

**The conflict with North Korea /
North Korea as a source of conflict**

An analysis from a peace and conflict resolution studies perspective

**Christine Locher
Badstr 65
13357 Berlin
Germany**

**Presented as graduation thesis at
FernUniversität Hagen
Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies**

Table of contents

1. Introduction	4
2. Theoretical background.....	5
2.1 Conflict: Overview of macro-theories.....	5
2.1.1. Neorealism.....	5
2.1.2. Post-modern conflict theories	5
2.1.3. Conflicts in a world-society/cosmopolitan/ post-national conflict theories	6
2.1.4. Conflict as contradiction	7
2.1.5. Escalation of conflict.....	7
2.2. Aggression and violence	7
2.2.1. Threat-aggression hypothesis	8
2.2.2. Frustration-aggression hypothesis.....	8
2.2.3. Security Dilemma	8
2.3. Social Psychology	8
2.3.1. Stereotypes	8
2.3.2. Danger	9
2.3.3. Cognitive dissonance	9
2.3.4. Psychology of the masses.....	9
2.3.5. Culture/cosmology.....	10
2.3.5.1. Occident I.....	10
2.3.5.2. Buddhic/Sinic/Nipponic.....	10
2.4. Theories of peace	11
3. North Korea background	11
3.1. General	11
3.2. History.....	12
3.2.1. Up to Japanese occupation and division	12
3.2.2. Korean War	12
3.3. Weltanschauung	13
3.4. Politics and political system.....	14
3.5. Juche	15
3.6. The North Korean economy	16
3.7. Military	17
3.8. Nuclear.....	18
4. Stakeholders	19
4.1. North Korea.....	20
4.2. South Korea	21

4.3. USA	21
4.4. China	23
4.5. Japan	24
4.6. The Soviet Union/Russia	25
5. Solution	26
5.1. Prerequisites	26
5.2. Confidence-building measures (CBM)	26
5.2.1. Military CBM	27
5.2.2. Political CBM	27
5.2.3. Socio-economic CBM	27
5.2.4. Sunshine Policy as CBM	27
5.2.5. Other CBM	28
5.2.5.1. Trust-building	29
5.2.5.2. GRIT	30
5.3. Diplomacy	31
5.3.1. Economic diplomacy	31
5.3.2. Track II diplomacy	33
5.3.3. Negotiation	33
5.3.4. Six-Party Talks	35
5.3.5. Unification	36
5.3.5.1. Unification through systems evolution and integration	38
5.3.5.2. Unification through collapse and absorption	38
5.3.5.3. Unification through conflict	38
5.3.5.4. Disequilibrium and potential external intervention	39
5.3.5.5. Soft landing, hard landing or no landing?	39
5.3.5.6. Post-unification implications	40
5.3.5.7. Challenges of unification	41
5.3.5.8. Comparison with German reunification	42
5.4. Other scenarios	42
5.4.1. TRANSCEND	43
5.4.2. Solution for all of Northeast Asia	43
6. Conclusion	43
7. Appendix	45
8. Literature/References	46

1. Introduction

My interest in North Korea has been ongoing for several years. I have had the chance to travel in South Korea and to visit Panmunjeom in 2002, which left me deeply moved by seeing the border between a divided country. The fact that North Korea started nuclear tests in the past October strengthened my interest in making this country the topic of my graduation thesis in peace and conflict resolution studies.

The topic of this thesis is the North Korean conflict. There are different views as to what the Korean conflict is. In US-American literature, the Korean conflict refers to the Korean War 1950-1953 whereas in Europe, the word conflict is also used in this context to refer to the current situation with the two states being in conflict as opposed to a full-on war, although no peace agreement has been signed. This thesis is based on the definitions of conflict as will be presented below and refers to the conflict concerning North Korea in the current, non-peaceful situation since the country became divided.

This thesis will assess North Korea from a peace and conflict resolution studies perspective. The title "The conflict with North Korea / North Korea as a source of conflict" implies that this work takes into account the notion that a one-sided approach is not very fruitful for a peace studies perspective. I will therefore work with both aspects to try to create as complete as possible a picture within the scope of this short thesis.

Peace and conflict resolution studies cover a large academic field spanning across various disciplines. As Johan Galtung puts it:

"Peace is the process of reducing violence on all levels with peaceful means. Non-violence is the basis of the systematic setup of peace studies. Because these mechanisms are not limited by scopes of academic disciplines, peace science must be "interdisciplinary, if not transdisciplinary" (Galtung 2003, 156).

This thesis will therefore address the conflict in and with North Korea from a variety of perspectives, which means it will also cover relevant points from adjacent academic fields like social sciences, social psychology, Asian studies, history and international relations. In the first part, I will start by defining the relevant theoretical concepts of peace studies including the psychological background, the cosmologies from Johan Galtung and international relations. The second part will explore the roots of the conflict. Relevant topics from Korean history will explain which countries are stakeholders in the conflict and how that happened. I will then present background information about North

Korea and its state system and leadership cult and its international relations and nuclear policy. The third part will comprise an analysis of the different stakeholders in the conflict, which will then lead on to part four, in which I will present possible conflict resolution scenarios.

I have used the terms "the North", "North Korea", "DPRK" to refer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the terms "the South", "South Korea", "ROK" to refer to the Republic of Korea. Korean, Japanese and Chinese names are presented as the custom is in these countries, that is, last name first, then the first name. So "Kim" is the last name, "Il Sung" is the first name. In case of Korean first names consisting of more than one syllable, they are hyphenated, except for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, where the non-hyphenated form of writing is so widely used that it became quasi-standard.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Conflict

Conflict is the topic of this thesis. The word 'conflict' comes from the Latin word "confligere" which can either mean 'bumping into each other', 'beating up of something/someone'; which refers to a direct action, or it can mean 'being in a quarrel', 'starting a controversy'; which refers more to a state or a structure (Bonacker 2005, 70). There are many definitions of what a conflict is, depending on the scope of the various theories. So conflict can be seen as "a phase in a continuum, (...) as a means and as an end"(Bonacker 2005, 69).

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) defines conflict as "the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases" (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2006: no page).

For the topic of North Korea, macro-theories of conflict are most relevant. I will therefore present relevant theories in further detail.

2.1.1. Overview of macro-theories of conflict:

2.1.1.1. Neorealism: States are stimulating conflict in an international system based on insecurity (Morgenthau). They are searching for power to achieve security (Waltz).

Theories of neorealism were mainly used to try to explain the Cold War and the conflict between East and West (Hartmann, 2001: chapter 2.1). Since part of the Korean conflict is an effect of the Cold War, they are relevant to this subject. North Korea experiences a high level of insecurity and is building nuclear weapons to increase its security.

2.1.1.2. Post-modern conflict theories: conflicts are a result of the way collective identities are formed and linked to interests (Jabri). "The Other" is often stereotyped as threat (Weaver). This taps into the North Korean state ideology "Juche", which forms a strong collective identity and will be presented in more detail below.

2.1.1.3. Conflicts in a world society/cosmopolitan/post-national conflict theories: conflict does not stop at national borders (for example the conflict between globalization advocates and globalization critics). Security problems are transnational. Actors are increasingly transnational entities such as NATO, the UN etc. but also multinational religious terror groups (Bonacker/Schmidt, 2005: 9ff). Furthermore, the situation in North Korea is far from isolated, for the major superpowers USA and Russia as well as China and Japan are involved as stakeholders. With its weapons arsenal and their arms trade, they are also directly involved in other conflicts. So solving this North Korean conflict would thus not only help the region but also promote peace within a broader context.

According to Singer, "conflicts are processes where contradicting tendencies create a critical tension. The actors are aware of the tension and act accordingly. The structure in which the actors are embedded is endangered by this tension" (Bonacker/Schmidt 2005, 19). So the solution of the conflict can either be approached by tackling the tension or the structures. There is pronounced tension between for example the position of the US and the position of North Korea. Both countries are aware of this tension and both countries react accordingly, sometimes via negotiations, sometimes through threats.

Conflict is defined by the following conditions:

- ⑩ "Conflict requires at least two parties or two analytically distinct units or entities"
- ⑩ "Conflict arises from 'positional scarcity' or 'resource scarcity'"
- ⑩ "Conflictual behaviors are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party" (...) "and a conflict relationship is one in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense"
- ⑩ "Conflict requires interaction among parties in which actions and counteractions are

mutually opposed"

⑩ "Conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce resources and positions or to influence behavior in certain directions", (...) "the attempt to acquire or use power or the actual use of power".

(Mack 1971, 8-9)

All this holds true for the North Korean situation which can therefore be described as a conflict: there are several entities involved (see also the stakeholder section of this thesis), they act from a position of scarcity, their interactions are at least partly in opposition, they negotiate with a zero-sum mentality and try to gain more control over the other side by various means.

2.1.1.4. Conflict as contradiction (Luhmann):

"A conflict is the operative becoming-independent of a contradiction through communication" (Luhmann 2005, 253). Conflicts are social systems based on double contingency. According to Luhmann, morals and justice can also stimulate conflict, by "suggesting that one is on the correct side with one's position and that it is possible to expose the other party to public rejection or sanctions by a court"(Luhmann 2005, 257). This is exactly what happens in the North Korean conflict where both the US and the North try to ridicule and demonize the other side and where the US has economic sanctions in place.

2.1.1.5. Escalation of conflict:

Escalation of conflict is supported by a double divergence of perspectives: First, our own actions are perceived through our intentions whereas the actions of the other are perceived by their effects and we do not necessarily know the intention behind it. Second, the potential to hurt of our own actions is underestimated whereas the potential to hurt by the other side is overestimated. This leads to drastic measures to put forward one's own view and plans (Kempf 2005a, 306). These factors make negotiation in the North Korean case a lot more difficult, especially because the media and propaganda machinery on all sides seems to feed the conflict rather than trying to foster reconciliation.

2.2. Aggression and Violence

"Aggression is an act that intentionally harms another person or accepts the harm of another person"(Kempf 2005, 27). Aggression is defined as "the initiation of hostile action"(Webster 1984). According to Webster's Dictionary (1984), violence is "physical

force employed so as to damage or injure". With these definitions, we can see violence as a sub-category of aggression (both quoted in Keefe 1991, 14).

2.2.1. Threat-aggression hypothesis

Hovland (1938) state that intentional violence is often of defensive nature to ward off existing or imagined threats (Kempf 2005, 49). "The more someone tends to seek the responsibility for failures with another person, the more likely the person is to react to frustration with aggression"(Kempf 2005, 51). The North Korean leadership sees the economic decline of the country and the loss of its former allies and feels its options are growing increasingly restricted. This perceived threat (along with the expected improvement of its bargaining position) leads to aggressive behavior to the outside world such as the nuclear tests of October 2006.

2.2.2. Frustration-aggression hypothesis

When an organism tries to pursue a goal and is blocked from reaching it, frustration is created. Frustration increases arousal and can trigger various reactions, including aggression. This analysis also applies to North Korea (Dollard 1939, Miller 1941 as in Keefe 1991, 17f)

2.2.3. Security Dilemma

"It is generally thought that security is provided with a strong military that can deter attack" (Omario, 2003: no page). More military defense means less security for the neighbors who then in turn acquire more weapons whereupon the other neighbors acquire more weapons. This fuels an arms race and ends up in decreasing the security for both parties. This mechanism is called the security dilemma (Czempiel, 2002: 86).

2.3. Social psychology

Social psychology offers useful concepts to understand conflict, especially when it comes to stereotypes/propaganda, the perception of danger, cognitive dissonance and mass phenomena.

2.3.1. Stereotypes:

Stereotypes are an important part of human attitudes. They are generalized verbal expressions of a conviction regarding members of a social group without regard for the individual. Stereotypes are emotionally charged and lead to a biased world-view. Stereotypes make conflict resolution more difficult because they widen the perceived gap between the conflict parties that has to be bridged. In order to legitimize violence,

the world is separated in two different groups: friends ("us") and foes ("them"). The well-being of friends legitimizes the hurt of enemies. Because there are no social feelings towards the enemies, their suffering does not de-legitimize the use of violence. The policy of one's own group is therefore perceived as being peace-loving whereas the policy of the other group is perceived to be violent (Allport, 1971; Lilli, 1982; Kempf, 2005: 55f). This tendency is clearly visible if one compares the media coverage of the US about North Korea with the way the North Korean state news agency portrays the US. It is always clear that one's own side is the peace-loving one and that the other party is the aggressor. In South Korea, the media has now started to portrait a more realistic picture of the North (Crisis Group No. 89, 2004).

2.3.2. Danger:

"Danger is not an objective condition. (...) Danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive"(Campbell 2005, 155f). Campbell links conflict theory and assessment of dangers to risk analysis in the insurance business, where there is also no absolute risk, but a risk depending on a certain assessment. "The ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience"(Campbell 2005, 158). This can also be true for the way North Korea has been portrayed.

