

Respect and International Relations: State Motives, Social Mechanisms and Hypotheses

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*To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind,
are the great objectives of ambition and emulation.¹*

*If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this:
The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation.²*

Abstract:

In our daily lives few things are as important to us as gaining and preserving the respect of our peers. Yet in IR, we regularly assume that decision makers or collective actors do hardly care for the consideration other actors show for their dignity, achievements or mere presence. All our major theories are based on the implicit premise that an international actor's sense of its own worth is either unimportant or is totally unrelated to its interactions with others. Drawing mostly on insights from moral philosophy and social psychology the paper makes the case that even in IR social respect can be a significant goal, both for instrumental reasons and as an end in itself. As a matter of fact, as long as we ignore this dimension of international politics we will be unable to fully explain major features of world politics, specifically the intensity and duration of many cross-border conflicts. To show the perspectives systematic research on respect may open for IR, the paper presents a theoretical overview of the chief factors governing both respect seeking and the reactions to respectful or disrespectful behaviour.

¹ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Cambridge 2004 [1791], section I, iii, 3.

² Thomas L. Friedman, „The Humiliation Factor“, *New York Times*, November 9, 2003, p. 11.

Introduction

In our daily interactions we take it for granted that everyone strives for respect. Usually, we go at great length to protect the images of our interlocutors. To this end modern cultures have developed elaborate rituals which help us to save our opposite's face, be it in normal conversations with friends and colleagues or in more awkward encounters with strangers (Goffman 1967). Conversely, for ourselves we take great precautions to insure the respect of our peer group and we feel seriously offended when being denied "proper respect". In fact, according to social psychologists, the experience of disrespect is a prime cause, perhaps even the prime cause of angry behaviour. The causal relation between the two is so strong that anger is considered the best indicator for disrespect (Miller 2001: 532p.).

For IR scholars, however, respect seems to be a superfluous category. Apparently, the discipline assumes that, unlike normal persons, international actors do not care for social respect. Practically, the issue gets no attention whatsoever in our monographs and journal articles. To the best of my knowledge, not a single article or monograph on respect and IR has so far been published in the English speaking scientific community which largely defines the field. Similar neglect is shown for related concepts, such as "recognition", "prestige", "status", "honor", "dignity" and "humiliation". Thus, the index of the renowned Handbook of International Relations (Carlsnaes et al. 2002) entails no entry for any of these terms. (Needless to say, there is none for "respect", either.) While some monographs have been written on honor (O'Neill 1999), prestige (Markey 2000; see also Fukuyama 1992), and humiliation (Lindner 2006) in international relations, their insights have largely gone unnoticed in the main stream whose preoccupation with rational choice explanations seems as vibrant as ever. For the vast majority of IR scholars, states strive for concrete and tangible goals, such as security, power and wealth, but hardly for symbolic assets like prestige and honor, let alone respect.³

This neglect comes at a considerable price, for it blinds the discipline for a major influence on cooperation and conflict in world politics. It unduly narrows our perspective on the motivations and aspirations of international actors, especially actors of lower international status or with a different cultural background. For the Anglo-Saxons who have largely defined the avenues of IR research it may be natural to take international respect for granted. After all, for decades both the United States and the United Kingdom were used to getting far more attention than the rest of the international system. Moreover, this lack of sensitivity may have been exacerbated by pragmatic and utilitarian outlooks prevalent in the West, but uncommon among other cultures in which "face" to this day remains an all important issue.

³ Interestingly, the closest exception to this rule is to be found in the work of the most renowned practical philosopher of recent times, John Rawls. In § 3.3 of *The Law of Peoples* Rawls (1999) explicitly lists international respect as one of the prime interests of peoples (see also Haacke 2005: 194). Alexander Wendt and Hans Morgenthau refer to recognition as a major state goal. However, both theorists apply a rather constrained meaning of this term which largely focuses on its instrumental significance for other state interests. At the beginning of his chapter on prestige, Morgenthau (1993: 85) actually comes close to declaring social recognition a major goal of international actors: „In both spheres (international and domestic politics, R.W.), the desire for social recognition is a potent dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions. The individual seeks confirmation, on the part of his fellows, of the evaluation he puts upon himself.” In the rest of the chapter, however, Morgenthau deals exclusively with prestige which he practically equates with reputation for power. According to Alexander Wendt, the structure of international orders to a great extent depends on the degree of mutual recognition (1999: 283-297; 2003). Still, his discussion of recognition overly stresses the legal aspects of the concept – above all the mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity – while neglecting its evaluative dimension (but see Wendt 1999: 236p.).

Therefore, from the perspective of African or Asian societies, international respect probably is a much scarcer and thus more coveted asset. Ignoring this demand (and those of Western nations who increasingly feel disrespected by recent U.S. policies) risks both a limited understanding of conflict behaviour and missing opportunities for lasting cooperation.

This paper is but a first step that aims at raising the awareness for the importance of social respect in IR. It starts with a discussion of “respect” and related concepts, mostly drawing on insights and definitions put forward by philosophers and social psychologists. In the second section I shall explain why domestic and international actors strive for social respect, even in the absence of tangible material benefits. This is to be followed by a discussion of hypotheses concerning the conditions under which respect seeking should be particularly pronounced. The fourth section will change the perspective by focusing on the effects respectful and disrespectful behaviour are likely to have on cooperation and conflict. After this, I shall investigate why respect, so far, has received so little attention in IR, before making some suggestions as to how and why it should be studied nevertheless. In the conclusion I will briefly list some of the costs of respectful behaviour and also identify some potential avenues for further research.

1. The Meaning of Respect

Most of us use the word “respect” every single day in one of its various meanings. Particularly in the U.S. inner cities it has achieved special prominence as a signifier of social standing in a hazardous environment (Bourgeois 1999; Anderson 1999). Yet few of us would be able to come up with neat definitions of the concept. And perhaps there can be no general definitions in this case, as the concept does not gain cohesion through a general idea of “respect” which underlies all particular cases. It could rather be based on “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein) between different instances of respectful behaviour: We can respect the law, the risks of a polar expedition, the judgement of a colleague, the catholic church, the achievements of our brothers, the rights of business partners, the presence of a neighbour, the needs of our students and much more. If there is one common thread in all of these examples, it is a rather thin one: giving due consideration to another object, be it natural, human or institutional.

In an IR perspective respect for particular actors seems to be both the most interesting and least researched topic. Of course, respect of international law is a crucial subject in its own right. However, problems of compliance, legitimacy and acceptance have already been addressed by scores of international lawyers and political scientists. Hence, there is little need to restart this debate under another rubrum, simply by attaching a new label like “respect” to it. The same observation applies to respect for international risks and threats which also has been extensively studied by a great number of security scholars. In contrast, respect for international actors, such as states, international organizations, movements or individual decision-makers, has been grossly under researched. Accordingly, for IR the most useful definition of “respect” might be gained from philosophical, sociological and psychological writings dwelling on the respect given or due to other persons.

1.1 Towards a working definition of social respect

Unfortunately, sociological or anthropological studies explicitly dealing with social respect provide little guidance in this context. Richard Sennett's (2004) acclaimed monograph on respect fails to put forward a clear definition of the term. The discussion in its conceptual chapter remains rather vague and metaphorical. It is largely focussed on respect for other peoples' needs while giving little attention to other attributes persons want to see respected. Not surprisingly then, Sennett concludes the chapter with the observation that "what respect itself means is both socially and psychologically complex. As a result, the acts which convey respect – the act of acknowledging others – are demanding, and obscure" (Sennett 2004: 59). Even less helpful in this regard is Bourgeois' (1999) monograph on crack sellers in East Harlem ("In Search of Respect") which, while offering a vivid picture of inner city life led by socially marginalized Puerto Ricans, gives little consideration to the meaning of "respect". In contrast, Elijah Anderson's (1999) analysis of inner cities life "Code of the Street" provides far more insights on why people seek "respect" and how they actually understand the term. Their understanding, however, is largely constrained to a reputation for toughness which, indeed, may be crucial for inner city survival but hardly covers all those dimensions individual or organizational actors usually seek respect for.⁴ Philosophical works on general ethics and desires for social recognition may thus provide better starting points for developing a broader concept of respect applicable to international actors.

Kantian ethics lays special importance on respect of persons as a universal moral principle. According to Kant we owe unflinching respect to the categorical imperative to treat others always in accordance with maxims which could qualify as universal principles. Thus we may not grant ourselves any special rights or privileges which could not apply to everyone else. We must not put ourselves above the rest of society. Rather we have to respect everyone as equal persons with equal rights (and duties). To be sure, we are entitled to use other people for our own purposes (as they regularly use us for their own designs). Yet in doing so we may never use them *as means alone*, but must always treat them as purposes in their own right. In modern parlance: we must at all times respect their dignity as autonomous persons.

Building on Hegel, Axel Honneth has provided what amounts to the most elaborated theory of social recognition. Like Kant and Hegel, Honneth puts special emphasis on the importance of acknowledging other peoples' rights. People cherish their rights not only for the particular opportunities and material benefits that come with them. Even more important is their symbolic significance as indicators of social standing. According to Honneth, holding equal rights under the law means that we are socially accepted as fully autonomous persons. Conversely, being arbitrarily denied some of these rights can easily harm peoples' self-respect as it implies that they are merely second-class citizens. (In the most humiliating cases, people may be even stripped of all capacity for autonomous action, thereby being reduced to mere objects without human dignity.) Being disrespected in these ways causes frustration and anger on the part of the individual. If similarly experienced by a number of citizens, patterns of disrespect bring about collective identities turning discriminated individuals into social movements fighting for the recognition of their equal rights. As such "struggles for recognition" are successfully pursued by group after group, legal equality is spread out to ever larger segments of society (Honneth 1994; also Lindner 2006)

⁴ Anderson 1999: 10, 33f. Actually, as the inner cities' concept of „respect“ relates to a particular social code it comes closer to the concept of honor than to the concept of respect as it will be outlined below (see also O'Neill 1999: 137).

