Reconciliation Between Nations: Overcoming Emotional Deterrents to Ending

Conflicts Between Groups

Argentina Chair for Research on Social Psychology

Of Conflict and Cooperation

Tel Aviv University

Contents

(1) Two perspectives on ending conflicts: Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation

Within psychology the theory and research on the antecedents of conflicts and their ending is subsumed under the term conflict resolution. This research and theory assumes that conflict is attributable to actors' disagreement on how to divide valuable resources between them. When the rivals are two countries the contested resource may be land, and when the rivals are two individuals this resource may be money. Regardless of the nature of the resource or the identity of the rivals this perspective implies that the way to end conflict is to negotiate an optimal formula for the division of these resources. Thus, the conflict resolution perspective views the end of conflict as the outcome of the calculus of opposing interests between rational actors.

This general view on the end of conflict has dominated relevant discussions in social psychology in particular (Pruitt, 1998; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), and the social sciences in general (Blau, 1964; Homans,1961). It has found expression in the methodologies that have been used to study these processes (e.g: Prisoner's Dilema Game, Colman, 1982; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965), and the theoretical explanations that have been offered to account for the ability or lack of ability of the parties to resolve the conflict (Emerson, 1981). Diplomacy can be viewed as the attempt to put these principles into action in the international arena. Although both practitioners (Savir, 1998) and scholars of international relations (Crawford, 2000) acknowledge the role of emotional-psychological factors in the diplomatic process , they view them as background factors and secondary in importance to the actual differences that separate the parties. Operating under these assumptions diplomats have focused their efforts on ending or preventing conflicts between nations trying to find a formula that will be accepted by the rivals on the division of the contested resources between them.

Another perspective on the end of conflict is the empirical and theoretical discussions that are subsumed under the concept of reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000; Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1996; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). As defined elsewhere (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Liviatan, in press) the reconciliation perspective views the end of conflict as the result of the removal of the <u>emotional barriers</u> that exist between the rivals. These include the emotions that are associated with the parties' perceptions of having been <u>victimized</u> by their adversary, and feelings of <u>distrust</u> that have accumulated during years of conflict. Discussions within this tradition tell us that if these emotional barriers are not removed the likelihood of reaching an agreement will be relatively low, and that even if an agreement had been reached it is not likely to hold. When distrust dominates the parties are unlikely to rely on their adversary's commitments and refuse to sign an agreement with them even if the contours of such an agreement are well known and accepted. Regarding feelings of victimization, when parties' attention is focused on past pains inflicted on them by their adversary they are unable to center on actions that will advance the prospects of future co-existence (Scheff, 1994).

Beyond the potential inhibitory role on parties' ability to reach an agreement the emotional barriers between the parties may put to naught an agreement after it had already been signed. If parties harbor feelings of distrust towards each other their post-agreement relations are likely to be fraught with misinterpretations and misperceptions of the rival's behavior and intentions. Moreover, the viability of an agreement that had been laboriously achieved will be threatened if the parties do not address feelings, which are associated with the past of victimization, such as need for revenge and lingering feelings of humiliation. This is likely to find expression in re-ignition of violence. Nowhere is this reality more evident than in 2002 in Tel-Aviv-

the time and place in which these words are written. In fact, the Oslo agreements

signed in 1993 deliberately avoided addressing issues of the parties' responsibility for

past wrongdoings. These agreements were based on the assumption that after some

years of gradual building of trust between the two parties they will be readier to

address these thorny emotional issues. The hostilities between Israelis and

Palestinians that began in the summer of 2000 suggest that this assumption may have

been inaccurate. In fact, the violence that started in October 2000 has deepened the

distrust between the two parties and created new memories of pain and victimization.

All this serves to again remind us that the end of conflict must be built on two pillars:

Finding a solution to the actual problems that separate the parties (e.g., division of

land) thorough processes of <u>conflict resolution</u>, and addressing the emotional barriers

that separate them through processes of <u>reconciliation</u>.

The focus of the present chapter is on reconciliation. We shall center on the

removal of the emotional barriers on the road to ending international conflicts.

Although our analysis is a general analysis of processes of reconciliation the examples

and the research findings are situated within the context of the conflict between

Israelis and Palestinians. In the following sections we shall elaborate on a distinction

between two categories of reconciliation: <u>Socio-emotional reconciliation</u> and <u>trust

building reconciliation</u> and present research that is relevant for each.