2.3.3. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957):

Human beings strive for a consistent view of the world. When information does not fit, it tends to be overlooked or interpreted in a different way so it fits with the world view. Dissonant information is rejected. This also holds true for the negotiations to solve the North Korean conflict. If the other side is sufficiently demonized, it becomes difficult to have a negotiation about peace.

2.3.4. Psychology of the masses:

The psychology of the masses is an important factor for totalitarian regimes like North Korea. Phenomena like these are specifically used by the leaders to ensure that the population supports their cause unanimously. "Under certain circumstances (...), a group of people possesses new specific peculiarities that are different from the ones the individuals that form that group hold. The conscious personality wanes, the feelings and thoughts of all individuals are aligned in the same direction. A common group soul is formed"(Gustave le Bon 1895, quoted in Kempf 2005, 173). That is exactly what the architects of the North Korean state ideology "Juche" had in mind as I will present in a

later chapter.

2.3.5. Culture / cosmology

Culture is a symbolic aspect of human nature. It tells us what is right, wrong, good, bad, beautiful, ugly and on a deeper level also why that is the case.

A cosmology is the "collective unconscious ideas of what a normal and natural reality is" (Galtung 2005, 130).

Galtung presents six cosmologies (Galtung 2005, 136ff):

- Occident I (zentrifugal, expanding, Greek-Roman, modern)
- Occident II zentripetal, contracting, medieval)
- Indian (Hindu)
- Buddhistic (Buddhist)
- Sinic (Chinese)
- Nipponic (Japanese)

For this thesis, I will present the characteristics of Occident I, Buddhistic, Sinic and Nipponic since they are most relevant for the topic of North Korea and the stakeholders.

2.3.5.1 Occident I

Human beings see themselves as rulers over nature as the Bible states. Society is individualistic and hierarchical. The culture is deductive/analytic. There are strong dichotomies: good vs. bad, heaven vs. hell, center vs. periphery. The periphery is trying to become like the center. There is also a margin where the evil is that which is against the center and this evil thinks it is a center of its own.

2.3.5.2 Buddhistic/Sinic/Nipponic

There is a way from dukkha (suffering) to sukkha (blessedness). The sangha (buddhist community of believers) is a key element, the sangha is not hierarchical. Human being consists of his/her relations to other human beings. The culture is holistic/dialectic. there are no dichotomies, the symbol Yin/Yang shows that there is a bit of white in every black and vice versa. In China, this culture is mixed with Daoism, in Japan with Shintoism, in South Korea with Christianity and in North Korea with Juche.

The life cycle of a conflict and the means of negotiation and solution depend on the cosmology of the stakeholders. So a multi-stakeholder conflict like that involving North Korea is a challenge to resolve.

2.4. Theories of Peace

There are various concepts of peace: outer peace between nations, inner peace within nations, peace with nature, etc. Peace is a concept that is positive and means different things for different people (Meyers, 1994: 12).

According to Czempiel (2002, 83), there is no clarified concept of peace. The way Johan Galtung (1975, 48) sees it, peace can not be explained, just as health can not be explained. They are both defined as the absence of their opposite: violence/war or respectively the absence of disease. This is in line with the most common definition: peace is defined as the absence of war (Czempiel 2002, 85). "The nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE" (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1651, quoted in Sternberg 1995, 95; capital letters in the original). Extended definitions of peace from Galtung and others state that there is peace when there is no suppression, when there is justice, social development, pluralism, justice and freedom (Meyers, 1994: 66).

3. North Korea Background

3.1. General

It is important to note that it is very difficult to find unbiased figures about North Korea; the quality of the sources varies, they are often biased and have their own specific agendas (Choe, 2004: 98). Information about the North Korean economy and military in particular therefore has to be treated with caution. Very often information about living conditions comes from refugees, but some refugees were also said to be spies for the North. I have therefore tried to cross-check information with a variety of sources where possible and have stated where and how they differ if relevant.

North Korea is the northern part of the Korean peninsula. The border is formed by the rivers Yalu and Tumen In the north of the country, and by the so-called demilitarized zone roughly around the 38th parallel in the south. The North has about 22.5 million inhabitants. Pyongyang is the capital (2.7 million inhabitants). The population consists of 99% Koreans and a very small Chinese minority; some sources say there is no minority at all. The gross national product is 22.3 billion US \$ (2002). About 36% of the population work in agriculture, but only about 18-20% of the land is suitable for agriculture. There are no official unemployment figures. Important national resources

are coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesium and iron ore. Exports are mainly minerals, weapons, textiles and fish. The principal imports are gas, coal, machines and parts, wheat and food (Choe, 2004).

3.2. History

3.2.1. Up to Japanese occupation and the division

Korea was unified for over 1,000 years. The country was ruled by the same monarchic dynasty (Choson/Yi Dynasty) from 1392 till 1910, assisted by the aristocracy (Yangban). The governance system was authoritarian and bureaucratic with an absolute monarch at the top. The rules of society were predominantly Confucian. Korea was forced to sign a treaty with Japan in 1876. Britain and the US, also keen for the country to open up, signed treaties with Korea in the 1880s. Both China and Japan had interests in Korea and this led to the Sino-Japanese war in 1894/95, won by Japan. Japan annexed Taiwan and parts of Manchuria. After its victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904/05, Japan established dominance over Korea in 1905 and formally annexed it in 1910. Japanese occupation was brutal. There was an anti-Japanese resistance movement; both Rhee Syng-Man and Kim Il Sung were active members (Lowe, 2000: 1-9).

At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the leaders of China, the US and Great Britain stated that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent", but that was meant to take many years under a multi-power trusteeship of the US, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China (Kaufman, 1999: 5). After Japan lost WWII, Korea was under Soviet and US administration with the 38th parallel as the dividing line. The Koreans wanted their country to be united and independent. The right-wing, led by Rhee Syng-Man, won the elections in the southern part of the country and the Republic of Korea (ROK) emerged with a constitution claiming to be valid for all of Korea, declaring independence on August 15, 1948. North Korea followed, proclaiming itself the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 9, 1948. The UN acknowledged the ROK and recommended inner-Korean talks for reunification. In the North, Kim Il Sung came to power; he had also been active in the resistance against the Japanese and worked with the Chinese Communist Party in the 30s. He was appointed by Stalin, who thought he could be easily influenced. North Korea started a Communist land reform. The US helped to train and support the army in the South, the Soviet Union and China helped in the North (Lowe, 2000: 1-9).

3.2.2. Korean War (June 25 1950 until July 27 1953): (Lowe, 2000: 197)

North Korea was well equipped militarily by its communist allies. Ironically, the US

refused to equip South Korea in a similar manner because they thought they might invade the North and thus provoke a war between the US and the Soviet Union. Kim Il Sung made plans to invade South Korea and received promises of support from Stalin and Mao in spring 1950 after claiming the South could be defeated in three days (Kaufman, 1999: 7). On June 25, 1950, North Korea crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the South, fighting against South Korean and United Nations Command forces. The North Korean army had help from Russia and China (Kaufman, 1999: 7ff). The army in the South on the other hand was weak. It rapidly became clear that the only way to stop the North Korean army was with American troops (Hess, 2001: 8ff).

After severe fighting, with the front moving back and forth repeatedly, a cease-fire agreement was signed on July 27 1953. (Lowe, 2000) The division remained roughly around the 38th parallel. (Hess, 2001: 71). The signatories to the agreement were North Korea and the US General Mark W. Clark on behalf of the UN. South Korea (represented by Rhee Syng-Man) did not sign. To date there is no actual peace treaty. Pyongyang would now like to conclude a peace treaty with the US, whereas South Korea would like to have an inner-Korean treaty (Werning, 2004: 83).

The Korean War had terrible effects. It is estimated that 50,000 US soldiers died in the war (Rigoulot, 2003: 17), along with 900,000 Chinese soldiers and 520,000 North Korean soldiers (Kaufman, 1999: 43) and one fourth of the North Korean population - based on 1950s figures (Martin, 2004: 3). The Korean War also had ramifications for the political balance of power in Asia. The USA demonstrated that they viewed limiting the influence of communism internationally as a key priority. The People's Republic of China (PRC) showed that Korea was strategically important to them. Tensions between PRC and the Soviet Union became apparent. Kim Il Sung became an independent actor that tried to juggle between China and the Soviet Union as allies. Japan was rehabilitated and became part of the American security system (Cieslik, 2001: 68). That is why the US, China, Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia are the main external stakeholders in the conflict, which will be presented in a later chapter.

3.3. Weltanschauung

The term "Weltanschauung", (world view) was first used by German philosopher Kant. Later, Kierkegaard defined it as a "set of ultimate beliefs" (quoted in Lee, 1997: 204). James Sire says that "a worldview is a set of presuppositions (or assumptions) which we hold, consciously or subconsciously, about the basic makeup of our world" (quoted in Lee, 1997: 204). I will present an overview of important factors that have shaped the

Korean "Weltanschauung". Korean here refers to both South and North Korea, although it is clear that due to the different political systems the way these beliefs are still lived out differs in the two countries. As in other East Asian countries, people in Korea do not necessarily stick to one belief system, but combine several sets of beliefs in different aspects of life. I will present Confucianism as one of the major factors in addition to the Galtung cosmologies from the previous chapter.

Confucianism dates back to the days of Confucius (Kong Tse), a Chinese scholar who lived from 551 AD to 479 AD in China. A major part of his philosophy focuses on how individuals should interact with each other and how society and government should be organized. People ought to obey their rulers not out of fear of punishment but of their own will due to their personal virtue. Rulers must also possess virtue to ensure they are obeyed. Education is considered to be important (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

Everybody has his/her place in society and is part of a small group that in turn is part of a larger group. There are five basic relations between people: "Loyalty between the king and his subject, filial piety between father and son, distinction between husband and wife, faith between friends and order between old and the young" (Lee, 1997: 211). Part of Confucian thought is unconditional loyalty. Social symmetry is important as well as the well-being of the larger entity, which is valued more than individual well-being (Cieslik, 2001: 50ff). This is also reflected in the North Korean state system, as will be presented in more detail below.

3.4. Politics and political system

From the very beginning, North Korea was backed by other communist states. Later, from the 60s onwards, it pursued an active policy of establishing links with Third World countries like Vietnam, Mongolia, Indonesia, Cuba, Egypt, Libya and various other Arab, African and Latin American countries. These countries saw the North Korean independent way of development as a possible path for development without colonialism (Gills, 1996: 60ff)

In the 70s, other states like Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Austria also established diplomatic relations with North Korea (Gills, 1996: 130).

North Korea is a so-called People's Republic with President Kim Il Sung, who died in 1994, but nonetheless remains president. The current head of state is his son Kim Jong Il, which makes Korea the only communist dynasty. North Korea is a dictatorship. Dictatorship is a form of state violence. It is based on the state's monopoly on the

exercise of power backed by other organizations such as the secret police, military etc. The exercise of power, in many cases using force, is directed against the citizens. So-called 'soft' dictatorships are characterized by strong control, force and abolition of democratic rights. So-called 'hard' dictatorships are characterized by direct violence, oppression, torture, and prosecution of citizens that are not part of the oppressive system - and sometimes even of supporters of the regime (Bonacker/Imbusch, 2005: 96f). North Korea is a 'hard' dictatorship by these criteria. Dissidents or refugees or anybody that seems suspicious may be sent to labor camps with terrible conditions. It is estimated that there are at least 200 camps with up to 150,000 inmates (Rigoulot, 2003: 61ff).

3.5. Juche

The political ideology in North Korea is called "Juche". There is a surprising number of original sources from North Korea available in European languages produced specifically for foreign markets, most of them from the early 80s. Juche is seen by its followers not as a political ideology, but as a philosophical system. "The basis of the Juche idea is that man is the master of all things and the decisive factor in everything"(Kim Il Sung, quoted in Ajami, 1978: 19). Juche means "autarky, autonomy". The idea was developed by Kim Il Sung in the 1940s and replaced Marxism as the predominant ideology in the North Korean constitution in 1977. Juche is claimed to be the specifically Korean element in the revolution.

Juche stresses the country's self sufficiency. A strong army is considered to be important. Unification is viewed as an "internal affair of the Korean nation" (Ajami, 1978: 70f). The unification of Korea does not necessarily need to be achieved in a peaceful way, but a peaceful solution is preferred, as Kim Il Sung claimed (Kim, 1971: 6). "If we step up the revolution of our own country with our own efforts in a responsible manner, whether or not recognized by others, we will naturally gain sympathy, recognition and assistance from other countries." (Kim Il Sung, quoted in Ajami, 1978: 29). This goal has clearly not worked out, for even the country's former allies, Russia and China, have turned their backs on North Korea. The UN and other countries are granting humanitarian assistance, but certainly not out of sympathy or recognition for the North Korean system.