As Honneth points out, a similar dynamic also works in the realm of self-esteem. Individuals may be particularly interested in being respected as legal equals. Yet they also want to gain recognition for the way they actually make use of their rights. They want society to acknowledge their specific efforts for the common good (instead of being looked upon as mere consumers of other peoples' contributions). Being denied this kind of recognition is also a frustrating experience which tends to undermine peoples' sense of self-worth. Once it is experienced by a significant number of people, disrespect for cultural or economic contributions will also stimulate collective activities aimed at redefining their society's system of values. Again, groups struggling for general respect of their specific contributions or qualities will set (and keep) in motion a continuous process of evaluative disputes. (see also Taylor 1992). The ensuing "struggles for recognition", Honneth claims, may affect the dynamics of social transformation just as profoundly as contests solely fought for material benefits.⁵

While Honneth's concept of recognition provides a very useful starting point for establishing the contents and dynamics of respect seeking behaviour, it practically ignores the non-evaluative dimensions of human existence which people equally want to see respected. Those additional dimensions can most easily be detected when we think of other instances of disrespectful behaviour. In the first place such acts concern inadequate attention to our mere presence. As we all know, simply being ignored or overlooked, be it on purpose or as a result of mere negligence, is perhaps the most hurting form of disrespect. Indeed, it may hurt us more than a negative evaluation.⁶ Failing to catch other peoples' attention in situations where we reasonably can expect being noticed implies that we "do not count". When people "look through us" the way colonial officials often did with local servants they deal with us as mere objects without any social meaning. Implicitly, such officials treated their personnel as utterly unimportant or as mere automats whose reactions could be completely foreseen, thereby denying their capacity for autonomous action (at least while being in the presence of their masters). Seen from today's perspective, such behaviour compromises core elements of human worth which define the very dignity of persons. It is perhaps the most humiliating denial of respect (Margalit 1996: chap. 6).

Closely related to disrespect for our presence are the various other forms of hurting our sense of importance. Often, people may take notice of our presence but without giving us as much attention as we deem appropriate. They might acknowledge that we take part in a conversation and they might even listen to our contributions. Yet, in their own statements, they may hardly refer to our ideas. By failing to address our statements they indicate that our opinions are unimportant. Again, this kind of aloofness can hurt even more badly than getting a lot of critical responses to our statements. Apparently, people want to feel important, they want to experience themselves as influencing their social or physical environment. They cherish a sense of control even if others dislike their particular actions. Little children enjoy destroying toys or castles in the sand, teenagers or adults sometimes act as enfant terribles when they sense a lack of influence or attention.⁷

⁵ That means, if there are such contests at all. As will be pointed out below, the distribution of material benefits often is considered an indicator of relative social evaluation. Hence, groups arguing over the distribution of power and wealth actually may argue over relative group worth as well.

⁶ For instance, as authors we may be less annoyed by a negative review of our recent book than by waiting in vain for the first review.

⁷ Brennan/Pettit (2004: 185-93) consider the enfant terrible's anti-social behavior solely as a kind of investment in future esteem. According to them, it aims at catching more attention now, just to make sure that positively evaluated actions later will get well noticed. This parsimonious explanation may hold in some cases. For many instances, though, it strikes me as somewhat too strategic. For example, it leaves open to question (1) why the enfant terrible can assume that the higher level of attention will last long enough and (2) why it sees no chance to

For a working definition of social respect we may thus conclude that respect is an attitude we expect others to show by the way they treat us. Because we cannot read other peoples' minds, respect has to manifest itself in behavior towards us. When striving for respect, actors seek adequate consideration of their

- physical presence,
- social importance,
- ideas and values,
- needs and interests,
- achievements, efforts, qualities and virtues, and of their
- rights.⁸

While giving full respect for others' ideas and needs does not call for their active endorsement (but only for taking them seriously in debates and decision making), with regard to the last two dimensions "adequate consideration" requires both taking them into account as important "facts" and accepting them as authentic. Thus, even when somebody does not actively support my needs he can still fully respect me on this dimension by taking these needs into account. It amounts only to disrespect if I feel entitled to get his support, that is, if he seems to ignore a relevant right. As will become clear below, the crucial term in this definition is "adequate", for those who seek respect and those who are supposed to grant it may profoundly disagree as to the level of adequacy. This gap may result from mere misunderstandings, from lack of information or from open differences of opinion. No matter what the particular cause, a perceived lack of respect can easily thwart cooperation and bring about intense conflict (see section 4.1.1 of this paper). Therefore, under ordinary circumstances an act of disrespect is much more conspicuous than respectful behavior.

1.2 "Respect" and related concepts

Obviously, this definition of respect reveals many similarities and conformities with related concepts, such as "esteem", "prestige", "status", "recognition", "dignity" and "honor". Given the inherent vagueness of the term "respect" itself, it is essential to discuss these other concepts in order to prevent some unnecessary confusion.


First of all, "respect" needs to be differentiated from various forms of *esteem*. The latter can go far beyond an adequate consideration of some qualities. For instance, when admiring, adoring or loving a person we show a level of esteem which clearly exceeds proper respect. It does so because those levels are not based on a widely accepted criterion of adequacy. Clearly, outside of our families we do not deem ourselves entitled to these intense forms of esteem for they cannot be based on any objective criteria or measurement scales. Hence, most of us accept that it is entirely up to other people if they admire, love or adore us. By contrast, we feel that others actually "owe" us respect. When we subjectively meet relevant standards of achievements, virtues etc., it *must* be granted to avoid "inadequate consideration". Otherwise, we feel discriminated vis-à-vis other similar people who get more positive attention.⁹

catch attention with positively evaluated activities. Even for adults or social groups, being considered nice and inoffensive, may count for less than being regarded as a controversial, yet important actor.

⁸ For similar definitions see Hill (1998: 283) und Dillon (2007: 202).

⁹ To be sure, sometimes groups or individuals fighting for respect aim at changing commonly accepted norms which discriminate against themselves (Honneth 1994, Taylor 1992). In these cases they do not appeal to those

Figure 1: Respect and other Forms of Esteem



This difference between respect and other forms of esteem has two crucial implications: On one hand, it makes clear that, as far as respect is the sole motivation, the subjective demand for positive evaluation is not unlimited. It does not go beyond the levels we deem appropriate in light of widely accepted standards of esteem. As scientists, most of us do not feel disrespected simply because we get less praise than nobel laureates. (The same kind of moderation also applies to our demand for non-evaluative attention.) On the other hand, when being denied the level of esteem we consider adequate we feel far more frustrated and annoyed than in cases where we would appreciate some more admiration. After all, we think that our expectation is not based on arbitrary ambitions, let alone mere vanity, but is grounded in what we think are widely accepted standards of evaluation. This is one of the reasons why we often feel entitled to openly “demand” respect, whereas it can easily be self-defeating to frankly ask for a higher level of appreciation.¹⁰

standards but openly criticize them. Yet, usually they do so by pointing to contradictions between the standards in question and other, more widely accepted norms of higher order which rule out arbitrary discrimination.

¹⁰ As Brennan/Pettit (2004: 37) point out, asking for more esteem of one’s virtues, efforts or achievements is bound to convey the message that they are based on selfish motivations rather than on a sense of moral principles.

While the demand for respect thus covers just part of our desire for esteem, in another sense it goes beyond it. As indicated above, we also want others to confirm our importance. In this sense it is also broader than Honneth's concept of *recognition* which is also limited to the dimensions of positive evaluation.¹¹

In politics, the most important form of esteem is usually called *prestige*. Put very simply, enjoying prestige means being widely accredited with having achieved valuable political ends or with having special abilities for achieving such ends.¹² Prestigious political actors thus are considered capable, important and valuable. Obviously, this comes close to the common usage of the term "respect", for instance when we say of a legislator that "she enjoys the respect of her colleagues in the senate". Actually, however, this is a proposition about the senator's prestige as a capable politician, for we cannot know if she really deems the consideration of her achievements as adequate. While she may get a lot of credit for her legislative record, she may think nevertheless that, based on widely applied criteria, she ought to get a lot more. Therefore, in spite of all her prestige, she may still feel disrespected by her fellow senators. As pointed out above, lack of respect results from inadequate consideration of our value or importance. It refers to a gap between our subjective expectations and others' actual behaviour. A shortage of prestige, however, refers to the difference between our own reputation and the reputation enjoyed by particular others (or the average group member). Consequently, unlike common efforts to ensure respect, the struggle for prestige of necessity is a zero-some game.¹³ (The same observation applies to *status* if it is defined as the relative endowment with informal or formal rights or privileges.)

¹¹ One of his three dimensions which need not interest us in the context of this paper is love within the family and among close friends. Since, according to Honneth, love hardly affects social struggles for recognition I have listed it as a separate category in Figure 1.

¹² Sometimes prestige is equated with a reputation for power (Morgenthau 1993; Gilpin 1981). This neutral definition, however, is not in line with common usage of the term. For instance, few Americans would have accredited Hitler's Germany in 1942 with a high level of prestige.

¹³ This also becomes clear when we think of particular efforts to enhance our prestige or the respect we get. When we seek more respect we tend to invoke relevant social standards and then explicitly refer to some of our efforts, achievements, qualities or rights that were ignored. When we seek more prestige, however, we cannot openly praise our past achievements for this would easily be considered vane or self-serving. What we usually do then, is to try and secure new personal accomplishments. Once these accomplishments are noticed by our peers they will enhance our prestige. Still, they would fail to redress any lingering feelings of being disrespected for past achievements if the latter continue to go unnoticed.

