

# The Politics of World Federation

## Introduction to Both Volumes

Truth passes through three stages: first, it is condemned, then it briefly triumphs, and finally it ends as platitude.

—Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*,  
Foreword to the First Edition (1818), p. xv

### Summary Overview

This is a history of the practical, political efforts to establish a constitutionally limited, democratically representative, federal world government in order to effectively abolish war. Historically, during the coming, waging, and aftermath of World War II, a number of people in and out of government in America and in the eventually 51 allied countries in the wartime “United Nations” urged that the failed League of Nations not be simply revived, even with U.S. membership, but be transformed into the beginnings of a representative world government. In principle, they argued that the moment had come to guide international organization through a transition like that when the United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781) passed to a more perfect union under the federal Constitution (1787). Europeans, too, looked to federation as an end to endemic wars, and in time the European Union would be the practical realization of such dreams.

The basic idea is to do effectively for the world what has been painfully, but proudly, done for well organized national states—establish peace under the rule of law. Real liberty, as Immanuel Kant argued, exists only by obedience to law. The consent of the governed for the enactment of that law is the basis of democratic states. But the new United Nations Organization (1945) remained in principle a confederation of states, so world federalists then aimed to reform it into a representative federation of states and peoples.

The closest the United States has ever come to support for a world federation was in the State Department during deliberations about the shape of the U.N. organization in 1942–43, and again, after first use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, during negotiations over the Baruch plan for the international control of atomic energy in 1946. There were hearings on world federation in Congress in 1948–50, but amity among the victorious allies of World War II could not be maintained, and the Cold War emerged as the reality of international life for 40 years.

In Europe, practical thought focused more on a regional union, though many

recognized that world peace ultimately would require a union of all regions. The European Community (1951) and the European Union, established by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and at time of writing a European Constitution (2003), are the most familiar examples of the practical federation of modern states. In Europe, powers to regulate commerce (common management of coal and steel industries, a common market, and now a common currency—the *euro*) have been vested in the central institutions, while powers to provide for the common defense and foreign policy have still been retained by the states or their peoples.

In national life, history shows many instances of the choice of federation as a form of government to create unity while preserving diversity, starting with the United States of America in 1787. Other federations include Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Switzerland, Germany, Nigeria, and Russia (30 historic federations to date). Unitary states like Britain, France, Italy, Spain, India, and even China have experienced devolution or decentralization recently in various degrees.

Very novel political institutions at regional and world levels are evolving at the beginning of the 21st century. The United Nations, in its basic brochures, defines itself as “not a world government,” yet treaties on human rights (25 of which are currently binding), peacekeeping operations using national military forces, and treaties and protocols on the environment show the way to the future. The unity slowly being forged out of diversity in the future will probably be as novel in comparison to the historic national federations as the federations were to the confederations and monarchies that preceded them.

*One World* was the title of a book by Wendell Willkie, the Republican challenger in 1940, whom President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent around the world on a goodwill mission in the midst of World War II. “One World” gave a name to the aspirations of a generation of internationalists. Originally, the book before you was entitled, “What Happened to One World?” The short answer is that the ideal of a united, peaceful world is resurfacing in the public mind even while it remains utopian to scholars aligned with current trends in policy.

This book is properly entitled *The Politics of World Federation* because its whole burden is to treat world federation not merely as an ideal, nor as a proposal for the leaders of sovereign states to act upon, but as a popular movement, reflective of the general will, in the tradition of democratic politics. We begin to abandon the distinction between domestic politics (elections and the enactment of the laws) and world politics (relations between sovereign states that acknowledge no higher law). We remember that in all democratic theory (liberal and socialist) the *people* are sovereign. The view here, like that of Grenville Clark and the organizers of United World Federalists, is that until world federation becomes a matter for domestic politics, it will remain an idle dream. Hence, the climax of this book comes in the chapters on Henry Wallace, political action in the states, and the House and Senate hearings on world federalist bills in 1948, 1949, and 1950. The measure here of the movement is *influence*. The idea is treated as *practical policy* in the context, first, of the planning for the United Nations Organization in the midst of World War II, then, second, of the emerging containment policy at the start of the Cold War. Focus is on the *transition* and the formation, under public pressure, of an alternative foreign policy by the United States, allies, and adversaries. The hope is that the book will serve, not for easy imitation in the future, but as a reminder that greater things are possible than the current drift of policy.

### Prominent World Federalists

The idea of creating a political union of states and peoples in order to abolish war may be traced back for centuries—back to Woodrow Wilson, Peter Kropotkin, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, William Penn, Henry IV, le duc de Sully, and even Dante—but until the collapse of the League of Nations in the 1930s most such proposals of international union were not strictly federalist. Kant, for instance, proposed only a *confederation* of free and independent states. The League of Nations (and its successor the United Nations) was the great realization of the dreams of a confederal system of nation states; for all its limitations, it was a triumph in the slow and painful progress of international law.

By 1939, however, as the League collapsed, bolder spirits began to call for establishment of a true world federal government, by delegation of sovereign powers at least for the maintenance of peace and security. They are the principal subjects of this book. They included Clarence Streit, author of the book that practically conjured up the movement, *Union Now*. Another was Tom Otto Griessemer, German émigré from Hitler's Reich, who edited *World Government News*. Griessemer, educator Vernon Nash, and advertising executive Mildred Riorden Blake founded World Federalists in New York in 1941. The Wall Street lawyer and "statesman incognito" behind the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations, Grenville Clark, had some influence when the times were auspicious, and later he and Harvard international lawyer Louis B. Sohn wrote one of the classics of the movement, *World Peace through World Law*.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts retired from the Court in 1945 in order to publicly advocate Atlantic union as a stage to world union; he cooperated with both Streit and Clark. The world-renowned physicist and another émigré from Hitler's Germany, Albert Einstein, was an eloquent proponent of the idea. Atomic scientists Leo Szilard and J. Robert Oppenheimer supported it, too. The essayist E. B. White wrote a rare book of good humor about world government, *The Wild Flag*.<sup>2</sup> Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins at the University of Chicago and his dynamic professor of European literature Giuseppe Antonio Borgese led the Committee to Frame a World Constitution, which produced another classic, *The Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*.<sup>3</sup> His wife Elizabeth Mann Borgese (daughter of Thomas Mann) became a leader of the World Movement and later organized the *Pacem in Maribus* conferences on the Law of the Sea.

In the organized American movement, cofounder of Americans United for World Government, Thomas K. Finletter, was President Truman's secretary of the air force. Another cofounder of Americans United was influential editor of

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<sup>1</sup> Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace through World Law* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958; 2nd ed., 1960; 3rd, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> E. B. White, *The Wild Flag* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

<sup>3</sup> Committee to Frame a World Constitution; Robert M. Hutchins, president; G. A. Borgese, secretary; "Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution," *Common Cause*, 1 (March 1948), 1–40. Reprinted as *A Constitution for the World* by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, CA, 1965.

the *Saturday Review of Books* Norman Cousins. The only substantial money to come into the movement—\$1 million from McCormick reaper heiress Anita McCormick Blaine—funded the Foundation for World Government, which was managed by Stringfellow Barr, former president of St. John’s College, where the classics had been reintroduced in 1937. Among the University of Chicago group, the great books, which belong to no one nation, were read in that “great conversation,” as Mortimer Adler put it, of man as a rational being. Barr used to say, “To flourish, liberal education must be universal.... Only a reign of law between nations will permit any government to concern itself seriously with the liberal education of its citizens.”<sup>4</sup> Why the foundation failed is an instructive tale. The founder of Student Federalists was Harris Wofford, who would later serve the Kennedy administration as a regional director of the Peace Corps; he became briefly a U.S. senator from Pennsylvania. Wounded army veteran Remfer Lee (“Jack”) Whitehouse, with veterans David McCoy and Paul Sauer, founded the most radical student and veterans’ group at Northwestern University, in which briefly the flame of future world political union burned brightly. The “World Republic Boys,” as they were called by admiring, but doubtful, adults, had just enough spunk to pressure Americans United and World Federalists to merge into United World Federalists (UWF) by February 1947. UWF’s second president (1949–52) was Alan Cranston, later a U.S. senator from California (1969–93).