<u>(2) Two Routes to Reconciliation: Socio-emotional and Trust-Building Reconciliation</u>

Two emotional blocks that are grounded in the reality of conflict need to be

removed if the parties are to move from a reality of conflict to one of more

harmonious relations. The first is made up of feelings that originate from the parties'

perceived victimization by their adversary and center on the parties' wish to avenge

past wrongdoings done to them. This motivation is driven by the victims' desire to

restore perceptions of self control and self-worth that have been shattered by the experiences of victimization (Frijda, 1993). Such feelings originate from specific events which had occurred during the conflict in which one party views itself as having been unjustifiably victimized by the other. It should be emphasized that being a "victim" or "perpetrator" is viewed as psychologically construed and changeable as a function of relevant situational variables that affect an individual or group's construal of itself or its rival as one or the other. This active construal of self and other as victim or perpetrator has a key role in determining the course of conflict and the prospects of ending it. An example of this is the observation made by the first author (Nadler, 2002) and others (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998) that one of the reasons for the protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the fact that both Israelis and Palestinians view themselves as the only legitimate victim in the conflict. These emphases on active construal of victimhood that is affected by situational variables is consistent with social psychology's basic tenets that social reality is actively construed by actors and is that this construal is situationally determined (Ross & Nisbett, 1991)

One way in which feelings of victimhood can be dealt with is by taking revenge of one's rival- the perpetrator. Yet, while revenge is likely to have positive effects on the victim's feelings of self worth and control (Akhtar, 2002), it is associated with the danger of instigating a new round of violence in the form of revenge that is met by counter-revenge. The emotional barriers that are associated with feelings of victimization can be dealt with more constructively when the adversary apologizes to the victim who in turn may reciprocate by granting forgiveness to the pepetrator. This route has been discussed by Tavuchis (1991) under the heading of the apology-forgiveness cycle and is labeled in this context of inter-group relations as socio-emotional reconciliation. In relations between nations and

groups it is likely to take on the form of public apologies from leaders who assume responsibility for their nation's wrong doing. We shall expand on the nature of socio-emotional reconciliation and the conditions under which it may be more or less efficient in promoting reconciliation in subsequent sections.

The other emotional block on the road to securing conflict free relations is the distrust that exists between the adversaries after years of conflict and animosity. To remove this emotional block the parties must rebuild the trust between them in a prolonged and gradual process. This commonly occurs when the adversaries learn to trust each other as a consequence of successfully cooperating on joint projects. This process has been labeled by students of international relations as peace building (Lederach, 1997) and is labeled here as trust building reconciliation. In their recent review of the place of trust in inter-group negotiations Kramer & Carenevale (2001) write that much of the literature has recognized the circular relation between trust and cooperation. They write: "…Trust tends to beget cooperation and cooperation breeds further trust. Therefore, if a cycle of mutual cooperation can be initiated and sustained, trust will develop" (p. 441).

There are several key differences between these two routes towards reconciliation. These are differences in (a) the temporal focus of socio-emotional and trust-building reconciliation, (b) the nature of change that each addresses, and (c) the goal that each aims for. Regarding the temporal focus, socio-emotional reconciliation suggests that addressing past wrongdoings is the only way to build a reconciled future. In fact, this approach to reconciliation suggests that reconciliation between enemies is predicated on the perpetrator's willingness to accept responsibility for past wrongdoings, and the victim's willingness to let go of this painful past by granting forgiveness to the perpetrator. Trust-building reconciliation, on the other hand, is not

concerned with the painful past. Its emphasis is on <u>cooperation in the present</u> as a vehicle to achieve more trustworthy and reconciled future. It makes the implicit assumption that to "let bygones be bygones" is the most effective strategy for reconciliation between enemies. Thus, whereas socio-emotional reconciliation holds that confronting the painful past is the key to a reconciled future, trust-building reconciliation suggests that cooperation in the present is the key for such a future.

A second difference between these two routes to reconciliation is the nature of change that each implies. Socio-emotional reconciliation implies an immediate change in relations between victim and perpetrator once the apology-forgiveness cycle had been completed. After the perpetrator of evil had accepted responsibility for past transgressions and the victim had granted forgiveness, the relations between the two former enemies are said to be transformed from enmity and hatred to reconciled relationships almost instantaneously. Trust building reconciliation does not assume such a psychological transformation. It is viewed as a gradual and long learning process in which former enemies learn to slowly replace the belief that the adversary holds sinister intentions toward them with the belief that its intentions are benign and that one can base own words and actions on the other's promises (Kramer & Carnevale, 2001).