Juche claims to be a philosophical concept that puts the human beings and their welfare in its center (Pan, 1992: 62), but with a leader-cult that is probably second to none, where the leaders live in absolute luxury and where the population is on the verge of

starvation. It is claimed that Juche is raising human beings to be masters of their destiny and the "key to paradise on earth" (Pan, 1992: 62), which is the complete opposite of the reality of daily life in North Korea. Part of Juche ideology is also the subjugation of nature (forces of production), the subjugation of society (forces of politics), mastery of oneself (forces of ideology and culture). All these elements are called "creativity" according to Juche ideology (Pan, 1992: 65ff). The (political) consciousness is considered to be important. Love is only important as love for the community (fraternal love as comrades) reaching its peak as love for the leader.

This is highly reminiscent of "Newspeak" in George Orwell's "1984" where concepts are said to be defined as the opposite of what they really are. The subjugation of nature takes its toll with floods and bad harvests that further aggravate the problem of insufficient food supplies. North Korea is definitely not the "beautiful garden of golden tapestry" (Kim Il Sung, quoted in Ajami, 1978: 45), as its leaders think, with the possible exception of their own glittery palaces. The subjugation of society is obvious, North Korea has one of the most rigid systems of control to be found anywhere in the world. Self-control and self-discipline are crucial in a country where any deviation from the official line is severely punished and where dissidents are sent to work camps exist. Basic human emotions like love are instrumentalized to serve the cause of the system and the leader. The individual North Korean citizen is certainly a lot less master of his destiny than his Southern counterpart and citizens of other countries. Juche could be described as one of the most rigid extremist systems, thinly disguised as a pseudo-philosophical concept.

Through Juche, North Korean politics is highly focused on the leader, so he also presents a key factor in the conflict situation. "I am less impressed by the role of abstract forces such as nationalism, militarism or alliance systems that traditionally have been regarded as causes of war. Nor does a single one of the six cases indicate that economic factors played a vital part in precipitating war. The personalities of leaders, on the other hand, have often been decisive" (Stoessinger, 1974: 222). This can also be said in the case of North Korea.

3.6. The North Korean economy:

After 1961, North Korea was the most industrialized country in the Third World and had achieved an economic miracle compared to that group of countries. Living conditions were much better than in the South at that time (Gills, 1996: 59). That, however, changed soon and profoundly when the downsides of a centrally planned economy

became apparent and when South Korea turned into one of the economic "Tiger" states.

Precise appraisals of the state of the North Korean economy are problematic because the official numbers look fabricated: sometimes 54% production increases per year have been reported. As the economy is largely collective, it is difficult if not impossible to get accurate information. There are no official figures for parameters like GDP and value-added that could be compared internationally because the origin of the figures is unclear and propaganda-driven (Maierbrugger, 2004: 60).

After the Soviet system and barter trades between socialist states collapsed, North Korea's economy faced a severe downturn. It is said that the current level of electricity generation is between 10-30% of its former level due to lack of parts, energy and the drop in foreign trade (Maierbrugger, 2004: 36f). Large sections of the economy are in decline and much work is now done manually again because of the lack of parts and fuel for machines. Individuals may now engage in small-scale business activities and may acquire a small piece of land to grow crops and vegetables, which they are allowed to sell. It is estimated that approximately 2 million people died in the famines in the 90s (Rigoulot, 2003: 11ff). North Korea is approximately 2 billion tons of rice short to feed its people. The food stamp distribution system doesn't work anymore. Many North Koreans flee to China (Rigoulot, 2003: 40). The black market economy is vast and corruption is rife in North Korea. Some estimates claim 80% of the daily necessities of the people are covered by black market activities and cross-border smuggling (Suh, 1998: 143ff).

North Korea has very high foreign debt and lacks foreign currency. It is said to urge its diplomats abroad to organize foreign currency with mafia-like methods like drug manufacturing and dealing, the arms trade and counterfeiting money, especially US\$ and Yen. In 1984, a law was passed in North Korea to facilitate foreign investment (Rigoulot, 2003: 18ff). The Rajin Sonbong Special Economic Zone was founded in 1991 and in 1992 laws to facilitate foreign investments were passed (Gills, 1996: 252), but did not make business there more attractive for investors. There is a cooperation project between North Korea and Hyundai to enable tourism to Kumgang Mountain.

3.7. Military

North Korea is highly militarized. Four percent of the population are enlisted in the army, the compulsory military service lasts between 5 to 8 years. The army is said to be 1.2 million men strong with a reserve of 4.7 million (The Military Balance, 2007: 357). 22% of GDP – the GDP itself is not sure either - is invested in defense according to

Kirkbridge (1994: 6), according to Choe (2004) the figure is around 30% (p. 16) or 40% (p. 98), whilst Pollack (1999) puts it at 25% (p. XIV). This shows both that the number is extremely high in comparison to other countries and how difficult it is to get reliable figures for North Korea so all these figures are to be taken with a heavy dose of salt. The well-informed Military Balance does not cite any figure for military expenditures of North Korea (The Military Balance, 2007: 408).

North Korea possesses about 800 ballistic missiles, over 600 Scuds and 200 Nodongs, many of them in underground storages or launching devices. Scud missiles originally came from the Soviet Union, but also from Egypt. In the 70s, there was development cooperation with China. North Korea has its own production facilities and is said to receive parts and assistance directly, inadvertently or illicitly from Europe, China, Japan, Russia and Syria. North Korea has exported weapons to Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen (Center for Nonproliferation Studies March 22, 2006). Nodong missiles could attack targets throughout South Korea and parts of Japan, Taepodong missiles could reach Japan, US territory in the West Pacific and Hawaii and Alaska (Niksich, 2001: 20ff).

3.8. Nuclear

One of the major issues in the conflict especially between North Korea and the US is the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. The US President George W. Bush labeled North Korea part of the "axis of evil" (State of the Union speech January 29, 2002, quoted in Niksich, 2002: 19f). North Korea feels it is entitled to have nuclear weapons. This is how the official North Korean News agency presents it: "It is none other than the US which wrecks peace and security on the Korean peninsula and drives the situation there to an extremely dangerous phase. After the appearance of the Bush administration, the United States listed the DPRK as part of an "axis of evil", adopting it as a national policy to oppose its system and singled it out as a target of a preemptive nuclear attack, openly declaring a nuclear war" (KCNA Jan 10 2003 in Choe, 2004: 116f).

Most North Korean nuclear facilities are located in Yongbyon. Key elements include an atomic reactor said to produce enough plutonium for about one nuclear bomb annually (Niksich, 2001: 20ff). North Korea defends its right to possess nuclear weapons as follows: "The DPRK has the opinion that the problem of peace on the Korean peninsula is caused by the threat of the USA to strike first with nuclear weapons". North Korea wants to negotiate with the US on equal terms and therefore also needs nuclear

weapons. North Korea sees the US as aggressor, as state that wants to control the world and has threatened the states they labeled "axis of evil" by attacking the first one (Iraq) (Autorenkollektiv, no year indicated: 30ff).

The nuclear tests in October 2006 were framed as follows (all quotes KCNA Oct 3, 2006)

- "(...) the DPRK will never use nuclear weapons first but strictly prohibit any threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear transfer."
- "There is no change in the principled stand of the DPRK to materialize the denuclearization of the peninsula through dialogue and negotiations."

According to Saunders (2003), it is difficult to assess the true intentions behind the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

There are different possibilities:

- "North Korean leaders have decided that nuclear weapons are essential to their security. (...)
- North Korean leaders are willing to negotiate their nuclear and missile programs away for guarantees of their security and sovereignty. (...)
- North Korean leaders want both nuclear weapons (as an ultimate security guarantee) and good relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea. (...)
- North Korean leaders/factions disagree about whether nuclear weapons or a negotiated agreement with the United States is the best way to achieve security. (...)
- North Korean leaders seek nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to enable offensive actions against South Korea."

(Saunders, 2003: no page)

4. Stakeholders

The original meaning of a stakeholder is "someone holding stakes in a bet", this definition first recorded in 1708 is now broadened to signify "a person with an interest or concern in something", a "social actor"(Ramirez, no year: no page). Ramirez defines stakeholder analysis as the "identification and description of stakeholders on the basis of their attributes, interrelationships and interests related to a given issue". Applied to a corporate setting, Freeman defines stakeholders as "any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation's purpose"(Freeman, 1984: VI). It is also important to assess stakeholders' interests in any specific situation.

Following the background information I presented in the previous chapter, I will analyze North Korea, South Korea, the US, China, Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia as the main stakeholders in this conflict and as possible agents for a solution.

4.1. North Korea

North Korea is facing severe problems, which it tries to tackle with the various means at its disposal. The end of the Cold War and the systems change in many of its former allies has forced North Korea in a more isolated position. It can no longer count on help from Russia and China in case of an attack (Opitz, 1994: 141). North Korea is unable to feed its population and is economically extremely vulnerable, largely depending on foreign aid. Nonetheless the North wants respect and security guarantees. Apart from the nuclear weapons it is presumed to own, the country has little negotiating points (Cuthbert, 2007: 51f).

North Korea develops nuclear weapons out of fear and to attain a more positive deal in negotiations - that is the more positive view; alternatively, the North Koreans simply see the nuclear program and the bomb as their right and a necessity (Laney, 2003: no page). One of the ways for North Korea to obtain foreign currencies is through the arms trade, which is growing increasingly difficult due to sanctions. It is therefore vital for North Korea to participate in negotiations to receive international aid without abandoning its central goals. Changes triggering a greater opening up of the country would run contrary to the Juche ideology of self-reliance (Pollack, 1999: 28ff). North Korea is thus attempting to achieve a very delicate balancing act.

On the other hand, North Korea strives to attain unification of the peninsula; one of its most vigorously stated goals. The Korean War was an aggressive attempt by the North to achieve this. At that point, the North hoped it could stimulate a socialist revolution in the South, moving on subsequently to advocate a confederation with two separate systems. This scenario is not meant to be a stage on the path to complete unification, but instead the permanent solution. However, North Korea keen to ensure survival of its system (Paik, 1997: 109ff).

The North Korean vision of unification would be a confederation: "Koryo Confederation". It would consist of two partially sovereign governments with a central authority. The two parts would keep their ideology and system (Park, 1997: 96f).

North Korea has been making attempts to sign a peace treaty with the US. In the aftermath of the Korean War, only an armistice agreement was signed. The North hopes that the US would then reduce the level of its troops in the South (Park, 1997: 87ff).

The North Korean ruling class and the high-ranking military that live in luxury want to keep their current status and are therefore important to watch. On the other hand, there is a wealthy class of newly-rich emerging that profits from smuggling and the beginning of free enterprise. They want a bigger share of the cake and are likely to push for more power in the long run (Chang, 2006: 64ff).

4.2. South Korea

South Korea is a weak state with a powerful ally, the US. Therefore, South Korea's foreign policy is not independent (Park, 1997: 89). Inner-Korean relations have been characterized by mutual distrust after a long civil war. Since the 80s however, South Korea has viewed the North as more of a partner in solving the Korean question and has implemented a "Nordpolitik", analogous to the "Ostpolitik" pursued by West Germany before its reunification (Park, 1997: 87ff).

Large numbers of American soldiers have been stationed in South Korea since the Korean War. This has led to widespread anti-Americanism in South Korea with frequent protests (Polak, 2004: 12). The South feels threatened by the North and wants the nuclear question to be resolved peacefully. The South is looking for a balance between the cooperation with the US and negotiating attempts with the North (DeRouen, 2003: 107).

South Korea is also interested in unification. Taking Germany as a paradigm would not be feasible for South Korea though, as the economic and cultural gap between the two countries is much wider than that between the two Germanies (Park, 1997: 98). South Korea would be in a difficult position if it had to bear the economic burden of a potential reunification alone (Pollack, 1999: 22f).

4.3. USA

"America first" is a slogan often used, it also means America as number one in the world. Thomas A. Jefferson's formula of an "empire of liberty" evokes the notion that an empire is created by military means if necessary, to promote the cause of freedom and liberty. Foreign Policy oscillates between the idea of "Battleship America" taking an

active part by aircraft carrier in conflicts all around the world to defend American interests; and that of a "Global Society", created in the American mold (Schweigler, 1998: 393ff).

After WWII, the US was busy building Western Europe as its stronghold and buffer zone against the communists. Policymakers concentrated more on Germany than on Korea, fearing an open war against the Soviet Union in Europe. However, the US they did not want the attack on South Korea to go unpunished and therefore entered the war (Kaufman, 1999: 31ff). The Korean War was the first 20th century war that the US did not win. This was especially frustrating as the US had believed victory would be easy to achieve. After the war, there was no contact between the US and North Korea for decades. On the other hand, the US provided very generous economic aid to the South (DeRouen, 2003: 105f).

The US agenda is to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and to fight communism (Cuthbert, 2007: 52). After WWII, Germany and Korea marked the rift between communism and capitalism. After the fall of communism, the Soviet Union fell apart and Russia is now no longer the enemy (Hartmann, 2001: Chapter 3). Since 9/11, the US is fighting various wars in the name of combating global terror. North Korea is on the list of "rogue states" together with Iran and Syria. These states are either actively involved in terrorism against the US (or perceived to be) or are destabilizing regions that are important to the US. North Korea is selling ballistic missiles to countries like Pakistan and Iran and is therefore perceived by the US as a threat to American security (DeRouen, 2003: 106ff). The North is seen as a rogue state that is "developing long-range missiles, exporting missile technology, supporting terrorism, possessing biochemical weapons, producing nuclear material and potentially proliferating it" (Paik 2004, 53). The US seeks diplomatic solutions but does not rule out other options such as sanctions, negligence, so-called "surgical strikes", or regime change.