Figure 2: Lack of Respect





Figure 3: Lack of Prestige



Another difference between the two concepts concerns their ontological basis. Prestige resides in collective opinion (O'Neill 1999: 193). In contrast, respect is always conveyed by other actors' behaviour. Like high status, prestige can last for quite a while even if it is not constantly reaffirmed. Once granted, it may sometimes live on as a form of common knowledge until finally called into question by some important actor(s). Respect, on the other hand, calls for constant reaffirmation through concrete acts or gestures on the part of our social environment. The latter's inactivity in itself would be an act of disrespect as it would have to be taken as an indication of our unimportance. Hence, if our social environment wants to make sure that we feel respected, it needs to express adequate consideration from time to time with acts and gestures carefully designed for meeting our personal expectations. Needless to say, this can be far more difficult than merely holding someone in high esteem. Especially between people of different status, effectively conveying mutual respect may be far from easy. Sometimes, showing proper respect can require elaborate rituals (diplomatic protocol comes to one's mind) which have to be learned over a period of time. In this sense, making others feel truly respected actually can come close to an art (Sennett 2004: 226).

Honor is another concept which partially overlaps with the meaning of "respect". Unlike the latter, however, it is closely related to the specific code of some particular group. Usually such a group occupies a specified status position within society at large. Honor can thus be seen as an actor's reputation based on its public compliance with such a code which typically entails norms mandating honesty, courage, calm composure or generosity (Berger 1970). Like respect, honor usually is a non-rivalling good, at least within the status group itself. Thus, an actor can become more honorable without detracting from the honor of someone else. Unlike respect as it is understood in this paper, however, an actor's honor intrinsically rests on other actors' perceptions. It is based on the opinion of others; i.e. honor can suffer even when the code actually has been respected (and observers are mistaken). The experience of disrespect, by contrast, largely depends on the relation between others' behaviour to one's own subjective expectations, in particular to one's own standards of self-worth. The concept of respect, therefore, seems more applicable to the study of modern individual societies which lack strict codes governing the behaviour of specific status groups.¹⁴ For the same reason, it also appears of greater use for studying international society, given the striking heterogeneity of its actors.

Like "respect" the concept of *dignity* appears to be more in line with the social realities of highly individualistic and thus very heterogeneous societies. "Dignity" delineates the core area of human worthiness, as inter-subjectively defined by the prevailing culture. Usually, a person's dignity rests on its recognition as an autonomous agent with a moral worth of its own. Being the abstract and universally accepted core of human worth, dignity is not related to specific individual traits, characteristics or biographies actors also want to see recognized. While everyone seeks respect for this inner core of self-worth, uncompromised dignity thus falls short of full-scope respect. However, its violation is the most hurtful form disrespect: humiliation. For states, this culturally defined core currently consists of their rights to sovereignty, to territorial integrity, and to freedom of development (international society agrees on little else). National dignity thus largely coincides with a nation state's material interest in security. Yet, as will be shown below, upholding a nation state's worth as an autonomous actor may at times provide an additional motivation for resistance in hopeless cases where states face of an overpowering military opponent.

¹⁴ For an explanation of the receding use of the concept of honor see Berger (1970) and Honneth (1994: chap. 5).

2. Why individuals, groups and states seek respect

Individuals, groups and organizations seek respect both for material gain and for intrinsic or symbolic reasons. In what follows, I shall focus on the immaterial incentives because uncovering these motivations promises more innovative insights for a discipline which for decades used to be dominated by materialistic theories. Proving the material benefits of getting proper respect does hardly require detailed argumentation.

It is all too obvious that an actor's prospects for greater power, security and wealth are enhanced if her needs, ideas, achievements and rights get more social attention. While there may be situations where being ignored or underestimated provides useful opportunities for surprise moves or free riding, most of the time getting more attention along the above mentioned dimensions enhances both bargaining power and the chances to persuade potential partners of preferred norms or practical solutions (soft power). To impress others with our threats or promises we need them to know about our importance, our past achievements or our faculties. To convince them of our entitlements or proposals for cooperation we need them to take note of our importance, rights, achievements, intellectual abilities and ideas. Therefore, each IR theory can readily explain why diplomatic representatives at international conferences strive for their peers' attention and for lots of speaking time in front of the plenum.

Yet there appear to be even more basic reasons why actors seek respect, notably motives not so much related to what actors *possess* or may get but more related to who or what they *are* (or like to think they are). Apparently, we enjoy others' attention or praise also in situations where such behaviour hardly promises any material benefits. For instance, we even appreciate respectful behaviour from strangers we will never meet again. Research on procedural justice has repeatedly demonstrated that personal satisfaction with procedures often depends less on their material output than on respectful treatment by influential decision makers. Polite behaviour, proper attention, adequate information and especially voice opportunities had a significant effect on satisfaction with procedures. Thus, people tended to care more about their voice opportunities during the decision making process than about the actual distribution of benefits (Tyler/Blader 2001). In some cases, even voice opportunities granted *in the aftermath* of decisions enhanced personal satisfaction (Lind et al. 1990).

According to the group value model put forward by Lind and Tyler (1988: 230-240) respectful treatment by our peers and colleagues above all tells us that we are valued members of our group(s). Research by social psychologists has repeatedly shown that personal feelings of self-worth significantly depend on the respectful treatment by other group members (Smith et al. 2003: 162-64). Humans have no independent "meters" to measure their personal worth. Sometimes they may strictly follow their own ethical codes or they may rely on their own judgements rather than on the opinion of others. Ultimately however, everyone depends on social affirmation. Humans sense a "fundamental need to belong" to some group (Hogg/Abrams 2003: 413 xxx; De Cremer/Mulder 2007: 441). Most of us cannot live in opposition to the values of our social environment. And even those willing to bear the emotional costs of complete detachment cannot avoid the fact that the very meaning of their own judgements depends on the proper usage of a common language. A life in complete isolation may thus protect us from negative opinions, yet it would do so at the price of shaking the epistemic foundations of our own judgements (Berger/Luckmann 1966; Mead 1934: chap. 21). Only through social interactions can we experience who we are and what we count for. Hence, getting proper consideration and fair treatment is not only useful for advancing our material interests, it also is vital for our personal sense of self-worth.

Unsatisfactory respect for somebody's personal rights provides a good illustration for the interplay of the instrumental and intrinsic importance of respect. Obviously, disrespect for one's rights usually results in a material loss, for instance when somebody negates our entitlement to the use of a useful asset. Beyond this, such discrimination can also damage our reputation in the eyes of observers, especially if we do not fight for the denied rights. Third parties may conclude from our inactivity that they would face little risk when infringing upon our rights for their own benefit. Moreover, in the eyes of others, our image as an important, self-reliant person would suffer from such indolence. Finally and perhaps most importantly, our image would suffer also in our own eyes. After all, when somebody violates our rights he or she implies that we seem to be "somebody who can be dealt with in this way". This in itself already amounts to a hurting discrimination relative to those whose rights continue to be respected. Instead of giving our rights "due" consideration, someone treats us as a second class person. In fact, he or she diminishes our status as a member of a group whose members enjoy those rights. Yet this violation impairs our personal sense of self-worth even more if we cannot redress it or if we fail to act upon it at all. In this case, we practically admit that the perpetrator was correct: Apparently, we really are "somebody who can be dealt with in this way" (see Miller 2001: 541). In the end we cannot avoid the conclusion that both who we think we are *and who we really are* largely depends upon how others treat us.

The question, though, is if this strong link between respectful treatment and personal feelings of self-worth also applies to interaction between groups or collective actors. After all, we rely to a greater extent on the judgements of our peer group than on the opinions of complete strangers which we may have little in common with. In the latter case, it is much easier to dismiss negative opinions as ungrounded or altogether irrelevant (Turner et al. 1987: chap. 4; Abrams et al. 1990; Haslam et al. 1996; Smith et al. 1998: 490). Even disrespectful or humiliating treatment on the part of outsiders tends to hurt less than abuse by group members because it often can be "explained away" with the outsiders' bad character or their lack of better knowledge. If the disrespectful opinion or behaviour is directed at the whole group its members might also negate its importance or justification in their internal discussions. Due to their greater similarities and their closer interaction among themselves they can more easily question the validity of out-group views and reassure each other of the worth of their own group. Partially sheltered from out-side contact, members of the same group can readily focus on debating the special importance and merits of the in-group. Thus, compared to individuals, interacting group members can more easily nurture or create feelings of superiority vis-à-vis competing actors. Not surprisingly, very large groups, such as nations, are especially good at this (Mead 1934: chap. 26). Moreover, it is well known that group members tend to put special emphasis on those positive characteristics where the in-group excels (on "social creativity" see Tajfel/Turner 1979; Platow et al. 2003: 270). Again, such self-serving evaluations can more easily be stabilized when groups rarely interact with foreign groups which excel in other dimensions and therefore tend to propagate different criteria. Therefore, communication within a disrespected group sometimes may go a long way in sheltering its members against its environment's arrogance or other forms of symbolic ill-treatment.

Yet while respect from one's peer group tends to be more important than respect between different groups, respect (or disrespect) expressed by out-groups can still be vital – both for the collective self-esteem of the in-group and for the self-esteem of its members. For one thing, greater cognitive and social distance cannot altogether invalidate explicit or implicit judgements of outsiders. Depending on social context and the salience of categories, current out-groups can quickly become part of a larger (superordinate) in-group (Gaertner/Dovidio 2000; Stone/Crisp 2007). Besides, due to their higher status, some out-groups' judgements

may always carry as great or even greater weight as judgements passed by members of one's in-group. And sometimes even disrespect shown by lower status groups can hurt. Cutting ties with groups hardly provides a solution for such unpleasant experiences. In a globalizing world contact between alien groups can be avoided less and less. Hence, confirmation among in-group members cannot indefinitely substitute for out-group recognition. Ultimately, temporary isolation could even increase the risk of especially hurtful encounters in the future. Without the correcting force of ongoing exchanges groups are inclined to exaggerate their own virtues or merits in relation to those of out-groups. Moreover, by isolating themselves groups forgo opportunities for communicating their own needs, ideas or achievements. The longer this state persists, then, the greater the risk that renewed encounters will result in particularly disappointing or upsetting exchanges on relative worth and status. Thus, temporary isolation is no substitute for genuine respect, especially not in the long run. It may only postpone the experience of disrespect to later (and then perhaps even more unpleasant) encounters. Ultimately then, the self-proclaimed virtues of the in-group remain in question as long as they are not understood, accepted and appreciated by significant out-groups, particularly by those of higher or similar status.