Thirdly, trust building and socio-emotional reconciliation aim for different outcomes. Socio-emotional reconciliation aims to allow social <u>integration</u> between two former enemies, while trust-building reconciliation aims to allow conflict-free <u>separation</u> between them. Processes of socio-emotional reconciliation are intended to heal the rift between two conflicted parties so that they can live together harmoniously within the perimeters of the same social unit. The goal of trust building reconciliation is more modest. It aims to engender enough trust between the two parties that will

allow them to co-exist next to each other. To make this difference more concrete let us use an example of relations between a person and his or her estranged spouse. To end a conflict the two spouses must first decide whether their aim is integration or separation. If they want to be reunited as a family they may want to address past pains and suffering that they inflicted upon each other through a process of socio-emotional reconciliation. If however, they aim to separate they may want to center on processes of trust-building reconciliation which will allow them to co-exist separately and cooperate on issues that still bind them (e.g., visitation rights for children). This a-priori decision on integration or separation as determining the applicability of trust-building or socio-emotional reconciliation is not limited to the case of interpersonal conflicts. For example, the nations of the former Yugoslavia must first determine whether they envisage a future of living in the same integrated socio-political unit or co-existing as separate socio-political units before they embark on socio-emotional or trust building reconciliation.

We shall revisit this issue of the links and differences between trust building and socio-emotional reconciliation at a later section when we discuss the applications of the present analysis. Before we move to a more detailed discussion of each of these two routes toward reconciliation and present relevant data, it should be noted that their separate discussion is made for the sake of conceptual clarity. In reality these two processes are interdependent. The ability to openly confront the pains of the past (i.e., socio-emotional reconciliation) is likely to impact favorably on the trust between the two groups, and the existence of trust will facilitate a confrontation with the painful past.

(3) Socio-Emotional Reconciliation: Revenge or Apology and forgiveness?

When people and groups have been in conflict they have usually humiliated, and harmed each other. Because of this, at the end of conflict the perpetrator has a debt that he or she owes to the victim. This 'debt' must be paid if relations between the former two adversaries are to become more harmonious (Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Heble & Enright, 1993). This 'debt' is also said to be behind the victims' motivation for revenge. Frijda (1993) has made the observation that revenge is an empowering experience which helps the victim to overcome the feelings of helplessness that are related to having been victimized. The problematic nature of revenge is that because vitimhood is actively construed, in many inter-group conflicts *both* parties view themselves as the legitimate victim. They are therefore equally motivated to take revenge of their adversary and one act of revenge may institute a cycle of revenge that will intensify rather than quell conflict. Nowhere is this process more painfully clear than at the time and place in which these words are written. The violence between Israelis and Palestinians in 2001 and 2002 seems to follow a consistent pattern. A Palestinian's terror attack becomes the impetus for the retaliation that the Israeli army takes, which then becomes the cause for the Palestinian next act of violence, and so it continues to spiral into what seems like an uncontrollable string of loss and destruction.

In commenting on the nature of the apology-forgiveness cycle Tavuchis writes: "An apology, no matter how sincere or effective, does not and cannot undo what has been done. And yet, in a mysterious way, and according to its own logic, this is precisely what it manages to do." (p. 5). What is the nature of this 'mystery' that Tavuchis refers to? How can words that are exchanged between victim and perpetrator remove the emotional deterrents to ending a conflict? . The answer to this

lies in the way in which apology and forgiveness fulfill the emotional needs of the perpetrator and the victim respectively. Regarding the perpetrator, Tavuchis (1991) and Scheff (1994) suggest that the perpetrators of wrongdoings are threatened with being expelled form the "moral community" to which they belong. Using a similar logic Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton (1994) suggest that the arousal of guilt is due to a person's fear of being excluded from meaningful close relations with others. By apologizing and accepting responsibility the perpetrator acknowledges a "debt" to be repaid to the victim for having perpetrated these wrongdoings. The victim then may forgive in which case the 'debt' is cancelled, or he or she may seek material compensation that will allow the cancellation of this debt. In either case, however, the threat to the perpetrator's membership in the "moral community" is lessened. Regarding the victim, it holds the key to canceling the perpetrator's 'debt'. It can grant or withhold forgiveness, or make it conditional on some form of material compensation. In either case the victim is empowered by this and gains greater equality with the perpetrator.

The research on the effects of perpetrator's apologies, and the determinants of the victim's willingness to forgive has focused on interpersonal relations. We shall briefly review this empirical evidence and its implications for the inter-group reconciliation.