After the nuclear test in October 2006, Assistant State Secretary Hill declared: "We are not going to live with a nuclear North Korea. It can have a future or it can have these weapons. It can not have both" (quoted in Crisis Group No 56, 2006: no page). The US is also nervous that North Korea might sell off its nuclear technology to third countries.

The US is using different measures for the "rogue states", military intervention in the case of Iraq and threats followed by negotiation for North Korea. If Korea should one

day become united one day and fully independent, it is not entirely clear where it will seek its new allies, if it will remain as close to the US as the South Korea is now (Pollack, 1999: 20).

4.4. China

China is culturally very close to Korea. The cultural links between the two have always been very strong. China is still traumatized by losing power to the West and by being treated as a second-class state at the beginning of the 20th century. There were strong links between the Asian communist states, i.e. China, North Korea and Vietnam who had closer ties with each other than with the Soviet Union (Gills, 1996: 69f). In the past, Korea used to have special status within the Chinese tributary system. Korea had to pay tribute but was free to manage its own affairs. After the decline of the Chinese Qing dynasty, the West tried to "open" Korea. In 1885, Japan and China signed a treaty that made Korea a co-protectorate. Japan then won the Sino-Japanese war and annexed Korea (Gills, 1996: 21ff).

China has long been an ally of the North; fighting on their side in the Korean War, sometimes even disguised as North Koreans. Until the break-up of the Eastern Bloc, China was a bartering trading partner for North Korea. China is still supporting the North with delivery of grain and crude oil and is North Korea's third largest trading partner. China established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 and was always an advocate of the "one Korea" policy of the North - until it established diplomatic relations with the South. China's policy towards South Korea is nowadays mainly influenced by economic interests (Lee, 1994: 97ff).

Whilst China is unlikely to actually fight for North Korea (Pollack 1999, XVIf), it does play an important role in the Four Party Talks (Pollack 1999, 14f). As Cheong Wook-Sik puts it, "China is the only party capable of engaging the North Korean leadership in a meaningful dialogue" (Cheong 2005, no page). China now has influence over North and South and is a strong advocate of non-proliferation, because major Chinese cities would be within reach of North Korean missiles. Furthermore, China would be "the biggest loser if Pyongyang was to insist on the bomb"; China, Japan and other East Asian countries could be pushed into a dangerous arms race (Lorenz, Andreas 2007). In addition, China has a great interest in the North Korean state NOT collapsing, for it is keen to avoid an upsurge in the numbers of refugees coming to China. Large numbers of North Korean refugees already arrive in China (Cieslik 2001, 79ff). NGOs estimate that as many as 200,000 North Koreans live in China at present. Some refugees return

to North Korea several times a year to bring back goods (Rigoulot 2003, 39ff). In response, China is building a fence along the border with North Korea (Crisis Group No. 56, 2006, no page).

China's goal is to have its periphery stable and peaceful and is against a reunification scenario where one part swallows the other part. The goal is for the two Koreas to grow together (Zhao, 1997: 70). In addition, China's role in the Pacific area is growing in the wake of its economic opening and the economic success, and China seeks to play a greater political role in that area, too. "China believes that ideology should no longer be a significant factor affecting state-to-state relations" (Zhao, 1997: 82). Zhao (1997: 77) doubts that China would have the power to stop a violent conflict on the Korean peninsula if it were to break out (Zhao, 1997: 50ff).

4.5. Japan

Japan was the former occupier of Korea. At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan wanted to create a super-power in Asia and annexed Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and other parts of Asia and kept them under a bloody rule until being defeated at the end of WWII in 1945. The Koreans (North and South) have still not forgiven that and Japan does little to reconcile. Every year, the Japanese Prime Minister visits Yasukuni shrine where class A war criminals are among the soldiers venerated (Cho, 1998: 211ff).

North Korean missiles can reach the entire area of Japan and North Korea has fired test missiles: a Taepodong missile flew over Japan in 1998 (Pollack, 1999: 12). Japan is afraid of the nuclear threat, probably more than other countries since it has already suffered twice from the horrible after-effects of atomic bombs (Maul, 1998: 155).

Although Japan lost WWII, the US is now the most important security partner for Japan (Maul, 1998: 155ff). After WWII, Japan became an economic power. Officially, it has no military power, Japan only has a self defense force (which is constitutionally not an army, but equipped as if it were). The US still has a high military presence of about 100.000 soldiers. Japan relies on the US for defense. US hegemony in Asia was to be backed by a strong Japan. Therefore, after WWII, the US helped to rebuild Japan as an economic center in the region (Gills, 1996: 90ff).

In the Japan-ROK normalization treaty from 1965, Japan recognizes the South as the only legal government. There are tensions with North Korea over several issues: North Korea expects compensation from Japan for the occupation (Kim, 2004: 113ff). Japan expects clarification concerning the cases of the persons abducted by North Korea. In

the 70s, the North abducted several Japanese citizens to train spies. That was a barrier to negotiations between the two countries until Kim Jong Il admitted this had occurred and apologized in 2002 (Laney, 2003: no page).

The Korean conflict also affects Japanese domestic policy. The country has a large Korean minority of about 680,000 people, many of which have North Korean affiliation. This minority comprises descendants of the 2 million slave workers that were either forced to come to Japan during the occupation or that came to escape the poverty in Korea. With the division of Korea, the Koreans in Japan became quasi-divided as well. North-Korean affiliated resident Koreans in Japan are organized in the Soren or Chongnyon group, South-Korean affiliated are organized in the Mindan (there are also the "neutral" groups Mintoren and Seiwakei). Many Koreans left Japan to go back to North Korea (Hicks, 1986; Crisis Group, 27 June 2005). North-affiliated Koreans in Japan transfer an estimated 2 billion US\$ to North Korea per year (Kirby, 1998: 67).

Regarding Japanese foreign policy towards Korea, Shigemura makes four assumptions (Shigemura, 1997: 50):

- 1: "Japan has no foreign policy". That can be doubted.
- 2: "Japan's foreign policy is influenced by its relations with the United States"
- 3: "Japan's North Korea policy has always been decided by politicians for personal reasons without strategy"
- 4: "Japan does not welcome the short term effects of Korean unification, but it will in the long run"

Japan can not decide its North Korea policy without the US. Japan is also worried that a stronger Korea might align with China against Japan (Shigemura, 1997: 49).

4.6. The Soviet Union/Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union (SU), Russia was the largest state that emerged from the rubble. Russia is no longer communist, has a relatively free economy and system and is now fully integrated into the international economy. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia does not try to convince other countries of its lifestyle anymore. Military structures are partly deconstructed. There are still great problems of stability inside of Russia (Hartmann, 2001: chapter 4). Since 1998, the Soviet Union/Russia has cut back involvement in former spheres of influence (Ferdowsi, 1994a: 14)

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev also started to also have contact with ROK. Economic factors were very important; the South became an important trading partner

for the Soviet Union. North Korea was shocked by this; viewing it as an act of betrayal and as a measure to perpetuate the division. The Soviet Press even began to criticize North Korea for its rigidity (Kim, 1994: 86ff).

After WWII, the Soviet Union backed Kim Il Sung's attack on South Korea, which is what started the Korean War, as well as helping the North with material and military personnel. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the North's main ally. These close connections have waned. Trade is no longer based on the communist barter system. In March 1999 Russia and North Korea signed a treaty on interstate relations, which commits Russia to consultations with the North in the event of a crisis, but it doesn't stipulate automatic military involvement by Russia (Pollack, 1999: 16f).

Russia wants to play a more active role in negotiations and has called for six party talks (N/S-Korea, Russia, China, US, Japan). In this context, Russia could provide a balance to offset the dominant influence of the US (Paik 2004, 46ff). At present, Russia takes the view that Koreans should be the main players in resolving the problem of Korean unification (Denisov, 1997: 36ff).

5. Solution

A solution to the conflict would – as stated in the first part of the thesis – either tackle the tensions or the structures. Ideally, it would do both or find an approach that transcends the conflict. Concluding from what I have presented so far, I will now introduce possible ways and steps to solve the conflict.

5.1. Prerequisites

A necessary first step is a peace agreement between the two Koreas. So far, only an armistice agreement was negotiated to stop the Korean War. This agreement was signed by North Korea and the US, but not by South Korea. Until now, the US has been reluctant to negotiate and sign a peace agreement because that would mean a normalization of relations between the parties involved. Until the 70s, North Korea regularly took the initiative in proposing peace talks to the South (Lee, 1997: 136ff).

5.2. Confidence-building measures (CBM):

The goal of confidence-building measures is to create a framework for a stable status quo, to prevent armed conflict and to reduce the socio-economic differences between

North and South Korea. In addition, by creating more trust, CBM contribute significantly to countering aggression. If we take the threat-aggression hypothesis and the frustration-aggression hypothesis into consideration, CBM could relieve the pressure somewhat and therefore open up more scope for creative solutions.

5.2.1. Military CBM

1. Prevention of surprise attack: limits on personnel and certain types of weapons, surveillance/monitoring
2. Prevention of accidental armed clashes (crisis prevention): notification measures of military movements etc. and restriction measures
3. Escalation control (crisis management): communication (installation of a "hotline" etc.)
4. Arms limit and reduction (information and inspection)

(Kang, 1997: 208)

5.2.2. Political CBM

Most of the political confidence-building measures are symbolic and rather abstract in reality. One of the basics is that each Korea needs to accept the legitimacy of the other. Negotiation channels have to be reactivated and negative propaganda about the other side has to stop.

5.2.3. Socio-economic CBM

This means the preparation of North Korea for a "soft landing". It consists of an increase of trade and exchange of people, goods and ideas.

5.2.4. Sunshine Policy as a CBM:

Kim Dae Jung became South Korean President in 1998 and changed the policy towards the North from a formerly hard-line approach to a policy of engagement – the so-called "Sunshine Policy". In a speech at the US congress on June 10, 1998, the Korean president Kim Dae Jung explained the importance of this sunshine policy:

"To lead North Korea toward reconciliation, the Republic of Korea and the United States should promote a "Sunshine" Policy – offering inducements against the backdrop of strong security measures. And we should extend to North Korea both goodwill and strong security, so suspicion dissolves and openness emerges... above all, we need a flexible policy. To get a passerby to take off his coat, so the fable goes, sunshine is more effective than a strong wind.... We hope such an overall approach gives North Korea psychological room to open its mind . And its doors. To be sure, we will never

relax our vigilance against North Korea. But neither will we be afraid of pursue peace."
(quoted in Heo, 2003: 102)

The goal of this policy is to bring the North out of isolation and to integrate it into world politics. It encompasses economic aid, business activities, family visits and other measures. The Sunshine Policy was strongly backed by US President Clinton (The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even visited North Korea), but that has changed since George W. Bush took office. The core of the Sunshine Policy is "bringing North Korea out of isolation and integrating it into world politics" (Heo/Hyun, 2003: 89). The Sunshine Policy was backed by the US administration under Clinton, but support dwindled under Bush, who takes a more hard-lined approach.

At the South-North summit in June 2000, the two Koreas showed their willingness to coexist and recognize each other. That led to more trade, more visiting options for separated families and Kumgang tourists and more exchange on various levels, along with considerable financial assistance provided to the North by the South. However, the North still built and exported weapons and continued its nuclear research program (Paik, 2004: 48).

The Sunshine Policy has therefore reduced the tensions – at least for a while. The goal of the Sunshine Policy is to treat the North Korean leadership as an equal partner. The Sunshine Policy has focused on small, feasible steps such as the family reunion visit program. It also included an agreement to reopen the railway link between the North and the South. So far however, regular trains from the South stop at the border. A single train has symbolically passed through in April 2006 in exchange for more financial aid. The rail link could later connect Beijing, Pyongyang, Seoul and, via ferry or tunnel link, even Japan. Galtung (2001: no page) stresses the importance of mutual projects like these to break the cycle of accusations and to use creativity to create a better future for all. The success of the sunshine policy depends to a large extent on the involvement of the US; Japan and South Korea. So far, North Korea has not fully reciprocated the efforts of the South. The question is therefore how long the South can uphold this approach and how long it will want to do so (Heo, 2003: 89ff).

5.2.5. Other confidence-building measures:

South Korea has made several proposals to the North:

- "Prior notification of military movements and exercises above brigade levels, mutual invitations to observe the military exercises

- Withdrawal of force-deployed offensive arms and troops to rear areas and reduction of offensive arms and troops to prevent surprise attack and recurrence of war
- Maintenance of military balance based upon parity in the arms and troops of both sides, namely, the superior side's reduction of its arms and troops to the level of the inferior side.
- Reduction of troops corresponding to that of arms, and reductions of reserve and paramilitary personnel corresponding to that of armed forces.
- On the spot verification and monitoring to guarantee the implementation of the agreements in the process of arms reduction, and the establishment and operation of both a joint verification team and a standing monitoring team for the purpose.
- Decision about a final military strength level should be made by mutual consultation based upon the expected level of military strength appropriate to the unified nation."

