for other than just ends. Tyrants, whether ancient or modern, arbitrarily use punishment as well as crime.

But what of Mr. Livingston's proposal? It would seem that the forces at work are infinitely more subtle than those of a political regime trying to retain power, nevertheless they all can be subsumed under tyrannical power.

Nietzsche attempted to express this by listing a number of 'reasons' for punishing. Some of these are: punishment as a means of rendering harmless, as recompense, as the isolation of a disturbance, as a means of inspiring fear, as a kind of repayment for advantages enjoyed, as the expulsion of a degenerate element, as festival (the mockery of a defeated enemy), as improvement.[21]

Socrates himself holds to some of these justifications. When he tells Polus that one may ill justly even though he who kills should not be envied and when he recounts the myths at the end of the Gorgias. In these myths he says that there are those who's souls are beyond help and that they should be punished so that they might be "…a warning to the rest, in order that they…may become better men."[22] I have great difficulty with this in that for the entire dialogue Socrates argues for punishment as being an ordering of the criminal's soul.

It is necessary to explain why he sees some people as needing punishment. This is certainly not explicit in the dialogue. When he tells Polus that one may kill justly he does not say under what circumstances and when he says there are incorrigibles it is in a myth and in a myth about the after life. In the myth he justifies punishment because it has a deterrent effect. I want to suggest that we simply not consider these speculations. They are speculation in that they are not supported in a way he supports his views when talking with Callicles. In those discussions Socrates continually looks to the world for examples through which he may convince Callicles. This is not so in the myth and therefore I am tempted to call it 'a part of flattery' because it encourages our use of vindictive punishment by flattering our appetite for revenge.

True enough that Socrates has admirable ends in that he wishes to deter others from doing wrong but I see grave problems with this. The two major ones are: (1) even if it was a justifiable end how do I justify the intentional infliction of suffering on others so that a third party may benefit? And (2) that it is foolish to think that using punishment for a deterrent effect would not be abused more times than not in order to achieve other ends aimed at revenge.

In fact some, like Nietzsche, see all punishment as revenge. In The Wanderer and His Shadow he expresses all the justifications listed in his above list and which include those of Socrates as such:

> Thus: everybody will revenge himself unless he is without honor of full of contempt or full of love for the person who has harmed and insulted him. Even when he has recourse to the courts he wants revenge as a private person – but besides, being a member of society who thinks further and considers the future, he also wants society's revenge on one who does not honor it. Thus judicial punishment restores both private honor and the honor of society which means, punishment is revenge.
>
> Indubitably, it also contains that other element of revenge which we described first, insofar as society uses punishment for its self-preservation and deals a counterblow in self-defense. Punishment desires to prevent further damage; it desires to deter. Thus both of these so different elements of revenge are actually tied together in punishment and perhaps this is the main support of that above mentioned conceptual confusion by virtue of which the individual who revenges himself usually does not know what he really wants.[23]

But where do we go to find out what punishment should be? I think if we return to the final pages of the Gorgias we will find a partial answer.

We are in other words ready to ask what punishment is in the sense of how it is to be carried out. We have seen, in the most general form, the reasons why we punish and the character of punishments based in unprincipled and vindictive power. What is the character of punishment in a principled state? The answer to this is hinted at when Polus is asked if he is killing justly or unjustly. The following exchange ensues:

> P: Whichever way, is he not to be envied in either case?
> He who kills at will?
> S: Hush, Polus.
> P: Why?
> S: Because we should not envy the unenviable
> and miserable, but pity them.
> P: What? Is that your impression of the men
> of who I am speaking?
> S: Of course.
> P: Then you consider miserable an pitiable him
> Who puts to death any man he pleases, and
> does so justly?
> S: No, not that, but he is not to be envied either.
> P: Did you not call him miserable just now?
> S: The man who puts to death unjustly, my
> friend, and he is pitiable too, but he who
> does so justly is not to be envied.
> P: Surely it is the man unjustly put to death
> who is pitiable and wretched.
> S: Less so than hi slayer, Polus, and less
> than he who is put to death unjustly.
> P: How is that, Socrates?
> S: In view of the fact that to do wrong is
> the greatest of evils.
> P: Is that the greatest? Is it not greater
> to suffer wrong?
> S: Most certainly not.[24]

Socrates has made it clear that both the punisher and the punished must submit themselves to a third force, namely justice. I, the punisher, am no longer free to do what

I will but must have as my end justice and the maintenance of order. But how do I maintain order? It is essentially that I maintain order and am just if the punishment is aimed at ordering the criminal's soul the basis for this is the argument that to do wrong is worse than to suffer for it. If the state is taken as an individual (in the sense that it can decide how it is going to punish) then it too can do wrong in harming the criminal instead of helping him to an ordered life. But this is still speaking to why punishment is necessary, albeit, this function seems closest to what should be. It does not say how this ordering should take place.