When the group is disrespected, individual group members are motivated to defend its the standing to the extent they identify with it. Depending on circumstances being a member of a given group may figure prominently in an individual's personal identity. Where this is the case, denigration of the group's standing also compromises the social affirmation its members derive from feeling part of it. Whoever disparages my group's values, achievements or features calls into question my own feeling of self-worth to the extent I share and take pride in those values, achievements or features (Mead 1934: chaps. 26, 34; Worchel 2003: 482; Tyler/Blader 2000: 144-48, 195). Resentment against attacks on the in-group's worth therefore is considered a prime factor in the origins and escalation of ethnic conflicts (Horowitz 2000: chaps. 4-5). Fervent nationalists will often react with outrage if other nationals insult their nation (Taylor 1992; Berlin 1991). On the other hand, sometimes people may experience respect for their group as more pleasant or up-lifting than recognition of their personal rights and achievements. Not a few nationalists have been willing to sacrifice the personal rights they enjoyed under colonial rule for the independence and international recognition of their nation.¹⁵ Respect for their group, its representatives and its symbols can thus profoundly affect individuals' self-esteem and consequently also their behaviour in various political contexts.

In the international arena, the desire for respect may influence individuals, groups and collective actors in several constellations. Four kinds of respect seeking may deserve special consideration:

- Nations or ethnical groups which care for their prestige or their status
- Bureaucratic elites which strongly identify with their state or department, for instance members of the foreign service
- Top officials of international organizations and NGOs who care for the status of their organizations
- Chief executives or heads of departments who may strive for the respect of their peer groups, especially if for some reason they feel more detached from their domestic environment.

Obviously, these various actors' desires for international respect may feed into one another, for instance if an autocratic ruler realizes that disrespect shown to him by his foreign peers

¹⁵ Interestingly though, many ethnic groups opposed political independence when decolonization would have put them in a state together with another "more advanced" group which enjoyed higher status (Horowitz 2000: 190p.).

might motivate domestic nationalists to question the national legitimacy of his rule. In this case, the ruler should be even more eager to gain more respect than he would be for personal reasons alone. This could result in variants of two-level-games where decision makers' win sets could be significantly constrained by the respect desires of powerful domestic actors.¹⁶

3. When states care for international respect: some hypotheses

Under what circumstances is it to be expected that actors will attach especially high importance to the respect they enjoy? In which constellations or issue areas will this motive play a particularly prominent role? When can the intrinsic worth of respect make actors to sacrifice material assets for some enhanced level of recognition? Which factors determine the level or kind of respect actors consider as adequate? Some of these questions have already been touched on in the preceding paragraphs. This section tries to give additional and more systematic answers. For the sake of simplification, it will only discuss those questions only in relation to the most important type of actor in our field: the state. Since this section will also try to identify those particular areas where the respect motive is most likely to provide some "value added" to conventional explanations, it will largely focus on those factors which enhance the symbolic importance of respect.

Apart from the material benefits international respect may entail for states, the following variables seem to affect the influence of this political motive:

- The importance an affected dimension (need, value, achievement, or right) has for the identity of the in-group
- Stability of the state's identity
- Outward orientation of the state's identity
- Domestic importance of international respect
- Status of relevant interaction partners
- Intensity of the identity threat or abuse

Before I elaborate on these variables, however, a few comments on the material variables are in order lest these more conventional motives for respect seeking get completely overlooked.

Four hypotheses seem especially pertinent concerning the material importance of respect:

- The more closely a state is involved in important international negotiations, the greater emphasis its representatives will put on adequate consideration of its importance, achievements, faculties, needs, standpoints and rights.
- The more conflict-ridden the state's regional environment is overall, the more decision makers will want to make sure that its reputation as a tough actor will not be undermined by other actors' disrespectful behaviour.¹⁷
- The more a state's physical power is or seems in decline, the more value its leadership will put on preserving the state's current level of respect (see Gilpin 1981: 30-34).
- Finally (and not surprisingly), a state will particularly try to assure adequate respect for those of its features (particularly needs and rights) which relate to its vital security and welfare interests.

¹⁶ My thanks to Rainer Baumann for pointing this implication out to me.

¹⁷ Research on U.S. street gangs has shown that many young males consider „respect“ indispensable for coping with a violent society with little police presence (Anderson 1999: 10, 33p.; Bourgois 1999: Introduction; see also O'Neill 1999: 137).

Unlike the above mentioned factors, *the relative importance a feature has for a given state's identity* chiefly affects respect seeking behaviour which aims at preserving national self-esteem. Depending on the dimension in question, there may be considerable variance in the weight decision makers and the population give to a particular feature. Some of those features will be highly valued under all circumstances. As far as its international rights are concerned each state can be expected to insist on their respect as a matter of principle. After all, few national decision makers will like the idea that their state is widely considered a "second rate state" as it does not enjoy the rights most other states can invoke. Also, all state elites are likely to appreciate a high level of attention. However, when it comes to the other dimensions of respect, specific characteristics of national (or state) identities may have a greater influence. Some state elites will put more emphasis on attention to their state's historic achievements, while others may primarily expect proper consideration of specific national needs or values.

- The more prominently a particular feature (e.g. some value, achievement, point of view, faculty) figures in a state's identity, the more emphasis its leadership will put on its proper consideration.

Another important variable related to national self-esteem is the *stability of a state's identity*. Just as with personal self-confidence it can be assumed that states which internal discourse attests to a strong consensus on national merits, values, achievements etc. will care less for foreign recognition than states whose elites or populations in the midst of an identity crisis. The latter will be much more sensitive to foreign affirmation and thus could be more easily hurt by other countries' disrespect. For similar reasons, recent experiences of disrespect are also likely to enhance a state's sensitivity (Kaplowitz 1990: 50-52). This leads to the following two hypotheses:

- The more fragile a state's identity appears at a given point in time, the more effort its leadership will put into securing international respect.
- The more recent a state experienced a serious case of foreign disrespect, the more strongly its elites will appreciate current respectful behaviour.

For obvious reasons, the *outward orientation of a state's identity* should also enhance its interest in foreign respect. Some states will always be more dependent on international affirmation than others whose self-image is more detached from past or current international status. It stands to reason that newly founded states or those with questionable internal legitimacy belong into this category. For instance, the former GDR suffered from this handicap as it could be neither based on democratic nor national legitimacy. Not surprisingly, it put strong effort into securing international recognition through triumphs in international sport competitions.¹⁸

- The stronger the outward orientation of a state's identity, the more its leadership will strive for international respect.

The *domestic benefits of international respect* should be of particular importance to challenged rulers who need to cope with domestic groups that have a strong outward orientation. Fragile regimes must fight the notion that they cannot represent the nation in a dignified manner. Under such circumstances, the elite's interest in its rule can force it to act upon the expectations of domestic groups which may cherish foreign respect for reasons of self-esteem (Lepsius 1990; Snyder 2000: chap. 2).

¹⁸ This example demonstrates once again how intrinsically motivated respect seeking can be linked to material interests. For obvious reasons the GDR leadership considered international recognition as a valuable means for stabilizing its domestic rule. On the other hand, it can be safely assumed that it also was keen on getting international respect for the state it had created.

- The stronger the domestic challenge from nationalistic groups, the more its rulers will strive for international respect.

The *nature and status of the other states involved* will also impinge on the intensity of respect seeking behaviour. Actors with higher international status or more similar features are more important in this context as humans tend to take their views more seriously than those of a lower standing or with very different characteristics. Humans rely to a greater extent on the judgements of actors which are more like themselves. They expect to agree with their peers but not necessarily with people with a very different background (Turner et al. 1987: chap. 4). Also, respectful behaviour from high status actors will be more appreciated, not least because it tends to get more positive attention from other observers (Brennan/Pettit 2004: chap. 3).

- The more characteristics it shares with another state, the more value a state will see in its respect.
- The more status another state enjoys, the more value a state will see in gaining its respect.

Intense threats or damages to a state's self-image should result in stronger respect seeking behaviour. Massive insults, permanent humiliation or persistent disrespect are likely to enhance the importance of respect for two reasons: For one thing, more intense abuse will evoke stronger anger and outrage. Thence, it will intensify the individual motivations for a proper response (Honneth 1994: 219-225; also Tyler/Blader 2000: 112; Smith 2003: 171). For another, more intense abuses are more likely to evoke similar reactions on the part of many affected individuals and thus more likely to lead to a common reaction (Honneth 1994: 260-262)

- The stronger the damage or threat to a state's self-image, the stronger its effort to avoid or rectify such abuses and to ensure proper respect.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that *involvement in conflicts* observed by international audiences will enhance respect seeking not only for reasons of deterrence. As pointed out above, a challenged state has a material incentive to cultivate its reputation for toughness. Yet, just like (almost) any other actor engaged in an open dispute, a state will also seek public confirmation of its rightful cause. Hence, in its quest for moral superiority it will highly appreciate bystanders affirming its national importance, needs, rights, achievements and superior qualities. And it will be equally grateful for depreciating comments on its opponent (Glasl 1997). Winning the image war in this way may not only enhance chances for prevailing in the substantive dispute, it is also essential for preserving one's self-image as the provoked party with no reason to yield.

- The more (intensely) a state is involved in international disputes, the more it will seek the respect of international bystanders.

4. The impact of respect: How respect and disrespect affect international interactions

The first part of this section presents some mechanisms and hypotheses which indicate how actors react to isolated instances of respectful or disrespectful behaviour. It puts forward a number of arguments which point to the conclusion that disrespect exacerbates conflict while respectful behaviour promotes cooperation. In the section's second part these causal links will be integrated into a more dynamic view of social interaction which briefly addresses the interplay between material stakes and threats to the conflicting parties' self-concepts.