North Korea did not respond (Heo, 2003: 98f).

A first round of talks were held under the aegis of the Red Cross in summer 1972. In 1990, the Prime Ministers of both countries (Yon Hyong-Muk for the North, Chung Won-Shik for the South) signed a non-attack and reconciliation treaty that also included a nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula (Cieslik, 2001: 137ff), so far, as is even more evident since October 2006, that has not materialized.

Further measures would also include the opening of telephone and telecommunication connections between North Korea and other countries as well as measures to enable credit card use and financial transactions (Kim, 1999: 268) to facilitate contact and investment.

5.2.5.1. Trust building

The base for this to work is trust. Trust building focuses on four components: Reliability, acceptance, openness and congruence. It is not sufficient for one or several of these components to work, in order to achieve trust, all components have to be fulfilled to at least to a certain degree (Maister 2000). One key aspect is keeping promises, which has not always been the case towards North Korea. For example, in 1985, the Soviet Union promised four nuclear power stations if North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it did (and later dropped out). The power stations were promised but never delivered (Sigal, 1998: 22).

It is thus clear that for successful confidence-building, all parties have to work on their reliability, acceptance, openness and congruence. The nuclear issue for example must be approached in a comprehensive, mutual, phased and multidimensional manner:

1. "First, the US-DPRK or multilateral nuclear negotiations, mutual concerns and interest must be comprehensively addressed. In other words, all major demands of the related parties - e.g. North Korea's call for the guarantees of its regime, the normalization of the US-DPRK relations, lifting economic sanctions, the US call for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, anti-terrorism, human rights and South Korea's call for peace and denuclearization etc must be dealt with comprehensively in the new nuclear deal.
2. Second, agreements should be reached in a reciprocal and mutual manner; likewise, the results of these compromises should be implemented so that mutual confidence can be built gradually.
3. Third, the various agendas pertaining to the North Korean nuclear problem should be dealt with stage-by-stage, starting with the most easy negotiable issues, or the most urgent ones. The need for this approach becomes all the more apparent given how difficult it has been for both the US and the DPRK to strike a package deal or implement it due to the deep-rooted mutual distrust and seemingly irreconcilable differences.
4. Lastly, the process of resolution must be a multidimensional process that incorporates not only the improvement of the US -DPRK relations but also the construction of an inter-Korean peace regime as well as a Northeast Asian peace and security cooperation regime at large. The Inter-Korean peace treaty must be pursued in parallel with efforts for reinforcing the other dimensions."
(Paik, 2004: 56)

5.2.5.2. GRIT

The GRIT Approach (Gradual Reciprocation on Tension-Reduction) by Osgood (1962) is rooted in a concept similar as CBM: It is about creating the opposite of the spiral of violence. Unilateral measures of reduction of arms and hostility can lead to a "positive spiral" of de-escalation if they are met with reciprocity from the other side(s). Unilateral measures must be tailored in risk to reflect the degree of cooperation from the other side. These measures also must be diverse, publicly announced and carried out on schedule regardless of reciprocation. Unilateral measures must be unambiguous and take mutual self-interests into account (Koh, 1988: 67f).

"Cooperation takes place only in situations in which actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where there is harmony. Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict but rather as reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate" (Keohane, 1984: 54)

5.3. Diplomacy

5.3.1. Economic diplomacy

According to Immanuel Kant (quoted in Schmidt, 2005: 51), the spirit of trade can not exist together with war. In his view, the trade spirit will eventually predominate. If that was true, economic diplomacy could be a good way to reach North Korea and there are signs that North Korea is willing to trade in certain policies or weapons for food and economic aid. As it seems, North Korea engaged in actions "that could be seen as signs that it was trying to trade in its nuclear weapons program for what it may have thought it needed more – security assurances and political economic ties to the United States" (Sigal, 1998: 124). Sigal is referring to North Korea not extracting plutonium from Yongbyon as it could have done after 1992. It therefore appears that deploying economic leverage could be a potentially promising measure.

The US could cease or cut back their sanctions against North Korea in exchange for reduction of military capabilities and a halt in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug-trafficking. North Korea could receive technical aid and profit from China's experience with creating market economy zones within a planned economy and with transition processes. First aid measures would be special economic zones and infrastructure projects, followed by education, health care, agriculture and industry outside of special economic zones. Aid would not be provided in cash to prevent the North Korean elite from using it for their purposes. Economic sanctions would be lifted and diplomatic relations established where needed and possible (O'Hanlon, 2003: 87ff). Economic transformation could work because North Korea has a fairly educated workforce (O'Hanlon, 2003: 135).

There are several special economic zones in North Korea. One example is Rajin Sonbong free trade zone, established in the Tumen region with support from China and the UNDP. Around 200 trade bureaux are active in Dandong, opposite Sinuiju; and many tradesmen cross the border back and forth between China and North Korea (Crisis Group No.122, 2006: no page). An industrial complex is opened at Kaesong where North Korean workers work in factories under South Korean management (Crisis

Group No. 52, 2006: no page). Hyundai is planning to operate 3,000 factories, 100,000 apartments, a shopping center and a golf course there, all powered by electricity from South Korea (Feffer, 2003: 45). Other free trade zones are planned for Sinuiju (at the border to China), Nampa and Wonsan. Economic cooperation between the North and the South is growing. Currently, over 50 foreign companies are licensed to operate in the North (Cuthbert, 2007: 53). The founder of Hyundai, Chung Joo-Yong has organized a joint venture and the Kumgang mountain tour program, where South Koreans can visit a mountain area in the North (Cieslik, 2001: 137) for a hefty sum of money paid to the North Korean government.

Funding for economic aid could come from Japan; they already made payments to the South as reparation for the occupation but have not yet paid reparations to the North. Adjusting the figures for inflation and economic growth, such payments could be in the order of magnitude of 5-10 billion US\$ which would be a good start for economic aid (O'Hanlon, 2003: 141).

North Korea has different options to tackle its severe economic problems. It could implement economic reforms towards a more market-oriented economy, it could make cosmetic changes like special economic zones and it could pursue a "muddle through" strategy with tactical economic adjustments and heavy dependence on foreign aid. Currently, North Korea adopts this latter option. A strong move towards a more market-oriented economy is likely to create socioeconomic disruptions and destabilize the government, also because the national Juche idea is based on self-reliance (Pollack, 1999: XIVf). On the other hand, a gradual development and economic opening following the example of China also seems to be a possible solution. Development and opening would take place, but still under the Juche ideology of self-reliance. The example of China might encourage North Korea to do the same (Lee, 1998: 209f).

However, economic diplomacy will not come easily and quickly. Investment in communist states is seen as risky and tends to be very speculative. Therefore it would be necessary first for the North Korean government to create reliable laws and procedures first (Roxborough, 1998: 126). Joint-venture laws have existed in North Korea since 1992, allowing for contractual joint ventures, equity joint ventures and wholly-owned foreign enterprise. Furthermore, North Korea sends people abroad for training. Additional crucial factors, such as infrastructure, credit, transport, insurance and quality control still pose great problems for foreign economic activities in North Korea (Nixson, 1998: 161ff).

One of the major ways for North Korea to organize its financial transactions with foreign countries is through the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia. This bank was forced to freeze North Korean assets through pressure from the US. This caused problems since it is impossible to differentiate between dirty and clean money and all assets were frozen. The Crisis Group therefore proposes to take a closer look at the assets and unfreeze those needed for legitimate business transactions (Crisis Group No. 52, 2006: no page).

Upholding the conflict as it is creates staggering costs for both sides and ties up resources better used for civilian purposes. Millions of lives were lost in the Korean War and property, infrastructure and assets were destroyed. There are also the personal non-monetary costs of the over ten million Koreans whose families have been separated. Then there are the opportunity costs: If the money allocated to the military and to other measures to sustain the conflict on both sides had been invested elsewhere, it would have created a better life for many people (Koh, 1988: 56ff). This could be another argument for a resolution.

5.3.2. Track II diplomacy:

Track II diplomacy signifies contacts on non-state level, such as visits of individuals, or business delegations, contacts through churches, NGOs, sports groups etc. The potential impact of these contacts has been neglected so far (Sigal, 1998: 3ff and 131ff). These contacts are growing, for example, in 2000, a joint Korean team participated in the Sydney Olympics (Feffer, 2003: 46). Chun suggests the creation of a Northeast Asian Cultural Community with exchange programs on various levels (Chun, 2004) This is a field that needs to be extended a lot further because it forms the base of all other measures. A close friendship on individual and institutional level (like the French-German friendship) can bring two countries closer together and make the idea of war seem absurd.

Galtung (1975: 112) describes a conflict triangle of A (attitude), B (behavior) and C (contradiction) as roots for conflict. Any solution could start at either points of the triangle, but eventually, attitude, behavior and contradiction would have to be dealt with in order to resolve the conflict. Track II diplomacy approaches would work well with dealing with the attitude and part of the behavior side.

5.3.3. Negotiation

"Negotiations may be seen as an adjustment process in which concessions are

exchanged according to an incremental logic based on the evaluation of the costs that each party has to pay" (Dupont, 1991: 44)). Dupont explains negotiation as a process: "negotiation – especially international negotiation – is seen as a sequence of stages, either organized in well-articulated patterns, as in many instances of 'multiconference diplomacy' or overlapping and developing over time in a rather haphazard or even confused way" (Dupont, 1991: 40). He considers identifying the forces behind the dynamics to be important, which is why a stakeholder analysis is indispensable. Furthermore Dupont stresses that the stages have to be selected carefully. The goal of this negotiation process is to reach unanimity.

Negotiation consists of several variables: Culture, communication, influence and persuasion, threats, face-saving, personal conditions, information conditions, structural conditions and anticipation of the next negotiation (Dupont, 1991: 45ff). Various strategies can be used: Yielding, contending, problem solving (Pruitt, 1991: 80ff).

Paik (2004: 56ff) suggests a three stage peace process:

1. Creating the basis for peace:
 - Creating confidence measures
 - Increasing economic and social exchanges
 - Multilateral talks with North Korea
 - North Korea enters the international community
 - Declaration of non-aggression by South/US
 - On the other side North Korea must denuclearize.
2. Deepening peace and cooperation:
 - North Korea dismantles all nuclear facilities and stops production and sale of weapons of mass destruction
 - Japan will normalize diplomatic relations
 - Creation of a "Marshall Plan" for North Korea
 - Lift of economic sanctions
 - US give South Korea full power
3. Establishing a permanent peace regime:
 - Both parts of Korea are denuclearized.
 - Structural arms control.
 - Inner-Korean peace agreement
 - Building a post- cold War regime in North Korea
 - The neighboring powers must be willing to embrace these changes

- Creation of a Korean economic community with a free market with international help
(Paik, 2004: 56ff)

5.3.4. Six-Party talks

Six-Party-Talks (North Korea, South Korea, USA; China, Japan and the Soviet Union) have been held. The last round in December 2006 was not successful because North Korea demanded an end to of financial sanctions and the un-freezing of bank accounts in Macao. The North Korean leadership has a strong interest in maintaining stability and therefore needs access to the money it holds in foreign bank accounts (Richter, 2006: no page). As a result of more successful talks in February 2007, a bilateral work group was formed in March 2007. There have subsequently been talks between Christopher Hill (US-negotiator) and Kim Gye Gwan (Deputy Foreign Minister of DPRK) in March 2007. At the talks in February 2007, North Korea agreed to abolish its nuclear program step by step in exchange for economic aid (Zeit March 6 2006).

"The trick is to craft a plan that does not reward the North for its misdeeds. In such a plan, all major outside powers should guarantee the security of the entire Korean peninsula first. This will remove Pyongyang's excuse for nuclear proliferation and break the deadlock" (Laney, 2003: no page). This would then be followed by a comprehensive accord, the North would have to give up its nuclear program and allow inspection to receive financial and economic compensation. The next step would involve implementing economic and market reforms. A non-aggression pact between the US and North Korea could then be signed. All stakeholders must be involved at the highest level and all must agree for the plan and subsequent agreements to work (Laney, 2003: no page).

A roadmap must be developed that includes denuclearization, but also offers North Korea economic, political and security benefits. The stalemate must be broken and North Korea must be integrated into the region (Snyder, 2005: no page).

The Juche policy of self-reliance however will make it difficult for North Korea to open up to economic and other cooperation with other countries. A top-down approach is therefore difficult to achieve. The other option is of course a bottom-up approach to change the mindset of the North Korean people by providing them with information about the outside world. This is not easy either because North Korea is the most isolated country in the world and it is extremely difficult to disseminate information

among North Koreans (Park, 1998: 9). There is no cell phone network, though smuggled Chinese cell phones are sometimes used in areas close to the border, an estimated 20,000 are in use. Radios are blocked to receive state programs only and the possession of for example a bible is severely punished. However, with the increase of refugee traffic and smuggling activities, more of information about life outside of North Korea becomes available too, although people still face severe prosecution if found in possession of such information. Many defectors to the South send cash and information (Crisis Group No.122, 2006: no page).