Research has found that apologies have positive effects on the victim's perceptions of the perpetrator (Baron, 1990), and victim's feelings of self-worth (Obhuci & Sato, 1994). Further, independent observers who viewed a transgressor that had apologized for his transgressions viewed him more positively than those who viewed a transgressor who had not apologized (Darby & Schlenker, 1982). Regarding the operational definition of apology, this research suggests that apologies must

contain (a) the perpetrator's expression of empathy for the suffering of the victim,

and/or (b) acceptance of responsibility for having caused these sufferings. Yet,

sometimes apologies do not exert such positive effects on the victim and his or her

relations with the perpetrator. Research indicates that when the perpetrator who

apologized is perceived as being untrustworthy the offended party is not likely to

accept the apology and the likelihood that it will reciprocate by granting forgiveness is

relatively low (Obhuci & Sato, 1994). Moreover, when the perpetrator is perceived as

untrustworthy he or she are less positively if they had than if they had not apologized

(Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Similar emphases on the role of trust as a prerequisite

apology to promote reconciliation have been made by Tavuchis (1991) and Scheff

(1994). Taken together this highlights the fact that in the absence of a basic level of

trust between the perpetrator and the victim apologies are likely to be perceived by the

victim as a manipulative ploys and are likely to reduce the prospects for

reconciliation.

Applied to the arena of international conflict the above suggests that genuine

apologies in the form of acceptance of responsibility or expression of empathy for the

rival's conflict-related suffering can contribute to the removal of the emotional barrier

of feelings of victimization and contribute to reconciliation between the parties. This

has been well understood by political leaders. In the last three decades there have been

numerous examples where a leader of one nation or group has apologized for the

wrongdoings that had been perpetrated by its group. A famous example is the

memorable gesture of the then German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, who during a visit

in a Nazi concentration camp fell to his knees and asked the forgiveness of the Jewish

victims of the Nazi regime. Another prominent example is president Alwyn of Chile

famous speech on Chilean national TV in which he apologized for the crimes

committed by the Pinochet regime. A third, and more recent example, is the apology of Pope John Paul 2nd to women, Jews and other minorities that were the victims of persecution by the Catholic church. In all these examples leaders have tried to deal with the emotional barriers that were attributable to past victimization by accepting responsibility for these wrongdoings and apologizing for them. This has been done with the belief that perpetrators must openly accept responsibility for past wrongdoings and apologize to the victim if they wish to reconcile with them. This phenomenon has been aptly labeled as the "Politics of apology" (Cunningham, 1999).

In spite of this, social psychological research and theory has remained mute regarding the role of apologies in reducing tensions between groups. One reason for this may be the theoretical emphasis in social-psychology on cognitive, as opposed to affective, processes that govern social behavior in general and inter-group behavior in particular. Another reason may be the religious overtones that are associated with concepts such as forgiveness or reconciliation from which social scientists wish to disassociate themselves (Akhitar, 2002).

To study these processes we conducted experimental investigations of the effects of Palestinian leader's acceptance of responsibility for Israeli conflict-related suffering and his expression of empathy for these sufferings on Israelis' readiness to reconcile with Palestinians. In these studies Israeli students read what they believed to be a speech made by a Palestinian leader that had been delivered to the Palestinian parliament. This two page speech consisted of an analysis of the situation in the middle-east and ended differently for different participants according to the experimental conditions that they were assigned to. Half of the participants read a speech which ended with an expression of empathy for the conflict-related suffering of Israelis while the other half were not exposed to such expressions of empathy.

Further, half of the participants were exposed to statements in which the Palestinian

leader accepted Palestinian responsibility for having caused these sufferings while the

other half were not. This allowed us to experimentally assess the relative effects of

expressions of empathy and acceptance of responsibility on willingness to reconcile

with the enemy. Importantly, half of the Israeli participants were designated, on the

basis of a pre-measure, as having relatively high trust in Palestinians while the other

half were designated as low-trust. Finally, we ran two parallel experiments. The first

was conducted in June-July 2000, about 4 months before the outbreak of the current

wave of hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians, and the second 18 months later

at the height of these hostilities.

　　　　The results of the two experiments indicate that high trust Israelis who had

been exposed to expressions of empathy for their compatriots' suffering perceived the

speaker, Palestinians in general, and prospects for reconciliation with Palestinians

more favorably than high trust Israelis who had not been exposed to similar

expressions of empathy. An opposite pattern indicates that low trust Israelis who had

been exposed to similar expressions of empathy had worse perceptions of the speaker,

Palestinians in general and prospects for reconciliation with them than low trust

Israelis who had not been exposed to similar expressions of empathy. In other words,

for low trust Israelis apology in the form of expression of empathy backfired.