Outside the United States, world federalists included Lord Lothian (till 1930 Philip Kerr), who wrote another classic, *Pacifism Is Not Enough*,<sup>5</sup> before he became ambassador to the United States in 1939–40. Lothian was one of several English federalists, including Lionel Curtis, who had labored to transform the British Empire into an imperial federation as the nucleus of a world federation. Others followed them on European and world federation, including Sir William Beveridge, Lionel Robbins (later Lord Robbins), John Boyd Orr (later Lord Boyd–Orr), and Arnold Toynbee, the creative world historian. Prime Minister Winston Churchill made an actual offer, not often remembered, of British union with France on 16 June 1940; Toynbee was coauthor of this proposal. Then, beginning with his speech at Zurich in September 1946, Churchill daringly proposed Franco–German reconciliation, which culminated with plans for the confederal Council of Europe in 1948. British member of Parliament Henry Osborne, elected to Clement Attlee’s government in 1945, led a campaign to bring about a constitutional convention by unofficial popular elections, known as the peoples’ convention. He was supported by Hungarian pacifist Rosika Schwimmer (moving spirit behind the Henry Ford Peace Ship in 1915), Edith Wynnner, and Georgia Lloyd.

Jean Monnet, the French banker, was inspired by Churchill’s offer and guided the process of creating the more federal European Community. Italy’s Altiero Spinelli, who was impressed by the British federalists, deeply served European union; in 1984 as an elected member of the European Parliament, he

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<sup>4</sup> Stringfellow Barr, “Education: For Nations or Human Beings,” *Common Cause*, 1 (September 1947): 83.

<sup>5</sup> [Philip Kerr,] “The End of War,” *The Round Table*, 5, 20 (September 1915): 772–96; Lord Lothian, *Pacifism Is Not Enough*, 219–63.

chaired the group that produced the *Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union*.<sup>6</sup> That treaty, though not ratified, yet leading to the Council of Ministers' Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht treaty of 1992, which avoided early federation, was certainly the most significant recent draft constitution for the practical federation of modern states. At time of writing, still another constitution for the European Union has been drafted under the chairmanship of former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, designed to incorporate another ten members into the Union (for a total of 25) by 2004. Pope John XXIII's encyclical, *Pacem in Terris* (1963), similarly maintained high principle in the depths of the Cold War with its profound argument for a "public authority ... on a world-wide basis."

In India, M. K. (Mahatma) Gandhi once said that world federation could be based only on a foundation of nonviolence. Later, India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru echoed these views when approached by world federalists but shifted course toward nonalignment. In Japan, Morikatsu Inagaki was a leader by 1948, soon joined by the atomic scientist Hideki Yukawa. The World Movement for World Federal Government in 1950 consisted of 73 organizations within 22 countries, with a total individual membership of 151,000.<sup>7</sup> (The American UWF had a peak membership in 1949 of 47,000.) In a survey of the literature worldwide, *Strengthening the United Nations*, we have found substantial works from 72 nations and five intergovernmental organizations on systemic U.N. reform and world federalism. Outside of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, the next most fertile countries for federalist thinking were, in this order: India, Japan, Mexico, and so on down to Paraguay, Tunisia, and Zaire.<sup>8</sup> It has not been an "American" movement. Since the 1940s, prominent leaders have been much more reticent about such an ideal, but, as the Cold War ended, Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union and Václav Havel of Czechoslovakia began to write and speak in large terms reminiscent of old pleas for world federation.<sup>9</sup>

In the American political context, declared world federalists included Henry Wallace, last of the New Dealers, who challenged Truman on the policy of getting tough with the Russians in the presidential election of 1948. Senator Glen Taylor (D., Idaho), Wallace's running mate, introduced the most radical world federalist resolution in the U.S. Congress. Representatives Walter H.

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<sup>6</sup> European Parliament, *Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union*, 14 February 1984, Directorate-General for Information and Public Relations, P.O. Box 1601, L-2920 Luxembourg. The vote was 237 to 31, with 43 abstentions.

<sup>7</sup> Reply to Questionnaire from the United Nations on Non-Governmental Organizations, n.d. [post September 1950], Robert M. Hutchins Papers (A), Box 158.3, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. Hereafter, Hutchins Papers.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph P. Baratta, *Strengthening the United Nations: A Bibliography on U.N. Reform and World Federalism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). A draft update has been prepared.

<sup>9</sup> Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records*, Plenary. 43rd sess., 7 December 1988. A/43/PV.-72; Václav Havel, *The Art of the Impossible: Politics as Morality in Practice* (New York: Fromm International, 1994, 1997).

Judd (R., Minnesota) and Brooks Hays (D., Arkansas) introduced several more modest resolutions, including HCR-59 of 1948, which called on the president to convene the “general review conference” provided for in the U.N. Charter’s Article 109, and HCR-64 of 1949, which still more modestly declared the “sense of Congress” that the fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy should be the development of the U.N. into a “world federation.” HCR-64 was co-sponsored by 111 representatives, including John F. Kennedy, Christian Herter, Peter Rodino, and Jacob Javits. Even Richard Nixon, then a freshman representative, supported a comparable bill. In the Senate, a world federalist bill was supported by senators Hubert Humphrey, Wayne Morse, and Claude Pepper. Senator J. William Fulbright supported the Atlantic union resolution. Hearings were held in the House in 1948 and 1949, and in the Senate in 1950.

#### Definition of Terms

What do we mean by world federal government, and how would we place it into the array of contemporary approaches to peace? What is contemplated is much more than voluntary *cooperation*, which Jean Monnet, father of the European Community, disparaged as inadequate to the exigencies of the modern world. As he wrote to French prime minister Georges Bidault on the occasion of the signing of the convention of the organization to implement the Marshall plan:<sup>10</sup>

Efforts by the various countries, in the present national frameworks, will not in my view be enough. Furthermore, the idea that sixteen sovereign nations will cooperate effectively is an illusion. I believe that only the establishment of a *federation* of the West, including Britain, will enable us to solve our problems quickly enough, and finally prevent war.

The United Nations, like the League before it, is also based on cooperation—in the Security Council on great power unanimity—but since the League failed to prevent World War II, and since the U.N., although it has endured over twice as long, suffers from similar disabilities like national refusal to pay assessments under plausible excuses, many people have been attracted to federalism.

World federal government does not mean *confederation*. In American usage, contrasted, say, with Swiss or French, a “confederation” is the kind of union achieved by the United States during the Revolution under the Articles of Confederation (drafted in 1777, ratified by all the 13 states not till 1781). It was a “league of friendship” or association of sovereign states, requiring unanimity for common decisions affecting the army or foreign relations. Congress was a unicameral legislature, laws reached only to the states, the “president” was president of the Congress and not an independently elected executive of the laws, there was no supreme judiciary, and every state had a veto.