North Korean officials outline the negotiation plans clearly:

"North Korea has repeatedly made a simple request of the US. They have asked for security assurances from the US that they will not be attacked. This is not unreasonable considering that the Korean war has never officially ended, that the US maintains some 40,000 troops near the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, that the US keeps nuclear-armed submarines in the waters off the Korean Peninsula, and that the Bush administration has pursued a doctrine of preemption. In return for a Non-Aggression Pact from the US, the Koreans have indicated that they would give up their nuclear weapons program and rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" (Krieger, 2003: no page). This – if it is serious – should offer considerable scope for a possible solution of the conflict by diplomatic means.

As Chuck Downs puts it: "The words "crazy", "irrational", "erratic", and "bizarre" are too often used to describe North Korea's negotiating behavior. None of them accurately characterizes the generally effective, cleverly devised, skillfully implemented negotiating strategy pursued by this small, poor and relatively powerless country". (...) Few countries have so regularly practiced negotiation as their principal foreign policy instrument" (Downs, 1999: 253).

China, Russia, the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency have emphasized that the US will have to change their attitude towards North Korea (Cheong, 2005: no page). Negotiation only works if both parties are willing to negotiate.

5.3.5. Unification

Following the model of Germany, one would expect to read of "reunification" instead of "unification", particularly as Korea had been one country prior to the separation for much longer than Germany had been. However the literature almost exclusively speaks of "unification" instead of "reunification", so the term "unification" will be used here.

The South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hyon-Jae on June 3, 1988:

"It is heartbreaking that although it is nearly half a century since the Korean people were divided into the south and north, the ordeal of the division has yet to end. We are thus charged with the historic task of achieving peaceful unification at the earliest possible date. Looking back, we have, as a result of the division, lived in an age of pain, sorrow and frustration, aggravated by enmity and confrontation, which constitutes a dark spot on the 5000 year history of the Korean nation." (quoted in National Unification Board, 1988: 377).

If there should be a peaceful unification, North Korea must be assured that no one will take advantage of its relative weakness. The US and the South should not let themselves be provoked easily; North Korea is under great pressure and therefore adopts desperate means. A peaceful unification of Korea can only be reached by (business) development and integration of North Korea (Brown, 1997: 23ff).

According to the "Unification Formula for National Community" from August 1994, a potential unification would take several steps:

1. End the state of hostility and confrontation
2. Korean Commonwealth, activated exchange and cooperation, mutual confidence
3. Democratic process to complete legislative process of unification, unified government and national elections

(Park, 1997: 94f)

Before coming to power, the South Korean president Kim Dae Jung proclaimed a design for a unification policy: It should be based on three principles (peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, peaceful reunification) and three stages (the union of the republic state, union by federalism, completed unification (Heo, 2003: 101).

All sources envisage a range of unification scenarios, usually along the following lines:

1. Unification through systems evolution and integration
2. Unification through collapse and absorption
3. Unification through conflict
4. Disequilibrium and potential external intervention

(Wolf, 2005: 22ff, Pollack, 1999)

5.3.5.1. Unification through systems evolution and integration (Pollack, 1999: 49ff):

The road for this scenario would be dialogue -> negotiation -> unification. This is the method that would be favored by all stakeholders. Unfortunately, the events and hostilities of the past 50+ years are not conducive for this peaceful solution. A prerequisite is that both North and South Korea overcome the zero-sum-game, i.e. thinking that only one side can win and that the other side invariably loses. It is therefore important that both Korean regimes begin to alter attitudes towards the other side, start making changes and respecting the other entity as a negotiating partner. Military and other threats to the other sides would have to stop. The two Koreas would have to renegotiate some of the agreements that one of the two sides has with other states. There would have to be a strong element of reconciliation with regard to terrorist attacks and for the responsibility for the Korean War. A peace treaty officially concluding for the Korean War would have to be signed.

Indicators that the process works would include cessation of propaganda, censorship and espionage on both sides, high level exchanges between the countries, release of political prisoners, more freedom of movement between the two countries for people, goods, money, services, etc, full convertibility of currencies, compliance of the North with international nuclear regulations.

5.3.5.2. Unification through collapse and absorption (Pollack, 1999: 57ff):

The analogy between Germany and Korea does not work because the two Germans have never been at war with each other. Eastern Germany was never as completely cut off and economically fragile as North Korea, nor was it as militarily provocative and strong. A collapse of the regime could lead to either a successor regime that keeps control (potentially through a military coup), or complete political instability, or a collapse that would trigger internal or external conflict. It is extremely difficult to assess indicators for that given our limited insight into the internal state of affairs in North Korea.

Potential indicators:

The number of refugees to China is increasing. Fewer Party activities to mark anniversaries etc., breakdown of the food ration system, more requests for food aid, more public executions and harsher prosecution of "antisocialist crimes", military taking a stronger role in internal security, withdrawal from talks and negotiations.

5.3.5.3. Unification through conflict (Pollack, 1999: 49ff):

A strong military arsenal makes North Korea less vulnerable. North Korea is on the

losing side, for South Korea is doing far better than the North and North Korea's former allies Russia and China have adopted system changes and have – to varying degrees – embraced the market economy. The North could start a conflict to achieve limited goals. As opposed to the South and the US, the North is not constrained by treaties and UN conventions in responding to attacks. Indicators for this scenario would include strengthening of the military, war-like economy, replacement of technocrats by military people, enhanced surveillance of the population, violation of existing treaties and agreements, increased activities around missile sites. According to Pollack, this scenario is not very plausible, because the North would not have the backing of Russia and China this time round. So it could only be a very desperate attempt.

5.3.5.4. Disequilibrium and potential external intervention (Pollack, 1999: 49ff):

The two parts of Korea grow further and further apart. This would bring a threat to the stability in the region, which would then in turn affect China, perhaps leading China to adopt a more active role in the North. Indicators would be stronger media coverage of North Korea in China, enhanced communication between the North Korean and Chinese leadership, increasing flows of refugees from the North to Russia and China, an upsurge in black market activities, governmental control becoming limited to urban areas, economic transactions increasingly for hard currency. In Pollack's opinion, China is not looking for a long-term engagement in the North, if stability can not be kept up with economic and other aid, China might see the collapse of the North and its absorption by the South as the better alternative.

5.3.5.5. Soft landing, hard landing or no landing?

Those who see a hard landing coming do so because North Korea has failed to cooperate and to implement structural changes due to the rigid system prevailing there. Hard landing here means that the regime loses control and the regime dissolves, meaning the state might collapse. Those in favor of a soft landing claim that a hard landing would be detrimental to all the stakeholders involved and that a mix of incentives might steer North Korea towards economic reforms that would eventually allow its integration with the other Asian economies. Soft landing here means that the regime would stay in power (at least at first) and economic reforms would be implemented. There is also the "no landing" approach which essentially means that North Korea would continue to pursue its muddling through strategy. These three scenarios are not separate or particularly rigid, for example a soft landing could turn into a hard landing (Pollack, 1999: 39f).

5.3.5.6. Post-unification implications:

All external stakeholders have a strong interest in bringing stability to the region. All stakeholders also have to come to terms with their role in Korean history. A unified Korea could either opt for autonomy, alliance or neutrality (all of these options with or without nuclear weapons). Every step would be closely watched by the external stakeholders (Pollack, 1999: 84f).

South Korea puts the aim for unification as follows:

"We aspire to a national unification by which two separate societies in the South and the North are brought together in substance rather than appearance, to make a truly integral nation-state. (...) By unification we mean to integrate the two different societies into one homogeneous nation as it used to be so that all the people can live together in a peaceful order, thus concentrating on national development as well as playing a more active role towards world peace" (Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1979: 11).

Kim Il Sung commented on reunification:

"We are ready to consult the matter of gradually and completely effecting reunification through confederation by besting the regional autonomous governments of the confederal republic with more rights on a tentative basis and then increasing the functions of the central government in the future" (Pyongyang Times Jan 1, 1992, quoted in Kihl, 1994a: 140)

O'Hanlon and Mochizuki propose thinking big when it comes to solving the Korean conflict. They suggest that fresh ideas are needed since the current situation is a deadlock that doesn't move in any direction. That means aiming for a larger bargain (i.e. offering more to North Korea to get more back) could be a solution worth trying. This is also backed by studies of North Korean negotiating behavior. The authors also propose that aid should be offered for cuts in of conventional arms and not just for scaling down the nuclear arsenal. This would help reduce the enormous military sector in North Korea (O'Hanlon, 2003: 51f).

Six Point Policy (National Unification Board, 1988: 386ff):

1. Exchanges between the people of North and South, free visits (also for overseas Koreans)
2. Finding of family members that were separated when the two countries were first divided, mutual visits

3. South-North trade
4. Acceptance of non-military trade by allies
5. Free inter-Korean contacts and cooperation with the international community
6. Willingness to cooperate to improve the North's relation with the allies

5.3.5.7. Challenges of the unification:

However, as was also the case for German reunification, a severe divide between the two countries will persist for many years: "More affluent and educated southerners will hold superiority complexes over their northern brethren. Northerners will see their southern counterparts as materialistic and money-crazed. Much as in the German case, southerners, while initially welcoming unity, may increasingly grow resentful, at the cost they must bear in the form of taxes and social welfare burdens to assimilate the North" (Cha, 1997: 78). In contrast to the situation in Germany, the Korean War is an important factor, pitting as it did North and South against each other (Cha, 1999: 255).

South Korea has a special unification fund (Common Fund for Unification) to collect money for the unification with a view to avoiding the type of economic impact unification had in Germany. The estimated costs of the Korean unification are between 300 -700 billion US\$ (Kihl, 1994a: 141f). The Korea Development Institute in Seoul suggests figures for the cost of between 200 billion and 3,5 trillion Euro (Cieslik, 2001: 272).

Other important issues about Korean unification need to be addressed as well to bridge the gap between the two countries. The role of the army has to be defined and demobilized soldiers need to be offered alternative job perspectives. Alignment of the economic system would be essential. Measures to open up the education system would be called for to enable people from the North to have access to jobs. At the same time, introductory courses for citizens of the North would be required in order to familiarize them with the new economic system, state system, law etc. (Cieslik, 2001: 249ff). Avoiding discrimination of Northerners in the South would also be a major challenge (Cieslik, 2001: 222).

At the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, North Korea proposed the name "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" for a unified confederal Korea. This would solve the problem of finding a neutral name for the new state by choosing the name of the Koryo Dynasty (936-1392) where the area of Koryo roughly encompassed the territory of both Koreas today. Currently, South Korea is called "Hanguk" and North Korea is called "Choseon". The North would like "one nation and two autonomous regions". The South

would like "one nation, one government" (Totten, 1991: 66).

5.3.5.8. Comparison with German reunification:

The comparison with the German example shows that reunification is possible, but it also demonstrates that the process entails many difficulties. To name but two, the economic cost can be far higher than expected and integrating two cultures that have evolved separately for decades is an enormous challenge (Koh, 1994: 160f). Not should one forget the many differences between East Germany and North Korea. East Germany was much more dependent on the Soviet Union and nationalism did not flourish. This was partly for ideological reasons and partly because Germany had lost the war, whereas in contrast Korea was freed from Japanese oppression. People in much of the German Democratic Republic were always able to receive West German TV and radio (although these media were prohibited). There was also scope for both East and West Germans to visit the other country, although scope for visits was restricted.

Economically too, the disparities between the North and the South are much greater than was the case in the German example, and the population numbers in the two countries are much closer. There were 3.7 West Germans to one East German when it came to bearing the economic burden of unification, whilst in Korea the ratio would be two South Koreans to one North Korean. It is difficult to estimate the North Korean GDP, but experts appraise North Korean per capita income as somewhere between 10 and 20% of that in the South. Monetary stability in the South would also be a key issue. Easton suggests a solution with two regimes, at first with a restricted flow of labor from North to South and vice versa at first. An alternative suggestion would be to leave the North Korean won intact to let the market find an exchange rate as a short-run strategy. The issue of property would have to be solved for the North to provide a secure basis for investments. Economic integration will take generations (Easton, 1998: 23ff).

A further important point is that technically speaking, the two Koreas are still at war since no peace treaty has been signed. The two Germanys have never been at war with each other.

5.4. Other scenarios

World peace has two prerequisites: voluntariness and the reality that a world with humans will never be perfect (Jaspers 1995, 51).

5.4.1. TRANSCEND:

"When the North and South Korean delegations at the Sydney Olympics marched together in the opening ceremony, holding hands, the whole world applauded. There is still time to build a football stadium in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South for an all-Korean team playing in the 2002 World Cup. And the stadium would remain as an all-Korean facility, the first of many. Meeting rooms for civil society organizations from North and South, and the entire Far East, could turn the DMZ into a zone of peace. It could become the seat of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia" (Galtung, 2001: no page). Unfortunately, this vision did not become reality, but it might, at some point in the future.