　　　　A number of points should be emphasized here. First, these findings provide

an empirical demonstration of the power of apology as a vehicle to reduce tensions in

the international arena. Second, these effects were obtained during times of relative

calm as well as during times when the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has

been red and glowing. Third, in these studies expression of empathy for the pains of

one's adversary rather than acceptance of responsibility for these conflict-related pains

was a more potent determinant of reconciliation. It has been suggested that this is due to the fact that the recipients of apology were the stronger party in the conflict, Israelis, for whom expressions of empathy may be more psychologically important than acceptance of responsibility. This is because such expressions which acknowledge Israeli suffering and victimhood reduce the threat to membership in the "moral community" more effectively than do statements about accepting responsibility for these sufferings. It may be that for the weaker side in the conflict acceptance of responsibility, which acknowledges a 'debt' to them, would be more psychologically important than expression of empathy (for a fuller discussion see Nadler, in press). Finally, the findings highlight the important role of trust in this context. On the background of lack of trust attempts to lower the socio-emotional barriers between parties to a conflict through apology may create higher barriers rather than removing them. This brings us to a discussion of trust and trust building reconciliation. We shall first consider the concept of trust, its links with socio-emotional and trust building reconciliation and then continue to a more detailed discussion of trust building reconciliation.

(4) Trust-Building Reconciliation: Learning to trust through cooperation

     (a) Trust: definition and links with socio-emotional and trust building reconciliation:

Trust is thought of as the "glue that holds relationships together (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000, p. 86). Within psychology personality researchers have viewed the tendency to trust others as a stable personality disposition that is rooted in early learning experiences (Rotter, 1971), and psychosocial development (Erikson, 1963). Social psychologists have focused on situational conditions that can destroy or build trust (Kramer & Carnevale, 2001). A common thread to these, and other theoretical perspectives on trust (e.g., Sociology, Gambetta, 1998; Political science, Hardin,

1992), is the idea that when one has a high level of trust in others, he or she attributes to them positive intentions and is willing to base judgments and actions on their words and deeds. Distrust implies that one attributes sinister motivations to the other and desires to protect the self from the other's conduct (Kramer & Carnevale, 2001).

There are different bases upon which trust can be based. Two bases of trust are relevant to the present discussion of socio-emotional and trust-building reconciliation (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). The first is labeled calculus-based trust and is determined by the outcomes that the parties obtain from maintaining the relationship relative to the costs of severing them. This trust is built slowly and gradually in many interactions that test the other's trustworthiness. Calculus based trust is fragile in that it can be destroyed by one or few actions that imply that the other can not be trusted. A second basis of trust is identification-based trust. This type of trust is characteristic of parties who are in a unit relationship and share a common group identity (e.g., familial or organizational identity). Parties whose relations are based on this type of trust perceive that their interests are fully protected and represented by the other, and therefore there is no need for ongoing monitoring of the other's behavior towards oneself or one's group.

There is a conceptual link between the distinction of trust-building and socio-emotional reconciliation and the distinction between identification-based and calculus-based trust. Trust-building reconciliation is a process that aims to yield calculus-based trust. It is aimed to enable two adversarial parties to co-exist in a conflict-free environment in which parties do not attribute malevolent intentions to their counterpart and believe that they can base their conduct on the other's words and deeds. Socio-emotional reconciliation is conceptually correlated with identification-based trust in that both emphasize the goal of social integration between two actors

who share a common group identity. Finally, Lewicki & Wiethoff suggest that oftentimes calculus-based trust must be established before identification-based trust can be built. In a similar way the data on the role of trust as a determinant of the effects of perpetrator's expression of empathy and acceptance of responsibility on the victim's willingness to reconcile tell us that a sufficient level of trust must exist before acts of socio-emotional reconciliation can proceed.

Conflict is likely to put a strain on the trust between two rivals, and protracted and intense inter-group conflict (e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is likely to destroy it completely. During such times each party seeks to maximize its gains at the expanse of the other, commits acts of violence against its rival and engages in much deception and concealment to further its goals. These actions reinforce each side's perception of the other as having negative intentions towards one's group and encourages the view that one can not base own conduct on the promises and commitments made by the adversary. The end of conflict is predicated on the willingness to base action on the commitments that the rival undertakes. When distrust dominates this is difficult if not impossible. In their recent review of the literature on trust Lewicki & Wiethoff write:"…acrimonious conflict often serves to increase distrust which makes conflict resolution even more difficult and problematic" (p.85).