The confederation of states was so weak that, as is well known in American history, the Founding Fathers by 1787 had to assemble in Philadelphia to form “a more perfect union.” This they did by drafting the federal Constitution,

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<sup>10</sup> Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), 272.

which, by delegations of powers from the states and the people, established an originally very limited national government over the states with powers to enact laws reaching both states and individuals. In effect, sovereignty, or the supreme power in the state, was divided between the states and the federal government. The people were made citizens of both a member state and the union. *Sovereignty* was understood as *popular* sovereignty, that is, in Thomas Jefferson's terms, as "the Right of the People ... to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its Powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

One can think of world federal government by analogy with the government of the United States under the Constitution, or, as people in Canada or Switzerland or the U.S.S.R. tended understandably to do, of any of the 30 other federal states that have been founded since 1787. Canada is a federation, as are Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina. In Europe, so are Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and Russia; in Africa, Nigeria; and in Asia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Australia. Some eight other countries have been influenced by federalist experiments in their history, including South Africa, Burma, Ethiopia, People's Republic of China, United Arab Republic, and Cyprus. Several unitary states have been experiencing decentralization short of federation: Italy, Belgium, Spain, France, and Great Britain. There have also been eight attempts at federation that failed, including most spectacularly the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, but also, tellingly, the United Provinces of Central America, Gran Colombia, the West Indies Federation, and the Mali Federation. For a complete list, with dates, see Appendix B.

The essence of the change from confederation to federation was abandonment of the fundamental flaw, found in the Articles of Confederation as in the U.N. Charter, of attempting to legislate for states or governments in their collective capacities, as distinguished from the individuals inhabiting the states, as Alexander Hamilton argued in *The Federalist*, No. 15. The idea is to establish the rule of law in place of the anarchy of states. Enforcement of the law would become a judicial matter within a civil society in place of threatened or actual military force among sovereigns. Hence, the level of violence necessary for the maintenance of order would be radically reduced.

Federation is also not a *unitary world state*, abolishing the nation states. Since the end of the Cold War, the term "world government," like "U.N. reform," has been creeping back into public consciousness, notably in fears of the new World Trade Organization or of the United Nations itself. But 99 writers out of 100 merely drop the term as if world government were a silver bullet to solve the problem of nationalism; a few, like evangelist Pat Robertson, treat the idea as a bogey for everything destructive of religion and diversity since the *Illuminati* of 1776.<sup>11</sup> But a unitary world state is a straw man. No historical figure known to us ever advocated the abolition of nation states and their replacement by a unitary world government, though some, like H. G. Wells and G. A. Borgese imagined so centralized a federal power that it would be much the same. All presume to save the liberties that the historic nation-states have so painfully won.

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<sup>11</sup> Pat Robertson, *The New World Order* (Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991).

World federation has actually been proposed to *preserve* the national states, just as the United States preserved Massachusetts, Virginia, and the others; it is the strongest form of union consistent with preservation of the states. “Unity and diversity,” the first motto of United World Federalists, has been the watchword. The states will be vital to a world federation as subordinate authorities more knowledgeable of local (national) conditions and hence more fit for legislation affecting every unique people. A unitary world state is another name for a world empire established by force—the very opposite of what World Federalists and their successors aimed at. Nevertheless, it is true that most federations tend over time toward unitary states, so every constitutional safeguard and eternal vigilance will remain necessary to preserve liberty.

World federal government is not undemocratic. A federation of the world could hardly be undertaken except on a democratic basis, but the powers to enact law reaching to individuals could be constitutionally limited to the most common concerns (like security and, next, regulation of trade), which would avoid radical redistribution of income from the global North to the South, though it should provide new means to begin to close global economic inequalities. Clarence Streit was the most vigorous proponent of proceeding only on the basis of *liberal democracy*; hence, he advocated a union of the Atlantic democracies, to which maximal powers could be granted, pending expansion to a world democracy.

After first use of atomic bombs in war, when the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union broke up, world federalists, on the other hand, felt that the acceleration of history required a *world* union at least to control nuclear weapons even before all peoples were prepared to responsibly act as world citizens. The United Nations was also a universal organization, so the world federal government devised by the Hutchins committee or Clark and Sohn was, like the U.N., shrewdly designed with minimal powers to accommodate the “people’s democracies” as well as authoritarian states. The key point was to establish a common security system in place of all the competitive national defense establishments, so that preparations for war and the posture of war could be safely abandoned, thus providing resources for peaceful competition.

But the Cold War was fought on just this point of democracy. G. A. Borgese said the Cold War was a conflict about the nature of *justice*, on which the necessary world government of the future would be based. By the time it ended in 1990 (when President George H. W. Bush, at the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, said the words, “The Cold War is over”) it was evident that humanity had made a great, inchoate decision that liberty was preferred to equality, capitalism to communism, markets to planned economy, liberal democracy to economic democracy. The Communist parties in the Soviet Union and East European Communist states, recognizing popular rejection, then voluntarily renounced their monopoly power. Streit was proved right, and Hutchins and Clark wrong, at least concerning universal membership. No future union of humanity is now conceivable except on a liberal democratic basis. The expansion of the international law of human rights, of which there are now some 95 instruments, 25 of which are binding treaties, is the advance



agent of such democratic world union.<sup>12</sup> When the U.N. is made representative of peoples in at least a second chamber of the General Assembly, democracy will have arrived at the world level.

#### **Revolution to Establish Politically the Brotherhood of Man**

World federal government, therefore, is not an easy solution to the problem of war. It is in principle the same, familiar solution that has been achieved in every well organized state—namely, the monopolization of force by a single authority (in democracies by a representative legislature) that governs by law reaching the people. World federation plainly implies a revolutionary exercise of the sovereignty of the people, a new social contract comprehending the whole human race, the family of man. Harris Wofford, founder of Student Federalists, called it “man’s greatest peaceful revolution, ... the revolution to establish politically the brotherhood of man.”<sup>13</sup> To become a reality, the people of the world would have to establish a democratic, federal World Republic. Hence, the great difficulty is whether *world community* is sufficiently advanced to undertake the construction of a world republic. Are the people of the world “ready” for federal union?

By the end of World War II, a number of people in Europe and America judged that the problem of war and the world-wide spread of industry and democracy made so great an innovation in world affairs as the establishment of world federal government both *necessary* and *possible*. It is necessary to protect the people, to make a reality of collective security, and to solve global problems beyond the capacity of sovereign national states. It is possible because of the global expansion of Western industrialization, finance, and economic techniques, the spread of European forms of liberal and socialist democracy, the counterflow of non-Western cultural ideas from the postcolonial world, the shrinking of distances by modern transportation and communications, and, in short, the interdependence of civilized life today on the planet. The world is already one, federalists say; only law and politics lag behind.

This book is an examination of what they attempted and accomplished. European Union, which was conceived by the Resistance during the war, when it was seen as a stage toward world union, has had far more success to date—it has all but ended the history of war between Germany and France, with Britain playing the role of “balancer,” even before full federation has been achieved—but the focus here is on the larger and more remote project of world union.

Another innovation with large implications is the recent establishment of the International Criminal Court. The institutions of the rule of effective and enforceable world law are still exceedingly rudimentary, but what is significant historically is the appearance of thousands of people who understood the project and were ready to assume the responsibilities and privileges of world citizens, ready to participate in the election of world legislators and to obey the new world laws. If the populations of even a few key countries were ready to start, it

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations, *Human Rights—Status of International Instruments* (New York: U.N., ST/HR/5, E.87.XIV.2, 1987); *Human Rights—Chart of Ratifications* (New York: U.N., ST/HR/4/—Rev.14, 30 June 1996).