4.1 *The static view: Respect, cooperation and conflict*

4.1.1 Disrespect, resistance and conflict

Disrespectful behaviour causes resistance and thus tends to intensify conflict. Forceful reactions to contempt or outright humiliation are the most powerful indicators of the social importance of respect. Just as with oxygen, being denied respect suddenly brings to the fore how vital the "stuff" actually is. Thus, the majority of disrespected people and collective actors almost immediately respond with efforts to redress the situation. Depending on the subjective severity of the transgression those reactions range from verbal protest or defection from ongoing cooperation to violent retribution. Obviously, ignoring a collective achievement which even the group in question considers not very significant will provoke a much milder reaction than violating a group symbol or a right it deems sacred. At least three intertwined mechanisms contribute to these responses: emotional agitation, image management and identity management.

The *emotional path to a forceful response* is perhaps the easiest to understand. After all, everybody has already experienced strong emotional reactions when being subjected to other peoples' contempt. Anger and a painful sense of frustration seem to be the most natural effects of such encounters. In fact, the link between insult and anger is apparently so strong that people routinely take anger as an indication of insult, even when they try to make sense of their own behaviour (Miller 2001: 533). Outright humiliation often has the same effect. In both cases, "getting even" with the offender may become an instant desire. Less offensive demonstrations of disrespect tend to provoke less aggressive emotions (Miller 2001: 536). For instance, denying proper credit to a group's achievements will rarely incite collective rage. Still, if such inadequate consideration is experienced over a prolonged period of time it is most likely to stimulate a deep sense of frustration and of injustice. All three emotions, but in particular anger, are well known to ignite or fuel strong reactions against the disrespectful actor (Miller 2001: 532-536; Smith et al. 2003: 171; Tyler/Blader 2000: 112; Honneth 1994: chap. 8). In and of themselves, however, these emotional reactions need not trigger or intensify open resistance, let alone a violent response.

The precise emotional reaction of groups and collective actors significantly depends on political interpretations. There is no invariant causal link between disrespectful behaviour and a particular emotional reaction. While individuals often can immediately grasp the symbolic meaning of personal actions they are confronted with, groups and large organizations frequently require public debates to arrive at a widely shared interpretation of such political gestures (Honneth 1994: chap. 5). Usually, the ambiguous nature of political actions gives interested actors some scope for verbally framing the behaviour in question. Research on

nationalism has repeatedly demonstrated that endangered oligarchies try to steer public emotions towards hatred for foreigners (Snyder 2000: chap. 2). In order to do so, they may depict rather innocuous actions as slaps into the nation's face. In other cases, though, elites themselves may sincerely buy into such dramatic interpretations or may be driven by mass publics to outwardly accepting them. In the latter case, elite or public emotions indeed help to cause open resistance to disrespect; in the former, other elite interests should be considered the chief cause, whereas latent public emotions at least acted as a critical enabling factor. How much scope for interpretation elites actually enjoy, largely depends on the group's identity discourse to which I will turn after discussing the second mechanism.

Concern for one's public image is another important factor stimulating open resistance against acts of disrespect. Repairing a tarnished image can be rational motive for retribution. As indicated above, open denial of respect may severely harm an actor's reputation as a resolute defender of its interests. Therefore, condoning an open violation of one's rights or needs may compromise an actor's capability to deter or compel in some future crisis. Hence, it seems rational to forcefully react to such provocations (a) the more obvious they are, (b) the wider the audience is and (c) the more likely it seems that the offended actor will soon get involved in similar crises where future opponents could draw analogies from current conflict behaviour.¹⁹ A second (and often related) motive for public resistance is the interest in protecting or improving one's status. In contrast to the concern for a tough reputation, this motive can also be affected by disrespect for achievements, standpoints and faculties. Just like a disregard for one's rights, overlooking or ridiculing these valued features can weaken an actor's prestige or lower its social rank to "a second class actor". This, in turn, reduces its "soft power" and thus can diminish its chances for influencing all kinds of debates and negotiations (Nye 2004). Accordingly, even from a rationalist point of view it only seems natural that disrespected actors will be inclined to redress attacks on their image. Yet how far they go in this regard is a matter of debate. It stands to reason that rationalists routinely underestimate the resolve of disrespected actors since they do not address the symbolic implications of disrespect.

Additional motives for such resistance which evade rationalist theories stem from actors' *need to manage their identity*. They also look to the symbolic value of public recognition. Being denied social confirmation of one's rights, faculties or merits usually is seen as an undeserved discrimination vis-à-vis those who are recognized in these respects for reasons which could also be applied to oneself. As such, this kind of disrespect can undermine an actor's self-esteem in at least two ways: On one hand, it can amount to a denial of the social value of some specific feature which is of central importance to a group's identity. For instance, playing down some of its historic achievements or denigrating one of its essential cultural values can put the very foundation of the group's self-esteem into question. As long as the group tolerates this affront it cannot be sure of the specific value it has for the rest of society. To reassert the latter, the group must resist this stance by engaging in a redefinition of historic memory or evaluative standards. For instance, it can apply some broader cultural standards in order to convince the wider audience that an underestimated effort or achievement actually meets the super-ordinate criteria from which more specific criteria are derived. If it prevails in this dispute it has also succeeded in reassuring itself of the value that lies in its

¹⁹ Due to its importance for debates on rational deterrence, reputation for resolute behavior is the one aspect of respect which already got wide attention in strategic studies and mainstream IR (see xxx Mercer 1996). The irony of this attention however resides in the fact that the alleged concern for a tough reputation seems to be ungrounded. In fact, crisis opponents rarely search past behaviour for clues concerning current resoluteness. Apparently, they are too well alert to the many differences between past and present crisis constellations (Mercer xxx).

defining characteristics. Yet even during such struggles for recognition the group can already achieve part of its symbolic aims: In itself the mere fact that it starts an open fight for the recognition of its special features makes a public point concerning the great value of those features. Thus, in effect, by the mere act of fighting the group partly pre-establishes the very public recognition it is still fighting for (Honneth 1994: chap. 8). In that sense, the group may value the struggle also in its own right.

On the other hand, disrespect can also result from a refusal to recognize a group's possession of a feature whose value is commonly accepted. For instance, an actor may fail to acknowledge a group's economic prowess or may deny it the rights usually enjoyed by this type of group. In this case, the sufferance of undeserved discrimination is even more obvious. Accordingly, this form of disrespectful behaviour arouses an even stronger sense of injustice. It directly attacks an actor's status as an equal for it denies this actor the recognition other actors with the same features routinely get. Practically, this kind of disrespect amounts to the statement: "Although you may share the criterion in question with *xyz*, I do not give you the same amount of respect, simply because you are not *xyz* but *abc*. Because you are you, you are of lower status." This is a straight attack on an actor's identity and thus can hardly be condoned without profoundly hurting one's self-esteem. Once again, fighting for the equal rights which one claims may come to be seen as an end in itself, for to some extent the mere act of fighting already establishes equality, as it tends to force the transgressor to take oneself seriously as an equal opponent.

Severe instances of humiliation can be considered an extreme variant of this type of arbitrary discrimination and thus tend to evoke the strongest emotional and physical reactions. As outlined above, humiliation is an extreme form of status denigration in as much as it strips an actor of its status as an autonomous actor with some intrinsic worth of its own. Often, humiliation is meant to reduce actors to mere objects with little or no control over their own fate. It thus challenges not only some specific rights or merits, but calls into question an actor's dignity, that is, its very quality as a subject of rights or moral qualities. In effect, humiliation often amounts to a statement that somebody is not worthy of having *any* rights or moral qualities. Accordingly, humiliation is the most blatant attack on an actor's self-respect. It leaves little choice between putting up a fight and publicly giving up one's claim for actor status.

Whether evident resistance to disrespectful behaviour actually succeeds in (re-)establishing respect in the eyes of others, is an open question, the answer to which largely depends on the relation between challenge and response. In some cases of hateful humiliation even the most noble and courageous acts of resistance will not make the transgressor respect its victim. In general, however, the victim stands a good chance of success as long as it can tailor the precise quality of its response to the nature of the challenge. Disrespect for an actor's importance often can be easily remedied by a mere act of resistance which by itself forces the transgressor to take its victim seriously. However, even in this case, the victim needs to comply with norms of reasonableness as understood by the transgressor and the wider audience. An overly aggressive reaction might re-establish the victim as an important actor, yet, at the same time, such an unrestrained application of violence may earn it new disrespect for its immoral conduct. Gaining due recognition for one's rights, rank, standpoints, special achievements or faculties usually requires even more circumspect reactions. Such acts must not only stay within the bounds of proportionality, they also need to successfully appeal to normative or evaluative standards held by those whose respect is sought for. And they must address the audience in a respectful manner (see below)! Otherwise, resistance will not bring the audience to re-evaluate the feature(s) which had been denied proper appreciation. To be

effective a struggle for respect hence depends on careful consideration of prevailing social norms and standards of evaluation.²⁰

Finally, resistance to open acts of disrespect can also be motivated by the fact that a strong reaction can directly reconfirm the victim's self-esteem, that is, *regardless of any observers' perceptions, judgements or reactions*. This becomes clear by looking at the implicit categorization effects of such interactions. By initiating an open act of disrespect a transgressor signals that he considers its victim as the kind of actor "which can be dealt with in this way". Often, this may be hurtful in itself. Still, the insult gets even more cutting if the victim fails to respond, for if it does not even try to resist it actually confirms the transgressor's judgment that the victim really is the kind of actor that can be dealt with in this way (Miller 2001: 540-42; with further references). Practically, by not responding the victim leaves the definition of its social type to the perpetrator. It effectively consents to its classification as a member of a lower status group. Even in situations without any significant audience, not responding to such acts entails considerable psychic discomfort, especially in humiliating encounters. If, however, the victim responds, the mere act itself implies a successful re-categorization. Once again, resistance seems to be worthwhile just for its own sake. At the very least, a halt to cooperation with the offender is required for.²¹