This is how it becomes clear in the final pages of the dialogue when we realize that the conversation with Callicles is meant to be a punishment in and by itself of Callicles. When Callicles is brought to the point in the already mentioned argument about disciplining the soul where he is asked: "Then to be disciplined is better for the soul than indiscipline…?"[25] He refuses to give the requisite "yes." Instead he says: "I do not know what you are talking about, Socrates ask someone else."[26] To this Socrates replies "this fellow will not put up with being improved and experiencing the very treatment now under discussion, the process of discipline."[27]

Examining ones actions through speech is for Socrates a means of punishment, a means towards ordering the soul, or rather the only means. Socrates sees it as the place of the statesman to carry out this 'punishment' and makes clear to Callicles that it is incumbent on him to practice this form of punishment for he says: "…and so, my best of friends, since you are just beginning to enter public life and invite me also and reproach me for not doing so, shall we not examine each other and ask, come now, has Callicles ever yet improved any of the citizens? Is there any man who previously was evil, unjust,

undisciplined, and senseless and through Callicles has become an upright and worthy man, be he stranger or citizen, slave or free?"[28] This I think to be the clearest statement in the dialogue of what one should be about when one punishes. But this is yet only a partial answer for us because we must face the prospect of being punished and being members of states that punish and in being members we are in part responsible for the actions of those states.

I am interested in how we might practically overcome our tendencies for revenge; a revenge that is carried out daily through infliction of pain on criminals. Before I discuss what I think might be a solution it is necessary to give some minor historical interpretation of the problem to bridge the gap between Plato, Nietzsche and ourselves.

I began this discussion with the Gorgias and during the course of that discussion I mentioned The Antigone. These are products of a very different society than ours. It seems fair to say that their view of their cosmos was an integrated one. If this is positing too much, then let us say at least that the myths of Gorgias and The Antigone present such a view. This view, in its broadest form, sees the Greek state, laws and religion as springing from the same common source. That source was an attitude that nature offered to us an intelligible order. Whether it is Plato, Aristotle or a playwright we see that a discussion of our nature pervades the particular work. Indeed these discussions often came to different conclusions but nevertheless it may be safely said that for both Plato and Aristotle there was a harmony between their religious, physical and political views.

We have inherited many disparate parts of their culture; we have also inherited a very different view of the world from the Christian religion. Here the knowledge of religious truth is from revelation and not from looking to the world.

When we speak of punishment for the Greeks we are speaking of a concept that was by necessity derived both from their view of state and their view of there Gods and therefore in harmony, at least in theory, with both.

When we speak of ourselves and of our more recent past we see that things have become much more confused. We have succeeded in many ways in rendering to Caesar what is his, but not entirely. I think this is made evident when we look at punishment. The church has developed its own view of punishment outside the one that has developed in the state although they have certainly influenced one another. In the church crimes are sins and "vengeance is Mine, saith the Lord." The church has often tried to reconcile the state's view on many subjects with doctrine usually by trying to ground the state in a divine plan. In so doing they have usually ignored the above command of the Lord and the gospel of love and given the state of power to punish in vengeful ways. We see, for example, that Mr. Livingston derives a good deal of his authority by appealing to the "Almighty." This interplay between the church and state seemed the only explanation for my not being able to find anyone outside of Christ himself that spoke of punishment in terms similar to the ones Plato used. Until I read Nietzsche.

The reason he speaks as Plato is because he wants to look to the world for his morality. As he said at one point that he discovered that one should not look <u>behind</u> the world for explanations. He begs us to be master of ourselves and of our morals. He begs us to cut through all the rhetorical justifications of punishment and look to our fellow man.

Nietzsche, however, still does not help us a far as how we render one undangerous and what is done to him after this has been achieved. He felt that this was the least of our

problems. That is, he felt that practical solutions would be derivative from our new attitudes.

Now to complete my historical speculations I will say that Nietzsche could have only written what he did and only had such faith, because of what was happening and had happened in the previous few centuries in philosophy and science. If we can admit that religion and political sciences can influence one another. Nietzsche's views came in part because of new ways of looking had been developed. People were now worried about such things as describing nature through mathematics and using words like 'objective' and believing that one could find the 'causes' of things. Nietzsche says:

> Punishment is supposed to possess the value of awakening the feeling of guilt in the guilty person; one seeks in it the actual instrumentum of that psychical reaction called "bad conscience," "sting of conscience." Thus one misunderstanding psychology and the reality of things even as they apply today: how much more as they applied during the greater part of man's history, his prehistory;
>
> It is precisely among criminals and convicts that the sting of conscience is extremely rare; prisons and penitentiaries are not the kind of hotbed in which this species of gnawing worm is likely to flourish; all conscientious observers are agreed on that, in many cases unwillingly enough and contrary to their own inclinations. Generally speaking, punishment makes men hard and cold; it concentrates; it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power of resistance…[29]

Nietzsche's conscientious observer is no other than the scientist. These observers of human nature have come to force us to look at punishment in a different light. Science

has, maybe, made us more honest. Or I would have to say it has the potential for making us more honest. I think I see signs of that taking place.