<sup>13</sup> “Dead End: Federalism Limited,” *Common Cause*, 1 (May 1948): 388.

would not be difficult to draft a world constitution to incorporate them into a civil body politic. Today's responsible national leaders would suddenly realize there was a practical, fundamental alternative to the conduct of foreign policy.

We are looking at more than an idea: world federal government is a *project* and a *movement*. A movement of ideas and people is harder to trace and less dramatic than, say, a biography of Harry Truman or a history of a policy like containment or deterrence; but it is as real and just as important as the idea of government to James Madison or of a general association of nations to Woodrow Wilson. If the world ever passes through the transition to the Federation in Star Trek, people will be interested in the beginnings.<sup>14</sup> G. A. Borgese, the leading spirit of the University of Chicago's Committee to Frame a World Constitution, used to say that a constitution, like his committee's *Preliminary Draft*, was a *myth*, in the sense of a "proposal to history," for "a myth incorporates the faith and hope of its age, mediates between the ideal and the real, and calls the mind to action."<sup>15</sup> Similarly, the Constitution of the United States was a proposal to history, as was the Charter of the United Nations. What follows is a history of the progress of the myth of *a more perfect union* for the world.

In short, expressions that are synonymous with world federal government are "world union," "world republic," "world democracy," and "world federation." What is *not* meant is empire, unitary world state, alliance, league of sovereign states, or confederation. We will sometimes speak of federation in the context of "international organization," for the latter can include a government of states and peoples, especially since the natural progression will be to reform the United Nations to include even one popularly representative legislative house and to limit the absolute veto in the Security Council. But it should be understood that we do not regard international organization as a final stage.

World federalists say that they, who wish to extend the rule of law, are the realists, while those who put their faith in a league of sovereign states or, worse, who suppose that peace can long be maintained by deterrence or competition in arms are the utopians.<sup>16</sup>

#### Delegations of Sovereignty

At first blush, most people cannot imagine that modern states and their peoples would ever delegate sovereign powers to a common, higher union. Yet some 36 states have declared their willingness to do just that, revealing that "sovereignty" is far less indivisible than theorists often maintain. For instance, shortly after World War II, the constitutions of France, Italy, and West Germany were expressly changed to permit limitations of sovereignty for their participation in a European federation (or, by legal implication, in a world federation); the constitution of Japan renounced war:

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<sup>14</sup> Jill Sherwin, ed., *Quotable Star Trek* (New York: Pocket Books, 1999), 180–82.

<sup>15</sup> "To the Reader," *Common Cause*, 1 (March 1948): 327.

<sup>16</sup> Erich Kahler, "The Reality of Utopia," *American Scholar*, 15 (Spring 1946), 167–79.

**France**

Preamble. On condition of reciprocity, France accepts the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organization and defense of peace.

—Constitution of the Fourth Republic, 1946.

Art. 55. Treaties or agreements duly ratified and approved shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that of laws, subject, for each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.

—Constitution of the Fifth Republic, 4 October 1958.

**Italy**

Art. 11. Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense to the liberty of other peoples or as a means of settlement of international disputes, and, on conditions of equality with other states, agrees to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary to an organization which will ensure peace and justice among nations, and promotes and encourages international organizations constituted for this purpose.

—Constitution of 1 January 1948.

**Germany**

Art. 24. Entry into a collective security system:

(1). The [German] Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to intergovernmental institutions.

(2). For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so, it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.

(3). For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation will accede to agreements concerning international arbitration of a general comprehensive, and obligatory nature.

—Constitution of 1949, confirmed by Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990.

**Japan**

Art. 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.

The right of the belligerency of the State will not be recognized.

—Constitution of 3 May 1947.

The point is that the limitation of national sovereignty for the purpose of participating in higher unions, to secure the common defense and promote the general welfare, is not unprecedented but rather is quite widely recognized in the fundamental constitutions of numerous states. All members of the European Union, except Britain (which has no written constitution), have made similar provisions for the limitation of their sovereignty in order to participate in a higher union, as have states once or prospectively in other regional federations.<sup>17</sup> An effort to amend the U.S. Constitution to similar effect by

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<sup>17</sup> Nations with such provisions include, in Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland; in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,

United World Federalists failed in 1950. For texts, see Appendix C.

Hardly one of the constitutional lawyers or political leaders who drafted such clauses limiting the sovereignty of the state or who enacted federal constitutions could be identified as a world federalist, and almost every one of them would be surprised or even offended if so labeled. (The one exception we have found is Joe Heydecker, president of Weltstaat-Liga in Munich, who apparently influenced Germany's Article 24.)<sup>18</sup> As far as is known, the authors were simply responding to the threat of internal anarchy and foreign invasion, as in Switzerland after the Sonderbund War (1847) or in Russia faced with the nationalities problem after the Revolution (1922), and they seized upon the federal structure as providing the least necessary government of the whole while preserving the government of the parts.

#### **Major Problems in Constructing World Federation**

There are four major problems for world federalism: membership, representation, powers, and transition.

#### **Membership**

Should membership be open to all states as in the League and United Nations, or limited to the democracies? Virtually all world federalists are agreed that *universality* is the ultimate goal; most hold that it is the immediate goal. Universality is the great achievement of the United Nations. Every weakness of the U.N. has been tolerated rather than tamper with the principle of universal membership, and every attempt to evict one country (the Soviet Union in the early days, later South Africa or Israel) has been rejected as a threat to the peace. Most of the world federalist movement, including Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn as they worked out *World Peace through World Law*, and Robert M. Hutchins, G. A. Borgese, and the Chicago Committee to Frame a World Constitution, favored a universal approach, since "democracy," liberal or economic, had become the central issue of the early Cold War.

Clarence Streit, on the other hand, argued that even a modest federal union is not practical unless the people accept common values, and the minimum are shared values concerning liberty and responsible government. So he favored membership *limited to the democracies*, pending the development of democracy in all nations, when they could be admitted to a democratic world federal government. The movement for European Union, similarly, has limited itself to liberal democracies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is now hardly any question about the necessity of beginning with democracies.

#### **Representation**

Granted that what is needed is a democratic republic of the world, should representation in the legislative body be *proportional to population*, which is the pure principle but which would give predominance to poorer, more populous, and less "politically experienced" countries like India, or should it be *weighted*

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Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela; in Africa: Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire); in Asia: India, Japan, Philippines, Singapore.

<sup>18</sup> *World Government News*, February 1949.

somehow to reflect the widely differing experience of national peoples with democracy and to make active participation more attractive to the great powers? To this vexing problem, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn proposed that the U.N. General Assembly be reorganized according to a system (subject to periodic amendment) of weighted representation cleverly scaled with respect to population, wealth, education, and traditional great power ranking: the U.S., U.S.S.R., China, and India would each be allocated 30 votes; mid-sized powers like Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan, 16; smaller nations, 8; and so on through seven steps to the smallest state, which would be granted 1. This scheme produced a total of 625 world representatives. Clark and Sohn urged that the representatives be elected by the people wherever possible, so that representatives develop a sense of responsibility to the people instead of to national governments; elsewhere, appointment by parliaments, national monarchs, or communist parties would have to be tolerated.