The fact that respect is not only sought for instrumental reasons implies that in fighting disrespect actors may go way beyond the escalation levels rationalist scholars would expect.²² Thus, the experience of disrespect may induce actors to bear larger costs and risks in response to transgressions than they would be willing to incur for material considerations alone. This, in turn, can have three important effects which cannot be accounted for by rationalist explanations of conflict behaviour: First, the experience of disrespect can lead to more intense reactions to a given transgression. In fact, it may even instigate a reaction where otherwise none would be anticipated. Second, such an experience can cause an actor to persist in its resistance over a surprisingly long period of time. Finally, and related to the first two effects, the experience of disrespect may bring about violent conflicts in cases where a rational calculation of material risks would rule out mutual escalation (Fearon 1995). In fact, an act of disrespect could even turn a costly war into positive-sum game if at least one of the

²⁰ Perhaps this point is best exemplified by the very ritualistic nature of traditional duels (on similarities between duels and contemporary "wars of honor" see Aschmann 2006). In 19th century Europe, a disrespected man could not simply restore his public image (his honor) by physically attacking the transgressor. Instead, he had to follow a precise set of rules which regulated the proper way of "demanding satisfaction", the choice of arms and the procedures of the violent encounter itself. Although this may be considered an extreme case of social regulation, it nevertheless points to an important heuristic implication: Unrestrained, yet premeditated attacks on an opponent indicate that strategic motivations dominate the use of violence. On the other hand, controlled resistance which carefully complies with general standards of acceptable behaviour (even when doing so diminishes the opportunities for prevailing over the opponent) often aims at respect. (Note that the reverse implication does not hold: an all-out response does not necessarily prove that the experience of disrespect did not play a causal role. After all, individuals or groups, when subjected to open contempt, sometimes react with blind rage. In this case, however, the absence of control indicates that the nature of the reaction did not result from a rational calculation of odds.)

²¹ This intrinsic value of resistance against disrespect may become more obvious when we imagine getting mugged in a foreign city. If we immediately give away our wallet the material loss may be just the same as when losing the wallet through mere negligence. Also, the damage to our public image or status would be just the same (i.e., zero) since only the mugger knows about the incidence and we are most unlikely to ever encounter him again. Still, the humiliating experience of being reduced to a helpless carrier of a wallet will hurt our sense of self-respect. It feels as if by peacefully giving away our wallet, we also gave away part of ourselves. Simmel xxx

²² On the following see also Aschmann (2006: chap. V) who makes very similar points with regard to the impact of honor considerations on Franco-Prussian conflicts during the 19th century.

combatants comes to the inclusion that resistance to disrespect in itself is valuable regardless of the military outcome. This may go a large way in explaining the fact that even very weak states rarely react to aggression with immediate surrender. Instead, the great majority of these victims choose to fight against all odds.²³ A closer look at the respect dimension of social interaction could thus considerably enrich our understanding of military conflict. In fact, it might even help explain the origins and duration of wars which otherwise would remain mysterious.

From the mechanisms just described a number of hypotheses can be derived from. All of them presuppose that the (individual or collective) victim has come to the conclusion that (a) the behaviour in question must be interpreted as an act of disrespect and that (b) it believes that the offending actor anticipated this interpretation.²⁴ The term “disrespectful behaviour”, as it is used below, can relate to both disrespectful acts and passive denials of recognition.

Hypotheses on disrespect and conflict:

- Disrespectful behaviour will incite or intensify resistance to the transgressor (ranging from verbal protests over a halt to cooperative efforts to violent forms of retribution).
- The wider the relevant audience which witnessed a provocative act, the less likely the victim is to give in before it has achieved effective rehabilitation.
- Disrespectful behaviour which apparently was tailored to be seen this way will incite more forceful reactions than behaviour of actors which apparently just did not care about the symbolic connotations of their behaviour.
- Disrespect for an actor’s achievements, standpoints, faculties or merits will lead to protest reactions which are less forceful and more norm-governed than reactions to disrespect for an actor’s overall importance, rights or status.
- The stronger the symbolic link between the disrespectful behaviour and essential elements of the victim’s identity or public image, the more forceful and the more disregarding of material costs the reaction will be.
- The more humiliating the act of disrespect (that is the more directly it is targeted against the victim’s quality as an autonomously acting moral entity), the more forceful and disregarding of both material costs and social norms the reaction will be.

4.1.2 Respect and cooperation

Preceding experience of respect increases the chances of cooperative behaviour. This causal relation has repeatedly been established by social psychologists for small group interactions at the work place. However, as will be shown below, there are also good reasons for expecting a positive link between respect and international cooperation. Specifically, the experience of respect should promote mutual trust and should facilitate bargaining over the distribution of

²³ Reiter and Stam (1998: 380) consider this a strong indication that many governments operate on the assumption „[that] honor in defeat is intrinsically preferable to ignominious surrender“ (see also Aschmann 2006: chap. V). Since most contemporary governments are no longer guided by a specific code of honor, the defense of national dignity may be a more pertinent classification of this motive. After all, by choosing resistance, governments demonstrate that their nation, even though it may confront certain defeat, still is an important actor who cannot be ignored.

²⁴ Thus I refrain from presenting hypotheses on the collective interpretation of the symbolic meaning of behaviour which might be considered disrespectful.

common gains. Perhaps most important, mutual respect seems vital for creating a deliberative exchange of ideas over the best definition and solution to a shared problem.

Research by social psychologists clearly shows that the experience of respect causes more cooperative behavior. Both laboratory experiments and surveys of peoples' experiences at the work place demonstrate significant effects of respect on pro-social behaviour. When people feel respected by fellow group members for their work and ideas, when they think they are accepted as group members, they demonstrate greater compliance with work norms, meet performance expectations to a greater extent and show greater willingness to engage in extra-work on behalf of the group. Moreover, respected employees also identify more strongly with their work group which further promotes their pro-social activities. As a matter of fact, taken together with personal pride in the group respect by fellow group members has a far greater impact on these kinds of pro-social behaviour than the amount of resources the group provides to its members (Tyler/Blader 2000, 2001; also Doosje et al. 1999; Mercer LLC 2008a; Mercer LLC 2008b: 14p.). In line with expectations derived from procedural fairness research, the subjective feeling of respect was strongly influenced by perceptions of fair and polite treatment which people tend to take as an indication of high personal status within their group. Institutionalized voice opportunities were particularly important in this regard (Tyler/Blader 2000: 136, 171, 178). As a result, individuals become significantly more interested in the success of their groups (Tyler/Blader 2000). These survey results have been confirmed by laboratory experiments that simulated problematic social situations. When confronted with a public goods dilemma, students who felt respected by their group showed greater willingness to forego personal gain in favour of collective interests. This effect was particularly pronounced for marginal, as opposed to core group members (De Cremer 2002). Findings in social psychology thus clearly support both positive and negative effects of respect behaviour: while disrespect stimulates resistance and conflict, respectful actions and procedures promote cooperative attitudes and activities.

However, before the latter findings are used as predictions for international interactions two caveats should be considered. First of all, most of the research on the effects of respect has largely focused on interactions within small groups. So far, there are extremely few studies on the impact of respectful behaviour across group boundaries. It stands to reason, that, in the latter condition, the experience of respect should be a weaker cause for cooperative behaviour. Interacting groups often lack a common identity which serves the self-esteem aspirations of the groups' members. Thus, respectful behaviour on the part of out-group members should be comparatively less valued for its positive identity implications (Smith et. 2003: 160p., 170). This "discount effect" presumably is especially strong when groups with very different cultural backgrounds interact (Smith et al. 1998: 471p.; with further references). In this case, due to contrasting values and standpoints the experience of respect should be less valued for the information it provides for personal (or group) self-assessment. Second, it should be remembered that the concept of respect as it is widely used in social psychology only partially match the concept of respect as it was defined for the purposes of this paper. For instance, the survey questions mostly used by Tyler and his associates primarily focus on others' appreciation of one's group membership and their respect for one's ideas and work contributions, while seldom directly addressing respect for one's rights, personal importance, and needs.

Still, there are enough good reasons for following the suggestion of social psychologists (Tyler/Blader 2000: 198) by making use of these insights and findings in an IR context. First of all, there seems to be sufficient overlap between the respect concept developed by social psychologists and the more encompassing one which (based on the philosophical discussion) I

propose here for international interactions. In particular, both of them clearly focus on the self-evaluative implications of others' behaviour. Second, research on stereotyping between different groups has shown that mutual agreement on the nature and valuation of respective group features affects the quality of inter-group relations. "[M]utual respect for the consensually shared stereotypes of each group" promotes intergroup harmony, while a "mismatch between our self-stereotypes and the out-group's stereotypes about our group, or a mismatch in the perceived valence of the groups' attributes can lead to intergroup conflict" (Wright/Taylor 2003: 439). Also, there are at least preliminary findings which make it plausible that pro-social effects of respect shown within groups can also be anticipated for interaction among groups. Thus, research on sub-groups sharing a common superordinate identity indicates that respect for those subgroups can significantly affect their members' affective relation with the more encompassing group. Black or Hispanic Americans who deemed their sub-group respected by fellow Americans showed more positive affects towards Americans in general, greater trust in the U.S. judicial system, and less in-group favouritism (Huo/Molina 2006: 371; see also Smith et al. 2003: 167-170). Such effects could not be observed among white Americans. (Again, this shows that peripheral members show a greater sensitivity for indications of respect than core members of a community.) Finally, while actors with different national backgrounds may find it harder to develop a shared identity, they can do so nevertheless. For instance, decision makers or negotiators collectively engaged in problem solving may indeed come to see themselves as members of a group that is confronted with a common problem, even in the absence of a threatening out-group. Faced with difficult domestic audiences, they may even develop a sense of camaraderie vis-à-vis their national publics (Wolf, K. D., 2000). What is more, once a weak sense of common identity has evolved, members of this new group become more sensitive to positive signals by the group. Indeed, respect shown by other group members increases one's sense of belonging (Hogg/Abrams 2003: 417) which, in turn, should make one yet more receptive to the pro-social effects of further instances of respectful behavior. Overall, then, self-enhancement effects as confirmed by social psychologists should also operate in various cross-border contexts.