One of the pieces I think I see this happening is with the law and punishment. Science is in part responsible for making us clarify use of law. It seems that rhetoric often leads us to associate the breaking of a law with punishment. We felt that implicit in the law was the punishment. We are beginning to see that at least in the political realm there is no necessary connection. We are beginning to clarify what belongs to God and what belongs to Caesar. We are beginning to see that if there is such a thing as vengeance it does indeed be about the gospel of love. As this father was, to use Nietzsche's words, 'full of love' for the murderer of his daughter:

> Dear People of Philadelphia,
>
> I write to you this morning, at the rise of dawn, still in the midst of a tormented wake, the most terrible grief which has ever seared my soul.
>
> Yesterday…I lost the most precious thing that life ever gave to me-a three-and-a-half-year-old girl child of surpassing purity and joy; a being profoundly close to the secret wellsprings of life itself-a closeness from which she derived great unconscious strength which made her irresistibly attractive to human beings with who she cam in contact
>
> She was murdered…by a fifteen-year-old boy…
>
> The boy himself has also always given an excellent formal account of himself-honor student, gentle in manner…
>
> …his parents…
>
> …undoubtedly took naïve pride in his constant good behavior…never suspecting that this very goodness was a serious cause of worry in the light of what must have been left unaccounted for.
>
> It is, of course, worrisome, from the social point of view, that there are parents with such lack of understanding. It is, I submit, much more profoundly worrisome that it should have been possible for this boy to go through his whole fifteen years without anyone who was responsible for his upbringing- who could have been aware of the danger signals before the tragedy.
>
> Beware, citizens. The human animal cannot be cheated

> forever. It will have love, or kill.
>
> You will understand that I am not lecturing to you for the pure joy of sounding wise. I am hurt to the depths of my being, and I cry out to you to take better care of your children.
>
> My final word has to do with the operation of the machinery of justice. Had I caught the boy in the act, I would have wished to kill him. Now that there is no undoing what is done, I only wish to help him.
>
> Let no feelings of cave-man vengeance influence us. Let us rather help him who did so human a thing.[30]

A Sick Father

We as a society have, of course, not come near caring in the manner of this father. Nevertheless there is hope. It has only been a hundred years since Nietzsche wrote and a lifetime since his death and it is just recently that we have come to really question our sciences. We, hopefully, are becoming wiser in seeing that science will never give us ultimate answers and that we have always only been "conscientious observers." That is the sciences can only hope to make us more honest about our morality and about themselves especially those sciences we call the social and psychological sciences. I think they are all being forced, through their own high standards, against the limits of what they may and may not claim.

But is not making us more honest a great deal? This honesty does and will not preclude a morality. Man still has to write laws for himself and develop customs. But he does not have to punish. This science has been precluded. We have the means on the most practical level of rendering the criminal undangerous and on a higher level we may be acquiring the knowledge of how to order his soul. Let us hope with Plato that our sciences, laws and moral codes may be brought into harmony with one another.

[1] Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: Random House, Inc, 1966), p. 304.
[2] Plato, "The Gorgias," Plato: The Collected Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 273.
[3] Ibid, p. 274
[4] Ibid, p. 275
[5] Ibid, p. 287
[6] Ibid, p. 287
[7] Ibid, p. 252
[8] Ibid, p. 252
[9] Ibid, p. 256
[10] Ibid, p. 2
[11] Ibid, p. 230
[12] Ibid, p. 247
[13] Ibid, p. 234
[14] Ibid, p. 234
[15] Ibid, p. 236
[16] Ibid, p. 246
[17] Ibid, p. 249
[18] Ibid, p. 302
[19] Ibid, p. 296
[20] Karl Menniger, M.D., The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p.p. 193.
[21] Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 516.
[22] Plato, op, cit., p. 305.
[23] Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 162.
[24] Plato, op, cit., p. 251.
[25] Ibid, p. 288
[26] Ibid, p. 288
[27] Ibid, p. 288
[28] Ibid, p. 296
[29] Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 517.

[30] Menninger, op. cit., p. 198.