The Chicago committee earlier proposed an ingenious alternative scheme of regional popular elections and nine electoral colleges, which eliminated the invidious weighting scheme. But it had the same effect, since the nine regions (nicely coincident with the world civilizations that Arnold Toynbee distinguished) had different populations. These representatives were to be finally elected by all the electoral colleges in plenary session, so each representative would in principle represent the whole world. There were to be 99 of them.

Weighted voting has actually been introduced into the World Bank and other international financial institutions, where it avoids a great power veto or voting in accordance with sovereign equality. Federalists later proposed ingenious alternatives, like Richard Hudson's Binding Triad (majorities of states, populations, and economies) or Joseph Schwartzberg's Entitlement Quotients. (Appendix J.)

Streit, because he started with working democracies, provided for immediate proportional representation, while states not admitted were not represented at all. The European Parliament was made elective on the basis of proportional representation in 1979. At the world level, however, respect for sovereign equality of states has been so recently and painfully won that there is little movement for basing the world order on the true political equality of citizens. The one nation, one vote rule avoids facing the vexed problem of democratic representation.

#### **Powers**

Should the powers delegated to the world federal government be the minimum necessary to preserve the peace, as was intended in the United Nations, or the maximum desirable to make peace and promote justice throughout the world? Grenville Clark argued that only minimal powers were acceptable for delegation by the nations at present; amendment could provide for gradual expansion of powers as the world federation proved trustworthy. This was the doctrine of *minimalism*.

G. A. Borgese and the Chicago committee, at the other extreme, contended that a mere security government would be a world police state; the federation had to start with powers to achieve justice, for injustice was at the root of the crisis of modern civilization. Hence, in addition to powers to preserve the peace,

the world federation would have to have powers to regulate world commerce, supervise world communications and transportation, lay world taxes, issue world money and control world finance, prepare plans for equitable economic development, regulate emigration and immigration, and supervise the rectification of borders and the creation of new states. Hence, this view with respect to powers was called *maximalism*.

Streit was a maximalist within his democratic Atlantic union. There has never been open resolution of this contentious issue of powers, but as the U.N. has entered the economic development field and peace workers everywhere have turned to development projects, since political progress toward federation seems so slow, virtually all federalists and internationalists are now maximalists.

### **Transition**

Should the transition to world federation be a revolutionary act, as at Philadelphia in 1787, or a gradual series of steps, carefully building on innovation after innovation as each one proves workable? The greatest problem of world federalism is the political transition. Most federalists have argued that the only practical course is to conduct a campaign of public education to persuade people that it is in their own self-interest, particularly in peace, to reach an international agreement for the non-violent establishment of world federal government. Federalists have always resisted talk and hints of preventive war, use of force, and a national bid for empire. The preferred method is to convene a general review conference for the reform of the United Nations, as provided for in Article 109 of the Charter, or to convene a new world constitutional convention, like that in San Francisco in 1945.

This is commonly known as the approach of *U.N. reform*. The approach is official, legal, and “realistic.” Appeal is made not to moral sentiments or to the sense of human brotherhood but to national interests. The politics of U.N. reform has consisted largely of lobbying with legislators and high executive officials to produce a resolution or other national initiative for a new conference. United World Federalists saw its purpose almost entirely as lobbying in Congress for a world federalist resolution. The World Federalist Association conducts a broader educational program but still attempts to influence Congress.

A variant on this official approach is the “parliamentary” approach, in which national parliamentarians, including members of the U.S. Congress, would introduce the federalist resolution themselves. The British Parliamentary Group for World Government, launched by Henry Osborne, began this approach. It is carried on, with more political “realism,” by Parliamentarians for Global Action (formerly Parliamentarians for World Order).

A minority of federalists have argued that national governments are natural enemies of a project that would reduce national sovereignty, so an appeal must be made directly to the people in order to produce a wholly new social contract. They propose to hold popular elections of delegates to a world constitutional convention, using state electoral machinery wherever possible; these delegates, legitimated by their election, would then assemble in convention to draft the world constitution.

This is the *peoples' convention* approach. It is unofficial, revolutionary, and

“utopian.” Most proponents see it as an educational device to bring greater grassroots popular pressure to bear on officials, in order to move them to undertake U.N. reform. British Member of Parliament (M.P.) Henry Osborne led a difficult campaign to hold just such a peoples’ convention in Geneva in December 1950. This extraordinary effort came to naught with the arrival of the Korean War in June.

Still another approach would be to form a transnational political party aimed at winning national offices for the purpose of carrying out a program of establishing world federation, as was once proposed by young Harris Wofford. A more modest variant would be to form an advisory committee of leaders of national political parties and trade unions on the model of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for a United States of Europe.

Actually, all federalist approaches are revolutionary, in the sense that they all aim to create favorable political conditions for the transfer of sovereign powers from nations to a higher governing authority. What is proposed is no less than the dissolution of the external sovereignty of nations. But federalists argue that—since sovereignty is really the right of the people to institute new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness—there can never be a “sacrifice” or dissolution of sovereignty. Rather, sovereignty is *strengthened* by uniting governments. Far from being a loss, establishing federal world government would be a gain of immense powers of social cooperation, analogous to what has been achieved under the U.S. federal Constitution, which was bitterly opposed at first.

Even the provision in Article 109 that each of the Big Five must ratify any amendments to the Charter need not be a barrier, if there were overwhelming popular demand for a stronger United Nations. Delegates to a U.N. Charter review conference could provide that the new Charter should go into effect when ratified by some large majority of states plus, say, three or four of the five “permanent members,” just as the delegates to the Philadelphia convention of 1787 provided that the new U.S. government should go into operation when the Constitution was ratified by 9 of the 13 states, and not unanimously, as required by the Articles of Confederation.

World federalists say that the times themselves are revolutionary. Nuclear weapons could end human civilization, a global economy is forming, the working classes and women have acquired political power in the West, the Communist countries are now in transition to bourgeois democracy and free market capitalism, the impoverished masses in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are discovering the rights of labor, the earth seen from space is fragile. These events reduce even the Cold War between Russia and America to a mere wave on the tide of history. Revolutionary times call for a revolutionary response.

Streit used to argue, in the early days of the Second World War and again in the early Cold War, that “the most dangerous way to cross a chasm is in two steps,” but most of the movement has followed Clark and Sohn in favor of incremental U.N. reform. The primary focus of the world order school of thought led by Saul Mendlovitz and Richard A. Falk, who were originally inspired by Clark and Sohn, is on this transition, which they realistically call the

“struggle of the oppressed.”<sup>19</sup> A similar approach at time of writing is the 20–40 year program “Global Action to Prevent War,” led by Jonathan Dean, Randall Forsberg, and Saul Mendlovitz. They propose forming a “coalition” of government officials and grassroots activists to support a series of four treaties to gradually reduce national defense forces while strengthening international ones under a functioning United Nations. In effect, a minimal transfer to the world organization of powers affecting peace and security would be accomplished after an effort lasting as long as the Cold War.<sup>20</sup> Such struggle is contrasted to the public pressure on national political leaders practiced by United World Federalists and their successors.

#### World Political Creativity in the 21st Century

In the United Nations community today, we can detect a novel, somewhat inelegant but practical statecraft that in principle could be called federalist. In our survey, *The United Nations System*, on the literature since the end of the Cold War on U.N. reform, most writers seem to see three general directions for the future of the United Nations, analogous to the three fundamental bases of international politics—balance of power, collective security, and rule of law:

1. Cautious development of the state system, utilizing the U.N. as at present only when bilateral diplomacy must avail itself of the services of multilateral diplomacy.
2. A non-hierarchical system of perhaps 100 international organizations, including a much more effective United Nations empowered to achieve the purposes in its Charter.
3. A world federal government, preserving the nation–states but providing a higher level of legislative, executive, and judicial authority, probably on the model of the emerging European Union.