There also more conventional reasons for expecting that different forms of respect can help overcoming the classic problems of international cooperation. Respect can mitigate the harmful effects of low levels of trust, of differences over the distributions of gains, of the quest for autarchy and of disagreements over the assessment of shared problems. In the first place, respect helps to generate and maintain higher levels of trust. This becomes evident once we think of the implications of comprehensive respect. As defined in this paper, adequate respect for another actor includes proper consideration of the latter's importance, needs, merits, and rights (including privileges due to some special status). Having been respected on all these dimensions provides important information on both the type of the current interaction partner and the social relation that one shares with it. Thus, if an interaction partner has respected one's *rights* over an extended period of time this should decrease the likelihood of its future defection, as continued compliance with cooperative norms tends to promote their domestic internalization via bureaucratic habitualization or identity transformation (Checkel 2005). Respect that has been shown for another actor's *needs* also tends to diminish the risk of a collapse of cooperation. Past awareness of the partner's interests indicates a thorough knowledge of that actor's stakes in the cooperative endeavour. This should lessen the potential for underestimating the partner's reaction to defective moves and thereby reduce the risk for careless unilateral moves. What is more, recognizing another actor's *status, importance, faculties or merits* also signals important information which tends to further trust on the part of the respected actor. Recognizing an actor in this way indicates that one basically shares its positive self-concept. Apparently, one values this actor almost as

much as it does itself. This has two consequences for compliance with cooperative norms: First, it signals that cheating on this partner would carry a higher price tag in terms of self-esteem. After all, all kinds of actors tend to especially care for the approval of those whom they like best (Turner et al. 1987: chap. 4). Second, an actor which is highly esteemed by one-self presumably likewise enjoys considerable prestige in the eyes of third actors belonging to a common peer group. In this case, a cooperative association with the highly esteemed actor will also enhance one's prestige among those other actors (Brennan/Pettit 2004: chap. 3). This should further enhance the interest in continued collaboration. Finally, if trust cannot be reduced to a calculation of one's partner's incentives but also must be seen as "an emotional belief" concerning the nature of a social relationship (Mercer 2005: 95-97), a history of respectful interaction will further enhance confidence in the partner's pro-social behaviour. True, depending on circumstances each of these mechanisms can be rather weak. Taken together, though, they may well have a significant effect on trust in the cooperative intention of one's partner.

This greater trust, in turn, can alleviate two other impediments to collaboration: relative gains concerns and the desire for autarchy. The latter is often due to fears that commercial partners could make political use of one's dependence on some good or commodity. Under anarchy, this concern may sometimes induce even cost-conscious actors to forego the economic advantages of the international division of labor. Greater trust among partners should thus make them more willing to tolerate vulnerability for the sake of efficiency. Basically the same reasoning also applies to relative gains concerns. They, too, at least partially result from fears that a partner may exploit its powerful position, in this case by transferring its bigger gains from cooperation into greater power resources which he might then use against his erstwhile partners. Again, enhanced confidence in the cooperative intentions of the partner would directly tackle the source of this problem.

Distributional issues also tend to be marginalized by mutual respect. As just pointed out, relative gains considerations resulting from concerns about power shifts should play a lesser role in such a relationship. Moreover, mutual respect should also make partners less concerned about the status effects which might result from a particular distribution of benefits. Often, actors do appreciate material rewards not only for the material benefits that come with them but also as symbols for their social standing. In other words, they consider the distribution of material goods as a "test" of their social standing (Ross 2001: 163). If, however, mutual respect includes mutual recognition of each others' status, cooperative partners can focus on the material gains for their own sake alone. Bargaining should thus become easier, as one motivation for insisting on a bigger share of the spoils recedes into the background. In some cases, a pre-existing consensus on relative status may already suggest an implicit formula for the division of resources or other benefits. For instance, the distribution of votes, high level positions or other kinds of privileges in international organizations may be facilitated by mutual acceptance of the states' international status.²⁵

Finally, mutual respect is also vital for deliberative problem solving and thus tends to make cooperative agreements both more attractive and more legitimate. This applies above all to

²⁵ To a certain degree, this may even apply to cooperation between rivals like the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the mutual recognition of superpower status paved the way to arms control agreements based on the principle of parity (Garthoff 1985: 51-67). As a result, both powers could finally start serious negotiations on the distribution of military power. Of course, bargaining remained tough as many distributional issues remained on the table. This was not only a consequence of technological and geostrategic asymmetries. It was also due to the fact, that Moscow and Washington did not respect each other on many of the other dimensions, such as standpoints, achievements, and merits. Hence, mutual trust remained low.

situations where a small number of officials or experts debate the nature of a common problem and the best ways to tackle it. In such settings, successful persuasion by the rational force of the better argument can only work when the persuadee is convinced that (a) he had a proper chance to voice all his needs and arguments and that (b) these points were seriously considered by the persuaders. Otherwise, the persuadee can hardly be assured that the persuader's views really are superior to his own. Moreover, mutual respect for importance, standpoints, values, achievements and rank is crucial for avoiding status conflicts in deliberative debates. While a mutually accepted status difference facilitates persuasive efforts by the higher ranking actor (Chaiken et al. 1996: 726p.) and while mutually agreed status equality promotes mutual understanding (Hogg/Abrams 2003: 420), domineering behaviour and disagreements on relative status easily poison the open exchange of ideas (see Risse 2000: 10p., 17; Deitelhoff/Müller 2005: 169, 173; also Wright/Taylor 2003: 438p., 447). In fact, usually „inter-group relations are characterized by a struggle over status and prestige” (Hogg/Abrams 2003: 422) and inter-group encounters, especially inter-group bargaining, further accentuate competitiveness (Hogg 2001: 193). Hence it requires a high level of mutual respect to cleanse an exchange from such rivalry. Once respect becomes questionable, competitive group identities readily reassert themselves. As a result, factual issues and disagreements will also assume a prestige dimension, so that each “side” is tempted to stick to its points “as a matter of principle” in order to defend the group’s rank and image. Moreover, as the debate (again) becomes a competition over status this will further stimulate group salience and thus will also consolidate group identities. Arrogant or condescending treatment, in particular, tends to undermine personal self-confidence, thereby increasing attachment to the in-group and dependence on the affirmation it can provide. This, in turn, stimulates stereotyping, polarization and greater trust in the in-group’s views. As a consequence, confidence in the in-group’s value will rise. Yet this comes at the price of blocking the unbiased appreciation of out-group arguments. Finally, the experience of arrogance or other forms of disrespect may further inhibit learning by provoking sheer anger which will further compromise rational reflection. For all these reasons, mutual respect is a *sine qua non* for an open exchange of ideas required for jointly identifying the best solution for a common problem. Therefore, it can play a significant role in the search for more beneficial, more legitimate and thus also more durable agreements.

Hypotheses on respect and cooperation:

- The stronger the respect between two actors, especially for their rights and individual needs, the less they will worry about their partners’ possible defection.
- The stronger the respect between two actors, especially for their rights and individual needs, the less they will worry about relative gains or about compromising their autonomy through greater dependence.
- The stronger the respect between two actors, in particular respect for each other’s status, the easier the parties will agree on the distribution of cooperative gains.
- The stronger the respect between two actors, in particular respect for each other’s achievements, faculties and rank, the easier they will arrive at a common definition and solution for a problem at hand.

4.2 Feedback mechanisms: Respect and conflict interaction

The previous section took a rather static view on the effects of respect and disrespect. It tried to derive hypotheses for interactive situations which were either unbalanced by an isolated act of disrespect or were characterized by a preceding history of respectful interaction. Of course, real world interactions are much more complicated. In particular, they will be characterized by various feed-back loops. The preceding paragraph has already indicated that disrespect by one group is likely to fuel disrespectful behaviour on the part of the other. Anything else would be a huge surprise to anyone familiar with social identity theory. That respectful behavior by one group tends to be reciprocated by the other also seems almost a natural conclusion (Wright/Taylor 2003: 448). Consequently, in some ambiguous situations an act of respect or disrespect may easily tip the balance towards spirals of either respect or disrespect. Given the inherently competitive nature of inter-group relations, disrespectful behaviour appears more likely to start such a circle. Hence, it seems promising to look into the nature of actions prone to start such dynamics. Two factors immediately come to one's mind: cultural misunderstandings and conflicts over scarce resources. In the following, I shall focus on the latter, because (a) the possible causes of misunderstandings seem too numerous to be addressed in this paper and (b) such misunderstandings may not matter much unless they happen in the context of a resource conflict.²⁶ Therefore, it is more important to raise the awareness for interactions between resource oriented conflict behaviour and experiences of disrespect. As will be argued, there are quite a few ways in which resource conflicts and respect conflicts can mutually reinforce each other.²⁷

At various points of the escalation process, conflicts over the distribution of some material resource can fuel implicit or explicit quarrels over recognition and status which, in turn, may further exacerbate the conflict in its material dimension. If a distributional dispute cannot be solved via compromise and both sides persist in their irreconcilable demands, each side refuses to recognise the full needs of its opponent. This in itself already may be seen as disrespectful to the extent each actor considers itself fully entitled to insist on its complete demand. Either implicitly or explicitly, both sides start to question the importance and/or legitimacy of the other side's interests. Yet, by disputing this claimed entitlement the opponent often goes one step further and starts to challenge the very values, norms and standpoints the claim was based upon. Consequently, prevailing becomes even more important, for giving up parts of the original material demand may now be seen as tantamount with giving up parts of one's values or norms. Also, the more controversial this quarrel gets, the closer the opponents move to the core of each other's self-concept. By assaulting components of its opponent's world view each side asserts the superiority of its own ideas. At least implicitly, but often also in direct words, both sides thereby degrade the legitimacy of the opponent's value system and thus practically also question the value of the opponent itself. In other words, the material conflict turns into a status conflict. The longer it persists, the greater the risk that it becomes a contest over the *moral* status of the parties (see also Wright/Taylor 2003: 443). Once the conflict reaches this level, further escalatory mechanisms may well be activated. First of all, mutual trust will be further impaired, thus making a negotiated settlement even less attractive. Second, disrespect of the parties' moral selves will significantly increase their demand for social affirmation. Both parties are likely to satisfy this demand both internally and externally. Internally, a challenged group will step

²⁶ As a matter of fact, people hardly react to disrespectful behavior which they attribute to a lack of knowledge or understanding (Miller 2001: xxx).