The TRANSCEND concept tries to find a creative solution that transcends (hence the name) the conflict space between the conflict parties in a creative way. For the case of Korea, Johan Galtung, the leading figure of TRANSCEND, suggests a similar model to the EU, an "East Asian Community" with the two Koreas, China, Viet Nam, Japan and Taiwan as members. In addition to that, he proposes the creation of an "Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia/Pacific", analogue to the OSCE in Europe. This Organization would consist of the East Asian Community plus Russia, the US and maybe even the EU (Galtung, 1999: no page).

5.4.2. Solution for all of Northeast Asia:

If Northeast Asia could achieve a peaceful cooperation and integration of all states, it would be comparable to Europe in population, area, market size, capital and technology. Korea is in the very center of this zone and could – if successfully unified – play a central role within it (Park, 1998: 238).

6. Conclusion

"I deeply believe that no individual can experience true happiness or tranquility until we turn humankind away from its obsession with war. War has held us in its irrevocable grip throughout history, it is the source of all evil. War normalizes insanity, destroying human beings like so many insects, tearing all that is human and humane to shreds" (Daisaku Ikeda, Buddhist leader).

There has to be another way, a way that leads to peace. The North Korean conflict has been going on for decades without an actual solution up to now. This is somewhat surprising, since the stakeholders and their positions are known, although not as widely

as one would hope. There is some willingness on all sides to resolve this conflict and to create a stable peace in Northeast Asia– at least on paper or in public speeches. All parties agree on the necessity to improve the lives of the North Korean population.

There have been successful attempts to negotiate and at least symbolic actions such as the train connection. North Korea will try to keep its arms and nuclear program as a bargaining chip to maximize the outcome in negotiations. However, North Korea has also stated it is interested in security guarantees. This should open a reasonable field for negotiations. Economic diplomacy also seems to be a good lever to help the North Korean people and to produce goods and services desperately needed, combined with a greater opening of the country and stronger economic integration in the region. All this would make war the least attractive option for all parties involved, a model that has worked very well for example in Europe.

Taking Galtung's ABC triangle as a basic framework, a lot more needs to be done on the attitude side and on the behavior side. These parts seem to be largely overlooked in the public discourse of this conflict. The hard facts, the contradictions, could be resolved, but not without tackling attitude and behavior as well.

Confidence building measures and a true commitment from all parties involved are prerequisites for all peaceful attempts to resolve this conflict. Stakeholders should manage to get over limitations in their respective agendas and attitudes to try to see the bigger picture to make use of all the useful initiatives and attempts already going on. They should change their behavior accordingly and refrain from aggressive rhetoric and show a willingness to cooperate. Resolving this conflict and reintegrating North Korea into the world or into a Northeast Asian community of some form will be a long-term task that could take decades to achieve. Nonetheless it really is the only long-term option for stability, peace and well-being of all those involved.

7. Appendix

8. Juni 2007 9:46


Ar. 1275 S. 1/1

Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond
Crisis Group Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006

Page 32

APPENDIX A

MAP OF NORTH KOREA



Crisis Group (ed.): *Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond*. Asia Report No. 122, 26. October 2006 p32. Retrieved from:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4469&l=1> (accessed June 6, 2007)

8. Literature/References:

Ajami, Chaouki: *Juche. Theory and Application*. Pyongyang 1978

Allport, Gordon: *The nature of prejudice*. New York 1971

Autorenkollektiv des Instituts für die Wiedervereinigung des Vaterlandes: *Nordkorea: zur militärischen Abschreckung berechtigt*. Pyongyang no year. In: Choe, H.-D.; Song, D.-Y. and Werning, R. (eds.): *Wohin steuert Nordkorea? Soziale Verhältnisse, Entwicklungstendenzen, Perspektiven*. Köln 2004

Bonacker, T. and Schmidt, L.: *Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien der Konfliktforschung. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005

Bonacker, T. and Imbusch, P.: *Zentrale Begriffe der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung: Konflikt, Gewalt, Frieden*. In: Imbusch, P. and Zoll, R. (eds.): *Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Eine Einführung*. Wiesbaden 2005

Brown, D. E.: *An American view of Korea's path to reunification*. In: Kwak, Tae-Hwan (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 21-34

Campbell, D.: *Introduction. On Dangers and Their Interpretation*. In: Bonacker, T. and Schmidt, L.: *Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien der Konfliktforschung. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005 pp. 95-113

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (no author cited): *CNS Special report on North Korean ballistic missile capabilities*. March 22, 2006. Retrieved from <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/060321.pdf> (accessed June 6, 2007)

Cha, V. D.: *Korean Unification: The zero-sum Past and the Precarious future*. In: Asian Perspective, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1997) pp. 63-92

Cha, V. D.: *The Problem of Post-Cold War Policy Templates and North Korea*. In: Park, J.-K. (ed.): *North Korea in Transition and Policy Choices: Domestic Structure and External Relations*. Seoul 1999 pp. 233-260

Chang, G. G.: *Nuclear Showdown. North Korea Takes on the World*. New York 2006

Cheong, W.-S.: *Getting North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks*. In: The KyungHyang Shinmun, February 18, 2005, quoted in: http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/economy/view.asp?volume_id=39&content_id=122&category=B (accessed June 6, 2007)

Cho, M.-H.: *Japan und die Koreaner*. In: Pohl, M. (ed.): *Länderbericht Japan. Geographie, Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur*. Bonn 1998 pp. 211-217

Choe, H.-D.; Song, D.-Y. and Werning, R. (eds.): *Wohin steuert Nordkorea? Soziale Verhältnisse, Entwicklungstendenzen, Perspektiven*. Köln 2004

Chun, Y.-P.: *Creation of a Northeast Asian Cultural Community*. Conference Paper

October 25, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/essays/view.asp?volume_id=37&content_id=89&category=G (accessed June 6, 2007)

Cieslik, T.: *Wiedervereinigungen während und nach der Ost-West-Blockkonfrontation. Ursachen der Teilung – Grundlagen der (fehlenden) Einheit. Untersucht an den Fallbeispielen Vietnam, Jemen, Deutschland, China und Korea.* Marburg 2001

Connor, E. V.: *Korea – Current Issues and Historical Background.* New York 2002

Crisis Group (ed.): *Korea Backgrounder: How the South views its Brother from another Planet.* Asia Report No. 89, December 14, 2004. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3173&l=1> (accessed June 6, 2007)

Crisis Group (ed.): *Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention.* Asia Report No. 100, June 27, 2005. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3533&l=1> (accessed June 6, 2007)

Crisis Group (ed.): *After North Korea's Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear talks dead?* Asia Briefing No. 52, August 9, 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4332&l=1> (accessed June 6, 2007)

Crisis Group (ed.): *Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond.* Asia Report No. 122, 26. October 2006. Retrieved from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4469&l=1> (accessed June 6, 2007)

Crisis Group (ed.): *North Korea's nuclear test: The Fallout.* Asia Briefing No. 56, November 13, 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4502&l=1> (accessed May 10, 2007)

Cuthbert, R.: *Peace with North Korea. Opportunity squandered. What next?* Denver 2007

Czempiel, E.-O.: *Der Friedensbegriff der Friedensforschung.* In: Sahm, A.; Sapper, M. and Weichsel, V. (eds.): *Die Zukunft des Friedens. Eine Bilanz der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung.* Wiesbaden 2002

Denisov, V.I.: *Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification.* In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies.* Seoul 1997 pp. 35-48

DeRouen, K.; Jackson, D.: *Recent US Foreign Policy Regarding the Korean Peninsula.* In: Heo, U.; Horowitz, S. A. (eds.): *Conflict in Asia. Korea, China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan.* Westport 2003 pp. 105-117

Downs, C.: *Over the line. North Korea's Negotiating Strategy.* Washington D.C. 1999

Drennan, W.: *USI Peace Briefing: North Korea's Nuclear Posture: Policy Options for the United States.* United States Institute of Peace 2002. Retrieved from www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2002/1223_nbnkorea.html (accessed June 6, 2007)

Dupont, C.; Faure, G.-O.: *The Negotiation Process.* In: Kremenyuk, V. A.: *International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues.* San Francisco 1991 pp. 40-57

Easton, S. T.: *Some Economic Aspects of Korean Unification.* In: Rhee, Y.-P. (ed.):

- Complexity of Korean Unification Process: Systems Approach*. Seoul 1998 pp. 23-54
- Feffer, J.: *Nordkorea und die USA. Die amerikanischen Interessen auf der koreanischen Halbinsel*. München 2003
- Ferdowsi, M. A.: *Sicherheit und Frieden nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes*. München 1994a
- Ferdowsi, M. A.: *Das Ende des Kalten Krieges und der Zerfall des Sowjetimperiums. Eine retrospektive Betrachtung*. In: Ferdowsi, M. A.: *Sicherheit und Frieden nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes*. München 1994b pp. 11-22
- Festinger, L.: *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford 1957
- Freeman, R. E.: *Strategic Management. A Stakeholder approach*. Boston 1984
- Galtung, J.: *Modelle zum Frieden. Methoden und Ziele der Friedensforschung*. Wuppertal 1972
- Galtung, J.: *Strukturelle Gewalt – Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1975
- Galtung, J.: *Der Preis der Modernisierung – Struktur und Kultur im Weltsystem*. Wien 1997
- Galtung, J.: *Frieden mit friedlichen Mitteln – Friede und Konflikt, Entwicklung und Kultur*. Opladen 1998, pp. 55-79
- Galtung, J.: *East Asian Integration and the Western European Model* 1999. Retrieved from: http://www.transcend.org/t_database/articles.php?ida=135 (accessed December 12, 2006)
- Galtung, J. and Fischer, D.: *Nobel Peace Prize for Kim Dae Jung*. Retrieved from: http://www.transcend.org/t_database/articles.php?ida=214° Jan 30, 2001 (accessed June 6, 2006)
- Galtung, J.: *TRANSCEND: Eine Philosophie für Frieden und Entwicklung*. In: Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden. JG. 20, Heft 4 (2002), pp. 195 – 197
- Galtung, J.: *Friedensforschung als universitäres Studienfach: wie geht es weiter?* In: Alfs, M; Dominowski, T.; Hiegemann, M; Kinkelbur, D; Nabers, D. and Westphal, N (eds.): *Arbeit am verlorenen Frieden*. Münster 2003
- Galtung, J.: *Transcend and Transform. An introduction to conflict work*. London 2004
- Galtung, J.: *Frieden mit friedlichen Mitteln. Konflikt und Kultur. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005
- Galtung, J.: *21st Century Conflicts, the Korean Peninsula, DMZ and Gangwon-Do*. June 23rd, 2005 Retrieved from: http://www.transcend.org/t_database/articles.php?ida=560 (accessed Dec 12, 2006)
- Galtung, J.: *Peace by peaceful conflict transformation: The transcend approach* (unpublished manuscript, printed in Institut für Frieden und Demokratie (ed.): *Reader*

- zum Workshop Die TRANSCEND-Methode der Konfliktbearbeitung. Einführung, Überblick, Ergebnisse. Schwerpunkt: Konflikttransformation und Tiefenstrukturen. Hagen 2006 pp. 148-174
- Gills, B. K.: *Korea versus Korea. A case of contested legitimacy*. London 1996
- Hartmann, J.: *Internationale Beziehungen*. Opladen 2001
- Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research: *Conflict Barometer 2006*. Retrieved from: <http://www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/index.html.de> (Accessed June 6, 2007)
- Heo, U. and Horowitz, S. A. (eds.): *Conflict in Asia. Korea, China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan*. Westport 2003
- Heo, U. and Hyun C.-M.: *The „Sunshine“ Policy Revisited: An Analysis of South Korea's Policy toward North Korea*. In: Heo, U. and Horowitz, S. A. (eds.): *Conflict in Asia. Korea, China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan*. Westport 2003 pp. 89-103
- Hess, G. R.: *Presidential Decisions for War. Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf*. Baltimore 2001
- Hicks, G.: *Japan's hidden apartheid. The Korean Minority and the Japanese*. Ashgate 1986
- Hovland, C.T. and Sears, R.R.: *Minor Studies of Aggression*. *Journal of Psychology* 1938, 9, 301-310
- Imbusch, P. and Zoll, R. (eds.): *Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Eine Einführung*. Wiesbaden 2005
- Jaspers, K.: *Prinzipien eines Weltfriedenszustands*. In: Senghaas, D. (ed.): *Den Frieden denken*. Frankfurt 1995
- Kanji, Omario. "Security." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 Retrieved from: www.beyondintractability.org/essay/security (accessed June 8, 2007)
- Kang, C.: *Inter-Korean confidence building*. In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 189-217
- Kaufman, B. I.: *The Korean conflict*. Westport 1999
- KCNA (official North Korean news agency, Author's note): *DPRK Foreign ministry clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent*. Oct 3, 2006 retrieved from <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/kcnatext.pdf> (accessed June 6, 2007)
- KCNA (North Korean state news agency) www.kcna.co.jp (Author's note: The somewhat rudimentary structure of the website does not allow for links on the different articles. They can be found under the respective publication date)
- Keefe, T. and Roberts, R. E.: *Realizing Peace. An introduction to Peace Studies*. Ames 1991
- Kempf, W. and Lück, H.: *Begriff und Probleme des Friedens. Beiträge der*