A non-hierarchical system (alternative 2) is now overwhelmingly preferred, not only because statesmen (and -women) are reluctant to part with national power, but also because the peoples of the states are fearful, after over 40 years of the Cold War, to centralize power in a world state, even if it could be designed as a federal system with such checks and balances as not to become a threat to liberty. But a non-hierarchical world system of organizations that could be *effective* in keeping the peace and in providing the negotiating forum for cooperating to solve global problems would practically amount to the same thing. If it keeps the peace and respects the independence and diversity of modern states and their restive peoples, what is its difference from a world federation?

The present world situation, we find, can be seen as a period of political creativity no less inferior to that at the founding of the United States, and the

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<sup>19</sup> Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *Toward a Just World Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982).

<sup>20</sup> Dr. Randall C. Forsberg, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139; 617-354-4337; globalaction@idds.org.



emerging world political order promises to be as different from any of the 30 historical federations as the U.S. federal government was from the confederation and colonial governments that preceded it. The European Union, with its five branches led by the European Council (the “summit” of heads of government), whose “policies” (delegations of sovereign powers) are continually reviewed by the Council of Ministers, is typical of the movement toward global governance. Consider the following facts replete in the literature of U.N. reform:

- U.S. hegemony since 1973, like British hegemony after 1918, has been declining, marked by abandonment of the gold standard and decline of the U.S. portion of the world gross product from one half (1945) to one fifth (2000).<sup>21</sup>
- The absolute sovereignty of states, enshrined in the U.N. Charter’s Article 2(7), no longer preserves states from war, economic disruption, or, now, humanitarian intervention.<sup>22</sup>
- International war is decreasing in incidence, while domestic and ethnic conflict affecting international peace and security is increasing. The U.N., which was designed to stop Hitlerite aggression across borders, is now increasingly charged with maintaining the peace among individuals, as if it were a world state.<sup>23</sup>
- Common security is supplanting national security as the first interest of states, and economic power is increasingly recognized as more of a reality than military power.<sup>24</sup>
- Nuclear weapons, which their most optimistic champions claimed undermined *Realpolitik*, are unusable.<sup>25</sup>
- Despite a public posture of ignoring or criticizing the U.N., the U.S. government

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<sup>21</sup> Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Inis L. Claude Jr., “American Values and Multilateral Institutions,” in Claude, *States and the Global System: Politics, Law, and Organization* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1988), 102–11.

<sup>22</sup> Edwin M. Smith, Keith R. Krause, and Brian Urquhart, “The United Nations: Meeting the Challenges of the Post–Cold War World,” *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, 87 (1993): 268–99.

<sup>23</sup> Ernst B. Haas, *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict* (New York: UNITAR, E.86.XV.ST.19, 1986; Ramesh Thakur, ed., *International Conflict Resolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).

<sup>24</sup> Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Olaf Palme, chairman, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982; Mikhail S. Gorbachev, “The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World” *Pravda* and *Isvestia*, 17 September 1987; U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures* (New York: U.N., Study Series No. 19, E.89.IX.2, A/43/368, 1982).

<sup>25</sup> U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Nuclear Weapons: A Comprehensive Study* (New York: U.N., Study Series No. 21, E.91.IX.12, A/45/373, 1991).

in particular recognizes the need for a general security system;<sup>26</sup> and, since the Persian Gulf War, many states have applauded the U.N.'s acquisition of greater enforcement powers.<sup>27</sup>

- Newer techniques of conflict resolution and more traditional means for the peaceful settlement of international disputes are combining and progressing rapidly—to the point where John Burton argues that they offer a universal ideology in place of liberalism and communism, mutually exhausted in the struggles of the Cold War.<sup>28</sup> Preventive diplomacy and all devices to prevent conflict, rather than contain or stop it, are held to be the elements of a mature international system.<sup>29</sup>
- The world is “governable,” as Georgi Shakhnazarov wrote in 1988, for a strengthened United Nations no longer threatens to take sides in the struggle between East and West.<sup>30</sup>
- A global *problématique* of common problems beyond the powers of any one national state to solve for the protection of its people—ranging from defense against attack and cooperation for international financial and commercial interests to protection and promotion of human rights and preservation of the environment—requires common action by the U.N.<sup>31</sup>
- The General Assembly, even as presently constituted, has a quasi-legislative competence, which would be increased if a second chamber, representative of

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<sup>26</sup> U.S. Department of State, *United States Participation in the United Nations*, Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, Pub. No. 9974, 1992; Tobi Trister Gati, *The U.S., the U.N., and the Management of Global Change* (New York: New York University Press for United Nations Association—USA, 1983).

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, Representative James A. Leach, co-chairman, *Defining Purpose: The United Nations and the Health of Nations; Final Report [to the President and Congress]* (Washington, DC: By the Commission, 1993); Edward C. Luck and Tobi Trister Gati, “Whose Collective Security?” *Washington Quarterly*, 15 (Spring 1992): 43–56; Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” *International Affairs* (London), 69 (1993): 451–64.

<sup>28</sup> John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* [sic] (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); Burton, *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis* (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf, 1984).

<sup>29</sup> Peter Stein, *Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement* (London: Butterworths, 1984).

<sup>30</sup> Georgi Shakhnazarov, “Governability of the World,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), 34, 3 (1988): 16–24; Georgi Shakhnazarov, “The World Community Is Amenable to Government,” *Pravda*, 15 January 1988, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup> John G. Ruggie, “On the Problems of ‘the Global Problématique’: What Roles for international Organizations?” *Alternatives*, 5 (1979–80): 517–50; Ronald J. Glossop, *World Federation? A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993), 49–95.

peoples like the European Parliament, were established.<sup>32</sup>

- Increasingly, consensus, rather than consent of every state willing to be bound, is recognized as the basis of international obligation laid down in the recommendations, or enactments, of the General Assembly.<sup>33</sup>
- The individual is being recognized as a “subject” of international law, particularly under the Nuremberg principles and now under some 95 human rights instruments.<sup>34</sup>
- An International Criminal Court, making permanent what began as *ad hoc* international tribunals at Nuremberg, Tokyo, Arusha, and The Hague for the prosecution of individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, was established in 1998 and entered into force in 2002, after 60 ratifications (not including the U.S.A.).<sup>35</sup>

When the *individual* is protected by international human rights law, is the beneficiary of humanitarian intervention by the international community despite the claims of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the U.N. Charter, has a role via non-governmental organizations accredited to the U.N. in the making of treaties and the hardening of customs, and has standing before world courts and international tribunals, have we not crossed the line from an association of sovereign states to a government of states and peoples? “We are living through

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<sup>32</sup> Stephen M. Schwebel, “The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on Customary International Law,” *American Journal of International Law*, 73 (1979): 301–09; Dieter Heinrich, *The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly* (New York: World Federalist Movement, 1992).

<sup>33</sup> C. Wilfred Jenks, “Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities, and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations,” in *Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour of Lord McNair* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 48–63; Jon M. Van Dyke, ed., *Consensus and Confrontation: The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Law of the Sea Institute, 1985).