²⁷ The following observations were significantly inspired by Glasl's conflict escalation model (Glasl 1997: chap. 10).

up its self-assuring discourse by reasserting its own values and further denigrating those of its opponent. As a result of the latter, its material demands may even further expand. After all, if the opponent is seen as an unworthy actor through and through, all of its entitlements become questionable. Externally, each party will look for allies who support its respective standpoints and demands. To this end, it will address a wider audience with its claims and with disparagements of its opponent's moral standing. By raising the stakes in this way, both sides make accommodation even more costly. Ultimately, they may competitively voice their mutual contempt in such a way that the dignity of each actor seems to call for the extinction or radical transformation of its enemy.

Obviously, this interaction between material and symbolic conflicts is not an automatic process. Far from it. Otherwise, we would be at each other's throats most of the time. There is quite a number of "circuit breakers": asymmetric interdependence in the material dimension may force one side to swallow its anger, mediators may succeed in reconciling the norms and values of the opponents (or they may at least may increase mutual understanding of the other side's claims), parties may be able to disengage from the interaction or they could discover attractive package deals etc. The point to be made here is rather that, once feelings of disrespect are incited, seemingly trivial conflicts over material issues can assume a symbolic dimension which begets escalation and frustrates compromise. Thus, something which superficially looks like a fierce distributional conflict may in fact be a bitter struggle for recognition.

5. Recognizing and analyzing the impact of respect

An analysis of all the likely effects of respect in international relations provokes the obvious question: if respect and disrespect affect interactions in so many ways, why have they not been studied before? How come that practically all explanations of international behaviour fail to include this variable? Should this not be taken as an indication that respect merely plays a marginal role in IR? This conclusion would be premature, for there are some plausible explanations why the respect dimension of international relations often gets so little attention. First of all, it hardly needs elaboration that, most of the time, being respected concerning one's rights, status, social importance, values, faculties and achievements is also useful in material terms. In this way, self-evaluative motives for respect seeking behaviour may simply "hide" behind conspicuous material interests. Hence, in a given case it may be very hard to distinguish self-evaluative and material incentives.²⁸ Second, actors' explicit explanations of their motivations may not be helpful, either. Frequently, disrespected actors will not voice their frustration publicly for fear for their prestige or rank. Of course, states usually insist on respect for their rights, status and needs. Yet, this again is also to be expected from an instrumental point of view. However, governments will rarely admit that they feel offended by inadequate consideration of their nation's achievements or faculties, for this could be taken as an indication for a lack of self-confidence.²⁹ Third, the impressive progress of that other social science, economics, induced political scientists to emulate the methods and ontology of their sister discipline (Mercer 2005; Brennan/Pettit 2004), and thus

²⁸ For a similar point on the analytical distinction between identity contests and conflicts over "objective" interests see also Tajfel/Turner 1979.

²⁹ To be sure, there are exceptions. For instance, China has an official "national humiliation day" for commemorating the slights it suffered at the hands of the imperialist powers. Of course, the day is also meant to remind the Chinese population that all this has been overcome by the resolute leadership of the communist party (Callahan 2004: 202).

to privilege material incentives and expected utility models over identity needs and social meaning. Thus, in case of doubt, rational-materialist explanations took precedence over accounts focused on symbolic interests and social processes. Contemporary scholars therefore readily attribute an escalation of a conflict to an escalation of risks or to an increased interest in the contested material resources, instead of looking for additional incentives rooted in an actor's identity needs.³⁰ In this way, many social scientists almost habitually take it for granted that, once they have found a plausible explanation based on material incentives, there is no further need looking for other motivational factors which also might be involved.

To be sure, this cannot be an excuse for falling into the opposite trap by indiscriminately applying respect based explanations where material accounts may suffice. The fact that material improvement can enhance an actor's self-esteem should be no reason for treating symbolic needs as the chief motivation throughout. Instead, we have to look for heuristic tools which can help us in discriminating the relative impact of different kinds of incentives. Fortunately, there are indeed some scenarios where analytical differentiation is possible (see Wolf forthcoming). For instance, respect motivations are likely to play a role

- where groups may fight costly wars without any reasonable chance of success,
- where retaliation is directed chiefly against targets of symbolic meaning rather than against objects with some strategic value,
- when resisting actors carefully comply with general standards of acceptable behaviour instead of consciously targeting the opponent's weakest spot,
- where actors insist on voice opportunities, although they are fully aware that expressing their concerns will not yield additional influence.

Another analytical tool would be detailed investigations of decision making processes. For example, it would be worthwhile to study possible covariations between experiences of disrespect and the hardening of bargaining positions. If the above mentioned hypotheses on disrespect and conflict behaviour are valid, we should observe both diachrone and synchronic covariations: Within a group of decision makers the more angered officials should be less accommodating to the offending state than their colleagues, while in the wake of disdainful treatment states should be less accommodating than before. Distinguishing the impact of respect motivations may thus be a demanding task, but it is far from hopeless.

That it might be worthwhile to embark on such detailed studies is indicated at least by some bits of anecdotal evidence and opinion surveys which, when taken together, should give reason to pause. For instance, there are strong indications that feelings of disrespect aggravated quite a number of bilateral relations. US-Iranian relations, US-Russian relations or recent Polish-German relations seem to be obvious cases calling for detailed investigations. (Also, one may wonder if the US occupation of Iraq might have been far more successful if, instead of condoning the torture and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners, high ranking administration officials had clearly expressed their great admiration for the Iraqi cultural heritage.) Furthermore, polling data show that the perception of disrespect plays a major role in relations between Muslims and Western civilization. Thus, according to a 2005 Gallup poll more than 60% of Iranians, Saudi Arabians and Turks considered Muslims disrespected by

³⁰ It is ironic to note that the father of modern economics, Adam Smith, primarily saw material resources as means for symbolic self-enhancement, rather than the other way round. When considering the question why humans struggle so hard for the betterment of their material situation, Smith came to the following conclusion: „To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency and approbation, are all the advantages we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded on the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all the agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him” (Smith 2004 [1791]: Section I, iii, 2).

the West. Among Egyptians and Palestinians more than 80% agreed with that perception. When asked, what the West could do to improve relations with Islamic countries the most frequent response was “[show] greater respect for Islam and stop regarding Muslims as inferior” (World Economic Forum 2008: 131p.). Also, vast majorities of Muslims all over the world (including communities living in Western countries) saw a prime cause of the controversy over the Danish Muhammad cartoons in Western disrespect for Islam (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006: 59). In a similar vein, feelings of disrespect seem to complicate Western relations with the developing countries. Africans, in particular, express dismay at what they see as condescending and self-gratifying behavior of Northern officials, NGOs and celebrities engaged in conspicuous efforts to ‘save Africa’ (Iweala 2007; Tevoedjre 2002: 43, 84; Lindner 2006: 83). As a matter of fact, a recent report written by independent African experts on the continent’s priorities even was published under the heading ‘Winning the War against Humiliation’ (Tevoedjre 2002). Apparently, feelings of disrespect are widely spread in the world beyond the wealthy democracies. Thence, the latter seem well advised to take those feelings seriously and figure out (a) if they compromise cooperative relations and (b) what could be done to mitigate these negative effects.

6. Conclusion: Implications for research and politics

This paper has tried to make the case for investigating the significance of respect for international relations. It has presented some ideas as to why and when states, not unlike persons or small groups, might be strongly motivated to seek respect for its own sake. In addition, it has discussed a few mechanisms and hypotheses concerning the impact of perceived respect and disrespect. Specifically, it has introduced theoretical arguments which indicate that disrespect promotes conflict while respectful behaviour furthers international cooperation. Given these potential impacts more research on respect seems long overdue.

Future systematic studies should particularly focus on the role of the respect motive in foreign policy and the political reactions to incidents of respect and disrespect. In case, such investigations prove important effects, more research should also go into analyzing the ways respect is secured or lost, the ways specific expectations of foreign respect form, the ways international respect can be effectively expressed, the particular institutional forms which might effectively grant respect to more members of international society etc. By clarifying these issues, studies on respect may not only enhance our understanding of international interactions but might also help both avoiding unnecessary conflicts and improving the opportunities for lasting collaboration.

Finally, it could be worthwhile also to investigate the costs and disadvantages of respectful behaviour. Given the benefits of mutual respect and the risks inherent in acts of disrespect one might too easily accept the maxim: the more respect is expressed, the better life will become for everyone. Doing so, however, would be oblivious to all the costs respectful behaviour can entail. Yet obviously, expressing one’s respect towards others does not come for free. First of all, as we all know from daily experiences, duly appreciating other peoples’ achievements, standpoints or importance consumes time which could be used for other purposes. Fully respecting their rights and needs may also cost money or other material resources. Second, giving others our thorough attention definitely means that we have less attention available for third parties or other issues. Third, respecting other actors, even when it just means paying attention to them, further opens us to their influence. Thus, respect can result in a transfer of power or control. Fourth and related, showing great respect for someone

else can lead to misunderstandings which blur status differences and hence complicate negotiations or decision making. Fifth, satisfying another state's respect expectations may run counter the prestige ambitions of domestic groups and consequently compromise the executive's domestic standing. While some of these costs may be avoidable and some of them may be tolerated in exchange for the beneficial effects of respect, they may still be significant. This, of course, should be seen as yet another reason for carefully investigating the possible advantages of showing more respect.

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