(b) Conditions for Effective Trust-Building Reconciliation

How can trust be rehabilitated? Research on the antecedents of conflict and cooperation indicates that trust is likely to replace distrust when the parties engage in successive interactions in which they are concerned simultaneously with their own interests and the welfare of their counterpart (Pruitt, 1998). This "dual concern" model suggests that "self" and "other" concerns are not opposites of the same continuum, but

two independent dimensions and it is likely to dominate when both parties work towards achieving a common goal. In successive interactions of this kind parties learn to be aware of and sensitive to the concerns of the "other" and to gradually become more willing to base own behavior on the other's words and deeds. In a similar vein, Sheriff et al., (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961) indicate that successive events in which rival groups had cooperated to achieve a common goal (i.e., super-ordinate goal) resulted in reduction in the level of inter-group conflict.

These findings suggest that when members of two rival groups work jointly to achieve a common goal they are, temporarily at least, embracing a larger group identity which subsumes their separate identities and this reduces inter-group conflict. This idea that cognitive redrawing of the boundaries of the two rival groups which produces a large and inclusive group reduces inter-group conflict has received more recent and direct support in the work of Gaertner and his colleagues on re-categorization. They report less negative perceptions and behavior towards a rival group when members of groups A and B had been induced to see themselves as members of an inclusive group C (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, Davidio & Pomare, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Davidio, 1989). Applied to the present context of trust-building reconciliation, this research suggests that trust can be enhanced through successive experiences of cooperating to achieve a common goal, which induces members of the rival groups to view themselves, albeit temporarily, as members of an inclusive common in-group. Research on the contact hypothesis indicates that such cooperation between rivals will lessen inter-group tensions and lead to more trust when it is a sustained cooperation between equals to achieve common goals in a supportive context (Pettigrew, 1998).

Applying this to the relations between the rival nations in the middle-east, the multi-lateral negotiations that have been established at the 1991 Madrid conference seems to have been based on a similar logic. In these multi-lateral negotiations parties from the region negotiated issues that were common to all of them. Issues like water shortages in the middle-east, quality of the environment in the region, or the promotion of tourism to archeological sites in the middle-east were discussed. Such experiences could have encouraged Israelis and Arabs living in the region to view themselves as equal peoples in the middle-east who share common problems. This work should have increased the trust between the rival sides and allow them to tackle the thorny bi-lateral issues in an atmosphere of greater trust.

(c) Trust Building Between Israelis and Palestinians: A study on key factors in the success of trust-building reconciliation.

To explore the processes of trust-building between enemies we studied the perceptions of Israelis and Palestinians who were involved in trust-building projects. These were common in the period between the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 and the outbreak of hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians in October 2000. Yet, they did not disappear. Even at the end of 2002, when these words are written, when trust between the parties is at its lowest, Israelis and Palestinians continue to cooperate in various areas. The projects that our interviewees were involved in included joint activities in the fields of education, commerce, agriculture, medicine and arts science and culture. The interviews were conducted in the second half of 2001 and the first half of 2002. Each lasted about 90 minutes and interviewees were 10 Israelis and 4 Palestinians. Due to the tensions between Israelis and Palestinians during this time and the fact that the interviewee, the second author, is an Israeli the number of Palestinian interviewees is smaller than that of Israeli interviewees. The

purpose of the interviews was to learn more about the conditions that facilitate or hinder trust building reconciliation.

The interviews were half-structured and consisted of open conversations that were designed to obtain information on specific issues. On the basis of pilot interviews and literature on peace building (Kelman, 1998; Lederach, 1997), we sought to obtain data on our interviewees' perceptions on the role of (a) power relations, (b) social identity processes, (c) cultural factors, and (d) third party's involvement in making cooperation on joint project an effective trust-building mechanism. We shall briefly describe some of the major findings.

The critical factor for the success of common projects as trust building mechanism is the existence of equality between the parties. Consistent with similar emphases in the relevant literature (Pettigrew,1998; Amir & Ben-Ari, 1986; Cook, 1985), inter-group cooperation led to greater trust and improved relations only when it was based on equality between interactants. When there is an objective power asymmetry between the parties, as is the case between Israelis and Palestinians, equality needs to be deliberately planned and systematically implemented. Thus for example, decisions about the design and implementation of the project must be made jointly, and a successful project is one that is administered jointly. Our interviewees also stressed that equality must have concrete expressions. A majority noted that the place of meeting should alternate between Israeli and Palestinian cities and that budget should be either split evenly or administered jointly with full exposure. When inequality dominates common projects seem to deepen distrust.