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening the International Court of Justice*, Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 10–11 May 1973 (CIS No. S381–22, SuDoc No. Y4.F76/2:In8/42).; Monroe Leigh and the Office of the Legal Advisor, “The International Court of Justice,” in *Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1976* (Washington, DC: Department of State, Pub. No. 8908, 1977), 650–80; Benjamin B. Ferencz, *An International Criminal Court: A Step toward World Peace; A Documentary History and Analysis* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1980).

<sup>35</sup> Fanny Benedetti and John L. Washburn, “Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference,” *Global Governance*, 5, 1 (January–March 1999): 1–38; Robert C. Johansen, “U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court: Unfounded Fears,” The Joan B. Krok Institute for International Peace Studies, Policy Brief No. 7 (June 2001); Benjamin B. Ferencz, “Misguided Fears about the International Criminal Court,” *Pace International Law Review* (forthcoming, Spring 2003).

the birth pangs of a world community,” said C. Wilfred Jenks in 1969.<sup>36</sup> We are immersed in the “emerging constitutionalism of world order,” said Edward McWhinney in 1987.<sup>37</sup> Judging by current interest in what is termed “world governance,” humanity is in search of some more stable, more peaceful world order, but few are ready to plunge into a world federal state in order to escape the fundamental flaw, found in the U.N. Charter, of attempting to legislate for states or governments in their collective capacities, as distinguished from the individuals of whom they consist, as Hamilton argued in *The Federalist*, No. 15.

If we look at the current movement toward world governance in terms of the world order school’s preferred values of peace, social justice, economic plenty, preservation of the environment, and democratic participation,<sup>38</sup> the new creativity of world politics will be evident. Slowly the realism and practicality of *common security* recommended itself to national statesmen, until by 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union unilaterally and courageously affirmed the idea as he led his country and the world out of the Cold War.<sup>39</sup>

What is striking about *human rights* from a world constitutional point of view is that millions of people in all cultures have affirmed common definitions of such rights and often begun to adhere to common institutions to enforce them even before establishment of a world state.<sup>40</sup> The situation is reminiscent of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen *before* establishment of the French national government.

It is not generally appreciated that the *economic development* of the poorer parts of the world is generally a success and proceeds at a brisk pace. Average life expectancy in the last 30 years has increased by 16 years, adult literacy by 40 percent, and per capita nutritional levels by over 20 percent. Child mortality has fallen by half. Developing countries have achieved in 30 years what it took industrialized countries a century to accomplish.<sup>41</sup> Such a result looks like a vindication of G. A. Borgese’s claim in 1948 that *justice* meant an end to colonialism, racism, and economic inequality and that the struggle between the two world systems eventually would result in a mixed system.

The *Apollo 11* photographs of earth from the orbit of the moon in 1969, the Club of Rome’s publication *The Limits to Growth* of 1972, and the Brundtland Commission’s report *Our Common Future* of 1986, which gave us the formulation of “sustainable development” for a rational development goal, may

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<sup>36</sup> C. Wilfred Jenks, *The World beyond the Charter: A Tentative Synthesis of Four Stages of World Organization* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), 15.

<sup>37</sup> Edward McWhinney, *The International Court of Justice and the Western Tradition of International Law* (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1987).

<sup>38</sup> Richard A. Falk, “Contending Approaches to World Order,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 31 (Fall–Winter 1977): 171–98.

<sup>39</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World,” *Pravda*, 17 September 1987.

<sup>40</sup> Joseph P. Baratta, *Human Rights: Improving U.N. Mechanisms for Compliance* (Washington, DC: Center for U.N. Reform Education and U.S. Institute of Peace, 1990).

<sup>41</sup> U.N. Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

be taken as landmarks of the mobilization of political will to *protect the environment*. The U.N. Charter, like a workable constitution, has proved flexible enough to bring the new concern into the conduct of diplomacy and multilateral negotiation. Since the Earth Summit in 1992, *protection of the environment* has unmistakably been put on the international agenda.<sup>42</sup>

The arguments for *political participation* or *democracy* in the U.N. and similar international organizations are exactly like those for widening the franchise in Britain 170 years ago or in the United States 220 years ago. Popular representation would bring *energy* into the U.N. as countless individuals around the world were given standing before the law, contributed to the work of monitoring agreements and aiding development, and undertook the responsibilities and privileges of world citizenship.<sup>43</sup> It is the task of this book to show the links between the world federalism of the past and such global governance in the future.

#### Placement of the Idea

To place the idea of world federal government into the context of other approaches to peace, it may be helpful to use the U.S. Institute of Peace's *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map* (1991). There, some four large approaches are distinguished: traditional diplomacy, international law, conflict resolution, and systemic political approaches, including world federation. The contributor selected to explain the latter misunderstands it as a unitary and tyrannical world state, destructive of cultural diversity,<sup>44</sup> but federation truly is a systemic political approach. We regard the first three as transitional to the fourth, which indeed treats the nation state as a historical form of political organization (since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) and looks forward to the political union of all humanity on the planet.

A second placement would be in the scholarship on peace, yet at time of writing, largely because the historic World Federalists failed to obviate the Cold War and even to rise to leadership in opposition to the Vietnam War, world federalism is usually overlooked. Peter Wallensteen's survey of the literature does not even have an index item for "world government."<sup>45</sup> I have tried to

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<sup>42</sup> Stanley P. Johnson, *The Earth Summit: The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development* (London: Graham & Trotman and M. Nijhoff, 1993); Michael Keating, *The Earth Summit's Agenda for Change: A Plain Language Version of Agenda 21 and the Other Rio Agreements* (Geneva: Centre for Our Common Future, 1993).

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening the International Court of Justice*, Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 10–11 May 1973 (note testimony of Louis B. Sohn); Angus Archer, "Methods of Multilateral Management: Interrelationship of International Organizations and NGOs," in Tobi Trister Gati, ed., *The U.S., the U.N., and the Management of Global Change* (New York: UNA–USA, 1983), 303–26.

<sup>44</sup> Michael N. Nagler, "Ideas of World Order and the Map of Peace," in W. Scott Thompson, ed., *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991), 382–83.

<sup>45</sup> Peter Wallensteen, ed., *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).

rectify such mistakes and omissions in articles for the *World Encyclopedia of Peace* and *Peace and Change*,<sup>46</sup> but the peace field currently does not seem much given over to what Einstein called “sound pacifism” (the prevention of wars through a world order based on power, not through a purely passive attitude toward international problems).<sup>47</sup> Federalist books of late that engage the scholarly community in the field of world politics are now quite rare; two of the best are Wesley Wooley’s *Alternatives to Anarchy* in American history and Ronald Glossop’s *World Federation* in philosophy.<sup>48</sup>

A third way to place federalism is to look at standard texts on international relations, such as that by Joshua Goldstein. There the absence of world government is abundantly shown as the essence of international anarchy, yet when he considers liberal alternatives to realism, federalism gets only brief mention after sections on feminism, postmodernism, and peace studies.<sup>49</sup> The attitude is not unlike that of Hans Morgenthau, who, with Carl J. Friedrich, Frederick Law Schuman, Nicholas Spykman, E. H. Carr, and Brooks Emery, carried realism (politics as the struggle for power, especially military power) from Europe to America. Schuman wrote a serious book on world government, and Spykman at Yale taught Cord Meyer, who became first president of UWF.