Sozialpsychologie. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies. Hagen 2005

Kempf, W.: *Konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung – ein sozialpsychologisches Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprogramm.* In: Kempf, W. and Lück, H.: *Begriff und Probleme des Friedens. Beiträge der Sozialpsychologie. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies.* Hagen 2005 pp. 299-319

Keohane, R. O.: *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton 1984

Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War.* Boulder 1994a

Kihl, Y.-W.: *The Politics of Inter-Korean relations.* In: Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War.* Boulder 1994b, pp. 133-152

Kim, I.-P.: *The Soviet Union / Russia and Korea: Dynamics of „New Thinking“.* In: Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War.* Boulder 1994 pp. 83-96

Kim I.-S.: *Über die Beseitigung des Dogmatismus und des Formalismus sowie über die Herstellung des Juche in der ideologischen Arbeit. Rede vor Mitarbeitern für Parteipropaganda und ~agitation 28. Dezember 1955.* Retrieved from: <http://www.marxistische-bibliothek.de/kim2.pdf>, Pyongyang 1971 (accessed June 6, 2007)

Kim H.-K.; Lee C.-J.; Koh B.-C. and Kim C.-L.: *Political Conflicts in Korea.* Inchon 1988

Kim, H.-N.: *Japan and North Korea: Normalization talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo.* In: Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War.* Boulder 1994 pp. 111-132

Kim, K.-R.: *North Korea – US Relations.* In: Park, J.-K. (ed.): *North Korea in Transition and Policy Choices: Domestic Structure and External Relations.* Seoul 1999 pp. 261-280

Kim, S. S.: *The two Koreas and the World Order.* In: Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War.* Boulder 1994 pp. 29-68

Kim J.-I.: *On correctly understanding the originality of Kimilsungism. Talk to theoretical propagandists of the party October 2, 1976.* In: International Institute of the Juche Idea (ed.): *Study of the Juche idea.* No. 29, April 1985. Tokyo pp. 1-5

Kirby, S.: *The Effect of Regional Power Factors on Inter-Korean Relations and Implications of the Nuclear Issue for the Northeast Asian Security Order.* In: Smith, H.; Rhodes, C. and Pritchard, D.: *North Korea in the New World Order.* Basingstoke 1996 pp. 53-73

Kirkbridge, W. A.: *North Korea's undeclared war 1953 - .* Elizabeth/Seoul 1994

Koh, B.-C.: *Structure of conflict between the two Koreas.* In: Kim H.-K.; Lee C.-J.; Koh B.-C. and Kim C.-L.: *Political Conflicts in Korea.* Inchon 1988 pp. 56-70

Koh, B.-C.: *A comparison of Unification Policies.* In: Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War.* Boulder 1994 pp. 153-166

- Kremenjuk, V. A.: *International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. San Francisco 1991
- Krieger, D.: *The second Nuclear Age*.
http://www.transcend.org/t_database/printarticle.php?id=272. Sept 23, 2003 (accessed June 6, 2007)
- Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997
- Laney, J. T.: *How to deal with North Korea*. In: Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301faessay10336/james-t-laney-jason-t-shaplen/how-to-deal-with-north-korea.html> (accessed June 6, 2007)
- le Bon, Gustave: *Psychologie der Massen*. Paris 1895, quoted in Kempf, W. and Lück, H.: *Begriff und Probleme des Friedens. Beiträge der Sozialpsychologie. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005
- Lee, H.-Y.: *China and the two Koreas: New Emerging Triangle*. In: Kihl, Y.-W.: *Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War*. Boulder 1994 pp. 97-110
- Lee, J.-C.: *DPR Korea after the breakdown of Realsocialism*. Chuncheon 1998
- Lee, S.-S.: *Building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula: A three-step concept for the peace process*. In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 129-189
- Lee, W.-S.: *Korean Culture and Worldview*. In: Koo, J. H. and Nahm, A. C. (eds.): *An Introduction to Korean Culture*. Seoul 1997 pp. 201-217
- Lilli, W.: *Grundlagen der Stereotypisierung*. Göttingen 1982
- Link, W.: *Überlegungen zum Begriff „Konflikt“ in den internationalen Beziehungen – Versuch der Begriffsklärung*. In: Bonacker, T. and Schmidt, L.: *Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien der Konfliktforschung. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005 pp. 95-113
- Lorenz, A.: *Matter Beifall. Diktator Kim Jong Il darf seine Atombomben vorerst behalten*. Der Spiegel 8/2007, p. 120
- Lowe, P.: *The Korean War*. Basingstoke 2000
- Lowe, P.: *The origins of the Korean War*. Harlow 1997
- Luhmann, N.: *Widerspruch und Konflikt*. In: Bonacker, T. and Schmidt, L.: *Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien der Konfliktforschung. Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005 pp. 253-273
- Mack, R. W. and Snyder, R. C.: *The Analysis of Conflict – Toward an overview and Synthesis*. In: Smith, C. G. (ed.): *Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences*. Notre Dame 1971 pp. 8-9
- Maierbrugger G.: *Nordkorea-Handbuch. Unterwegs in einem geheimnisvollen Land*.

Berlin 2004

Maister, D. H.; Green, C. H. and Galford R.M: *The trusted advisor*. New York 2000

Martin, B. K: *Under the loving care of the fatherly leader. North Korea and the Kim dynasty*. New York 2004

Maul, H. E.: *Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte*. In: Pohl, M. (ed.): *Länderbericht Japan. Geographie, Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur*. Bonn 1998 pp. 155-164

Meyers, R.: *Begriffe und Probleme des Friedens*. Opladen 1994

Müller, M.: *Der Friede als philosophisches Problem*. In: Senghaas, D. (ed.): *Den Frieden denken*. Frankfurt 1995

National Unification Board Republic of Korea (ed.): *A white paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea*. Seoul 1988

Niksch, L. A.: *North Korea's nuclear weapons program*. In: Connor, E. V.: *Korea – Current Issues and Historical Background*. New York 2002 pp. 19-35

Nixson, F. and Collins, P.: *Economic Reform in North Korea*. In: Smith, H.; Rhodes, C. and Pritchard, D.: *North Korea in the New World Order*. Basingstoke 1996 pp. 154-169

O'Hanlon, M. and Mochizuki, M.: *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. How to deal with a nuclear North Korea*. New York 2003

Opitz, P. J.: *Die asiatisch-pazifische Region – Ruhe vor dem Sturm?* In: Ferdowski, Mir A.: *Sicherheit und Frieden nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes*. München 1994 pp. 127-145

Osgood, C. E.: *An Alternative to War and Surrender*. Urbana 1962

Paik, H.-S.: *North Korea's unification policy*. In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 109-129

Paik, Y.-C.: *The three stage Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula: South-North relations and a new perspective*. In: Choe, H.-D.; Song, D.-Y. and Werning, R. (eds.): *Wohin steuert Nordkorea? Soziale Verhältnisse, Entwicklungstendenzen, Perspektiven*. Köln 2004 p46-60

Pan, C.: *Nordkorea. Die ideologische und soziologische Basis*. Wien 1992

Park, H.-K.: *Korean National Security Policy in the Global Dynamics: The Role of Korea in Asian Security System*. In: Rhee, Y.-P. (ed.): *Complexity of Korean Unification Process: Systems Approach*. Seoul 1998 pp. 231-238

Park, J.-K. (ed.): *North Korea in Transition and Policy Choices: Domestic Structure and External Relations*. Seoul 1999

Park, Y.-H.: *South Korea's Unification Policy: Past, Present and Future*. In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 87-108

Pohl, M. (ed.): *Länderbericht Japan. Geographie, Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft,*

Gesellschaft, Kultur. Bonn 1998

Polak, J.: *Nach 50 Jahren: Die Allianz zwischen den USA und Südkorea vor neuen Herausforderungen*. Berlin 2004. Retrieved from: http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1575 (accessed June 6, 2007)

Pollack, J. D. and Lee, C.-M.: *Preparing for Korean unification. Scenarios and Implications*. Santa Monica 1999

Pruitt, D. G.: *Strategy in Negotiation*. In: Kremenjuk, V. A.: *International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. San Francisco 1991

Ramirez, R.: *Stakeholder analysis and conflict management*. International Development Research Centre http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-27971-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html no year. (accessed June 6, 2007)

Research Center for Peace and Unification (ed.): *The peaceful unification of Korea. Questions and answers*. Seoul 1979

Rhee, Y.-P. (ed.): *Complexity of Korean Unification Process: Systems Approach*. Seoul 1998

Richter, S.: *Den Untergang verhindern*. In: Zeit online: www.zeit.de/online/2006/52/nordkorea-atomruestung?page=all (accessed June 6, 2007)

Rigoulot, P.: *Nordkorea. Steinzeitkommunismus und Atomwaffen – Anatomie einer Krise*. Köln 2003

Roxborough, I.: *Recent Transitional Experiences and Their Relevance for North Korea*. In: Smith, H.; Rhodes, C. and Pritchard, D.: *North Korea in the New World Order*. Basingstoke 1996 pp. 114-134

Sahm, A.; Sapper, M. and Weichsel, V. (eds.): *Die Zukunft des Friedens. Eine Bilanz der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*. Wiesbaden 2002

Saunders, P. C.: *Confronting Ambiguity: How to handle North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program*. Arms Control Association 2003. Retrieved from: www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/saunders_mar03.asp (accessed June 6, 2007)

Schmidt, H.: *In Sachen Frieden – philosophische Aspekte von Krieg und Gewalt. Studienmaterial der friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace Studies*. Hagen 2005

Schweigler, G.: *Außenpolitik*. In: Adams, W. P. and Lösche, P. (eds.): *Länderbericht USA. Geschichte, Politik, Geographie, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur*. Bonn 1998 pp. 393-464

Senghaas, Dieter (ed.): *Den Frieden denken*. Frankfurt 1995

Shigemura, T.: *Reunification of the Korean Peninsula and Japanese foreign policy*. In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 49-58

Sigal, L. V.: *Disarming Strangers. Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton 1998

- Snyder, S.: *USI Peace Briefing: Korean Peninsula Six-Party Talks: Defining a realistic roadmap for success*. United States Institute for Peace Nov 2005. Retrieved from www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace/_briefings2005/1108_sixparty.html (accessed Feb 21, 2007)
- Smith, C. G. (ed.): *Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences*. Notre Dame 1971
- Smith, H.; Rhodes, C. and Pritchard, D.: *North Korea in the New World Order*. Basingstoke 1996
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confucius/> (accessed June 6, 2007)
- Sternberg, D.: *Über die verschiedenen Begriffe des Friedens*. In: Senghaas, D. (ed.): *Den Frieden denken*. Frankfurt 1995
- Stoessinger, J. G.: *Why nations go to war*. New York 1974
- Suh, J.-J.: *Economic Origins of the socio-political Decline in North Korea*. In: Park, J.-K. (ed.): *North Korea in Transition and Policy Choices: Domestic Structure and External Relations*. Seoul 1999 pp. 139-158
- The Military Balance 2007: *East Asia and Australasia*, *The Military Balance*, 107:1, 331-384
- The Military Balance 2007: *Country comparisons - commitment, force levels and economics*. *The Military Balance*, 107:1, 385-415
- Totten, G. and Jo, Y.-H.: *South Korea and the Politics of Reunification*. In: Zhao, Q.-S and Sutter, R.: *Politics of divided nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam: unification, conflict resolution and political development*. Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 5 – 1991 (106) Maryland pp. 61-88
- Werning, Rainer: *Nordkorea – Südkorea. Auf der Suche nach neuen Freundbildern*. In: Choe, Hyondok; Song, Du-Yul; Werning, Rainer (ed.): *Wohin steuert Nordkorea? Soziale Verhältnisse, Entwicklungstendenzen, Perspektiven*. Köln 2004 pp. 70-92
- Wolf, C. Jr. and Akramov, K.: *North Korean Paradoxes. Circumstances, Costs and consequences of Korean Unification*. Santa Monica/Arlington/Pittsburgh 2005
- Zeit: *USA und Nordkorea: Abkehr vom Konfrontationskurs*. Retrieved from: www.zeit.de/news/artikel/2007/06/06/94567.xml (accessed March 6, 2007)
- Zhao, G.-C.: *China's Korean unification policy*. In: Kwak, T.-H. (ed.): *The four powers and Korean unification strategies*. Seoul 1997 pp. 59-86
- Zhao, Q.-S. and Sutter, R.: *Politics of divided nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam: unification, conflict resolution and political development*. Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 5 – 1991 (106) Maryland