The second issue that our interviewees focused on was the role of social identity processes in trust-building reconciliation. There is tension between two approaches in this context. On the basis of relevant research and theory in social

psychology (Brown,1995) we have labeled one as the re-categorization approach, and the other as the sub-categorization approach. Briefly stated the re-categorization approach seeks to de-emphasize the two conflicting identities and suggests that a cooperative contact will lead to greater trust when two conflicting identities are contained within a larger common identity. The sub-categorization approach seeks to emphasize the meeting between two distinct identities and suggests that cooperative contact will lead to greater trust when the identities of the two groups are made salient. Thus for example, when a group of Palestinian and Israeli cardiologists meet to work on a common medical project the re-categorization approach suggest a de-emphasis of the distinct national identities of the two groups, and emphasis on their common identity as physicians instead. The sub-categorization approach on the other hand would suggest to frame the project as one in which Israelis and Palestinians meet to cooperate on a medical project. This would retain, and even emphasize, the separate national identities of the two groups.

Our interviews suggest that the preference of one model over the other is linked to the group's power position. Palestinians show a preference for a sub-categorization model in which each group retains its distinct national identity while Israelis have a preference for a re-categorization model in which separate national identities are de-emphasized and a premium is placed on the common and inclusive group identity (e.g., physicians). One reason for this differential preference may be the fact that the Palestinians, as the weaker party, desire a socio-political change and to that end they want to accentuate the differences that exist between the groups. The Israelis, as the stronger group, are motivated to maintain the existing status-quo between the two groups and embracing a common identity lessens the conflict and with it the need for socio-political change.

Our interviewees have also referred to the 'equalizing' role of third party in trust-building projects. In fact, when a relatively powerful third parity is involved in a project (e.g., American, European, UN), the perceived power position of the two adversarial group becomes more equal relative to this more powerful third party. Finally, cultural differences play a significant role in the success of trust-building projects. Different cultural definitions on what constitutes a binding commitment (e.g., a signed agreement, an oral agreement, etc.,) can result in misunderstandings and deepen mistrust. Cultural differences are also linked to the issue of power. Some of our interviewees noted that the discourse that places an emphasis on conflict resolution is a Westernized discourse with which Israelis feel more comfortable than do Palestinians. This has resulted in the perception that Palestinians are often put in a disadvantage in such a cultural context. These perceptions reinforce Hubbard's (1999) observation that past discussion on inter-group contact has disregarded the link between equality and cultural differences.

In all, our interviews highlight the role of equality as a prerequisite for the success of trust building reconciliation. Equality can be introduced directly into a project as when parties decide on an even split of the budget between them, or indirectly as when the parties include a more powerful third party as their partner. This critical role of <u>equality</u> in the <u>cooperation</u> between adversaries is consistent with the emphases garnered from five decades of research on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew, 1998, 2001). The role of the other two conditions of <u>supportive context</u> and a <u>psychologically meaningful contact</u> are demonstrated in the responses of our interviewees regarding the fate of those trust-building projects that continued during the period of violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians.

During the first 7 years after the signing of the Oslo agreements there was a supportive context for trust-building efforts between Israelis and Palestinians. This allowed the creation of many such projects. Since Oct. 2000 the context was much less supportive and the number of such projects was reduced dramatically. We asked our interviewees what they thought accounted for the 'survival' of the projects that did continue. A recurring theme in the answers was the quality of interpersonal relations between Israelis and Palestinians who stood at the helm of a particular project. When relations were close and trustworthy a project continued in spite of the non-supportive context. Other reasons seem to be related to the content of the project. Those that were relevant to real and pressing needs (e.g., food related agricultural projects) stood a better chance of survival than those that focused on less concrete and pressing needs (e.g., cultural projects). We conclude by again noting that cooperation that is done on an equal basis in a supportive context and allows for the creation of meaningful interpersonal relations is likely to result in successful trust-building reconciliation.

(5) Conclusions and Implications

The present chapter departs from other discussions on the psychology of conflict by focusing on reconciliation rather than on conflict resolution. We focused attention on socio-emotional reconciliation which is anchored in the apology-forgiveness cycle, and trust-building reconciliation which is the slow process in which adversaries learn to trust each other by cooperating to achieve common goals. In the concluding section we would to like to center attention on the conditions under which one is more- or less-appropriate than the other.