Morgenthau wrote in *Politics among Nations* (1948), “Our analysis of the problem of domestic peace has shown that the argument of the advocates of the world state is unanswerable: There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world.”<sup>50</sup> Since the achievement of a world state seemed to him unfathomably in the remote future, he concluded his book with suggestions for an indefinite “wise diplomacy.” But by 1978, Morgenthau was becoming alarmed that in a nuclear age the pursuit of power was tending inexorably to a third world war, and, according to Francis Boyle, admitted to Louis Sohn that he had abandoned “Machiavellian power politics” for the more traditional American diplomacy in which respect for the Law of Nations and international organization was accorded a place alongside economic and military power.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Joseph P. Baratta, “Federalism, World,” *World Encyclopedia of Peace*, ed. Ervin Lazslo and Jong Joul Yoo (Oxford: Pergamon, 1986): 311–21; “The International Federalist Movement: Toward Global Governance,” *Peace and Change*, 24 (July 1999): 275–76, 340–72.

<sup>47</sup> Albert Einstein, response to a conscientious objector, 14 July 1941, in Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden, eds., *Einstein on Peace* (New York: Schocken, 1960), 319.

<sup>48</sup> Wesley T. Wooley, *Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism since World War II* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Ronald J. Glossop, *World Federation? A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993).

<sup>49</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), 77, 88, 103, 111, 140, 287, 292, 314, 340.

<sup>50</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1948), 398–99.

<sup>51</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *The Future of International Law and American Foreign Policy* (Ardsley-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publications, 1989).

George Kennan set the tone for the scholarly consensus that continues to the present day on world federalism. In *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*, the architect of the containment policy roundly condemned the “legalistic–moralistic approach to international problems.” This included Woodrow Wilson’s effort to establish the League of Nations, Secretary of State Kellogg’s Pact for the Renunciation of War, Franklin Roosevelt’s United Nations, and proposals of “World Law and World Government.” Kennan explained:<sup>52</sup>

It is the essence of this belief that, instead of taking the awkward conflicts of national interest and dealing with them on their merits with a view to finding the solutions least unsettling to the stability of international life, it would be better to find some formal criteria of a juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of states could be defined.

But these views did not prevent Kennan from accepting the Grenville Clark Prize in 1981. Somewhat chastened by the militaristic character of the more economic and political containment policy he had recommended a quarter century before, Kennan stated:<sup>53</sup>

To many of us, these ideas [of *World Peace through World Law* for a program of universal disarmament and for a system of world law to replace the chaotic and dangerous institution of unlimited national sovereignty] looked, at the time (1958), impractical, if not naïve. Today, ... the logic of them is more compelling. It is still too early, I fear, for their realization on a universal basis; but efforts to achieve the limitation of sovereignty in favor of a system of international law on a regional basis are another thing; and when men begin to come seriously to grips with this possibility, it is to the carefully thought out and profoundly humane ideas of Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn that they will have to turn for inspiration and guidance.

It would be tedious to cite others in the “realist” tradition who basically argued, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, that any notion of a union with a totalitarian power was profoundly unhelpful and misleading. Louis René Beres captured this attitude well when he argued that federalists neglect the realities of power; they write superficially and with more enthusiasm than use of evidence. “As a result,” he wrote, “large numbers of people have been diverted from a variety of potentially more productive courses to international order.”<sup>54</sup>

Even authors in the world order school, like Richard Falk, tried to argue during the Cold War that “world order” was something different from “world government.” Falk favored a kind of “central governance,” in which a variety of existing international institutions and transnational popular peace movements—not a world government vested with powers to enact and enforce world laws against preparations for war—will restrain national governments

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<sup>52</sup> George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (New York: Mentor, 1951), 93–94.

<sup>53</sup> “Beyond the Shadow of the Atom,” *Boston Globe*, 29 November 1981, p. A15.

<sup>54</sup> Louis René Beres, “Examining the Logic of World Federal Government,” *Publius*, 4 (Summer 1974): 75–87.

from recourse to war.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, his own preferred world, in *A Study of Future Worlds*,<sup>56</sup> was, apart from the novel terminology, indistinguishable from maximal world government devoted to peace and justice, and in recent years appreciation for the ideal of world federal government has begun to creep back into such books as *The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace*.<sup>57</sup>

In short, as the “realist” school of thought gives way to the functionalists, transnationalists, internationalists, and world order theorists and activists, the consensus on world federalism is loosening, if not yet deeply fractured. The theorists of world order, European union, functionalism, and the United Nations have developed a new vocabulary that avoids the historically loaded connotations of federalist terms. These may help to overcome groundless fears during the transition. Some equivalents are:

Subsidiarity	=	Federalism
Competence	=	Sovereignty
Consensus	=	Majority rule
Norms	=	Laws
Cooperation	=	Friendly relations
Common action	=	Binding law
Policies (E.C.)	=	Powers
Integration	=	Economic, social, and political union
Union	=	Government
Legitimacy	=	Lawfulness, consent of the governed
Multilateralism	=	Internationalism
Coalitions	=	Groupings of states outside the U.N.
Political will	=	Unanimity of will of great powers
Preventive diplomacy	=	Effective international organization
Peace making	=	Pacific settlement of disputes
Peacekeeping	=	International police operations
Enforcement	=	Use of international armed force
Collective security	=	Threat or use of international force
Implementation of decisions	=	Coercion of governments
Human rights	=	Justice
Regime	=	Rule of law
Mandate	=	Grant of powers
Central governance	=	World government

The Bahá'í faith, which developed in Iran after 1844, is the only religion that teaches as a point of doctrine that world peace can practically be achieved by a political union or federal world government. Such a government will abolish war by the familiar instrument of the rule of law, which Bahá'ís call the Lesser

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<sup>55</sup> Richard A. Falk, “Contending Approaches to World Order,” *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), 31 (Fall–Winter 1977): 171–98.

<sup>56</sup> Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press for the World Order Models Project, 1975).

<sup>57</sup> Richard A. Falk, Robert C. Johansen, and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace* (New York: SUNY Press for the World Order Models Project, 1993).



Peace. But world federation will provide the minimal political, economic, and social order for the full realization of the potentialities of every human being,<sup>58</sup> that is, for the perfection of religion, which they call the Most Great Peace.

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<sup>58</sup> J. Tyson, *World Peace and World Government: From Vision to Reality* (Oxford: Ronald, 1986).

This is a book about the Lesser Peace. When the oneness of humanity is established on a working basis, then the great work of education, science, democratic politics, industry, business enterprise, sport, art, and religion will begin to succeed.

The achievement of the rule of world law will largely depend on new, enlightened national leadership and on massive public opinion ready to undertake the responsibilities no less than to enjoy the benefits of world citizenship. Jean Monnet used to say that, for the hard work of uniting sovereignties, people will act only when faced by a crisis. Thomas Jefferson said much the same when he wrote, "All experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than they are to right themselves by changing the forms to which they are accustomed."

The world now is faced by a massive crisis, symbolized by the threat of nuclear war, economic depression, ecological collapse, new pandemics, terrorism from the global South, and all the problems of the global *problématique*. At the moment it is only a crisis of the mind. Until there is another disaster on the scale of World War II, demonstrating the failure of the old ways of internationalism, we probably cannot expect revolutionary action. Small changes must continue to suffice. "We are trying to hoist a sail," wrote G. A. Borgese in 1947. "It greets the good wind." The wind in the 1940s amounted to only scattered gusts. By 2002, the atmosphere lay becalmed, certain to stir into storms again, as happened by September 11, 2001. We hope this book will offer the pilots of the future some charts to steer by. World federation offers a positive vision of peace. Its history exhibits a new kind of world political wisdom.