Trust- a necessary condition: If there is a high level of distrust between the two parties socio-emotional reconciliation may do more harm than good. Our findings suggest that under such conditions apologies may do more harm than good. The intent

behind the perpetrator's acceptance of responsibility and expression of empathy may be misconstrued and inter-group relations may be worse than they would have been had no apology been made. Under such conditions trust-building reconciliation is more appropriate, and only after a degree of inter-group trust is established can the parties embark on the path of socio-emotional reconciliation through the apology-forgiveness cycle. This two-stage approach is consistent with Lewicki & Weithoof's (2000) suggestion that only after calculus based trust had been established can identification-based trust be built.

Consensus on the victim and perpetrator?: A second condition that determines the appropriateness of socio-emotional or trust building reconciliation is the degree to which there is a consensus on which group is the perpetrator and which is the victim (Nadler, 2002). Some conflicts come to an end when there is a consensus on who is the 'victim' and who is the 'victimizer'. For example, the conflict between black and white South Africans ended with a consensual agreement that the apartheid regime was the perpetrator of crimes against black South African victims. Other conflicts, however, end when both parties view themselves as the victim and the other as the perpetrator. This may be more characteristic of post-conflict relations between the nations in the former Yugoslavia or in relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Socio-emotional reconciliation is more likely to yield positive results in the first case when there is a clear and consensual agreement on who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. When each side views itself as the only legitimate victim and the other as the perpetrator, both view it as the other's responsibility to apologize and accept responsibility for past wrong-doings. Under these conditions, genuine expressions of empathy and acceptance of responsibility for the other's conflict-related suffering are unlikely. Enough trust must be built first to allow group members to be certain that

their apologies will be reciprocated by counter apologies and forgiveness by the adversary.

Goal of reconciliation- Separation or Integration?: A third variable that is relevant here is the goal of reconciliation (Nadler, 2002). Some reconciliation efforts aim to produce a post-conflict reality of social integration between former adversaries, whereas in other situations the goal is separation and co-existence. For example, black and white South-Africans determined that they will live together in a united South African, and their goal was to make a split society whole again. In other cases, in relations between ethnic communities in the former Yugoslavia, the goal has been the creation of separate national groups that will co-exist rather than be integrated into a single national unit. Socio-emotional reconciliation is more appropriate when the goal is integration, and trust-building reconciliation is more applicable when the goal is separation (Nadler, in press). In the first case all energies need to be harnessed to ensure that the wounds of the past are healed so that the two parties can become equal partners in the same social unit (i.e. country, organization or family). The apology-forgiveness cycle is necessary to facilitate this goal. When the goal is separation and co-existence, trust-building reconciliation allows the parties to build enough trust to enable co-existence rather than creating 'unit relationship' between them.

In conclusion, socio-emotional reconciliation should be treated with caution. Apologizing and forgiving is not a 'magic cure' for all conflicts. Sometimes it may backfire. When there is a high level of mistrust, a belief by both parties that their group is the only legitimate victim, and when the goal of reconciliation is separation-Trust-building reconciliation is more appropriate to achieve conflict-free relations between groups.

The foregoing discussion suggests that removing emotional deterrents may be an important vehicle of the diplomatic process when it seeks to promote the end of conflict between nations. We already how political leaders conduct politics of apology to further their goals. While noting the importance of this route in bringing about the end of international conflict, the present chapter also cautions against a wholesale adoption of this tactic. The existence of trust has been identified here as a key necessary condition. Our discussion of trust has focused on the fact that trust between adversaries can be rebuilt only in the presence of certain conditions. Chief among these is the equality that needs to be systematically designed and implemented into processes of trust building reconciliation. Further, our study suggests that the more and less powerful groups have different motivations when cooperating in joint projects. While the more powerful group seeks to maintain the status-quo the less powerful group seeks to change it. Finally, our understanding of the emotional barriers that separate nations that have been in conflict needs to be broadened before we can be more confident in devising ways to remove them. Once such a greater understanding is gained it is likely to inform the practitioners of diplomacy on ways to achieve an end to conflict between nations and facilitate the building of peace between them. The study of the emotional deterrents to the end of conflict between nations and research into the processes of reconciliation that aim to remove them are a heuristic meeting place for scholars of diplomacy and social psychology. This scholarly interaction is likely to bear important fruits that will broaden our knowledge of inter-group behavior and provide useful tools to the practitioners of diplomacy.

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